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This thesis presents a critical assessment of the relation between signification and 
political economy in the work of Jean Baudrillard. It argues that Baudrillard’s work 
should be read as an important but flawed contribution to critical theory rather than 
as an exemplar of a postmodern semiotic nihilism. Expositions of Baudrillard’s 
position in relation to political economy and the development of his thought are 
contrasted with other, Marxist inspired accounts of political economy and 
signification. Baudrillard’s account of commodity capitalism is shown to be an 
attempt to develop a radical political position within the camp of the left, which, 
however, rejects the fundamental tenets of Marxism. In putting forward this 
critique of commodity capitalism, Baudrillard argues that the structure of the sign is 
essential to the commodity form and the thesis considers the merits and limitations 
of his notion of ‘symbolic exchange’ which he puts forward as an alternative to 
commodity production and exchange for profit accumulation. While it is recognised 
that Baudrillard’s critique of capitalism is in some ways trenchant, it is argued that it 
cannot support and direct radical political action. The thesis then focusses on 
Baudrillard’s attempt to construct an alternative account of the development of 
capitalism as three distinct ‘orders of simulacra’ or regimes of signification. 
Baudrillard’s genealogy, and his notion of postmodern capitalism as being the latest 
order of simulacra, is then contrasted with David Harvey’s Marxist aetiology of 
contemporary capitalism. The thesis discusses Baudrillard’s contention, based on 
his particular account of capitalism as a social and cultural formation, that 
capitalism has shifted from being based on the production of commodities to being 
based on the reproduction and circulation of signs. This discussion is illustrated by 
referring to concrete examples of simulation derived from conservation and the 
heritage industry. The thesis argues that Baudrillard’s main theoretical strength is 
his avoidance of reductionism but that he effectively replaces economonistic 
reductionism with a ‘semiotic’ reductionism. This critique of Baudrillard’s genealogy 
of simulacra forms the basis of a ‘case study’ of Baudrillard’s writings on fashion. 
Ranging from Baudrillard’s early neo-Marxist to his later work, the discussion of 
fashion demonstrates that, for Baudrillard, fashion is a privileged locus within 
capitalism, an exemplar of the relation between commodity exchange and 
signification. Baudrillard’s mature conception of fashion as a pure combinatory of 
signs without referent to an anterior reality is then contrasted with the Marxist 
influenced work of Dick Hebdige and Angela McRobbie’s writings on fashion and 
identity. It is argued that Baudrillard’s depiction, although powerful, results in a 
dismissal of human agency which effectively places him in a quietist political 
position. It is also argued that Baudrillard’s overly totalising later work on fashion 
should be read as that of reductionist structuralist rather than that of a postmodern 
nihilist. In concluding, the thesis argues that Baudrillard is a critical thinker who is 
worthy of serious consideration. It will contended that Baudrillard’s work should not 
be read as a fundamental challenge to Marxism but as an adjunct to its critical 
project, and that Baudrillard’s critique of political economy and orthodox Marxism 
can be absorbed into the Marxist tradition as a corrective to economistic 
reductionism. It is suggested that this is an opportunity to demonstrate how 
signification is, in fact, essential to capitalist exchange and profit accumulation. 
Finally, the thesis suggests that Baudrillard’s critique offers Marxism an opportunity 
to develop its critical categories by accepting that forms and modes of signification 





My objectives in researching and writing this thesis are primarily to present a critical 
exposition of Baudrillard’s work on signification and political economy and contrast 
it with Marxist work in the same and related areas. From this, the thesis then aims 
to develop an essentially Marxist critique of Baudrillard’s writings that does not 
simply reject his work out of hand and which concludes by arguing that Baudrillard’s 
work offers new theoretical possibilities to the Marxist critical project.
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Introduction: Jean Baudrillard - Enfant Terrible and Eminence Grise
Jean Baudrillard is a stocky man of something under medium height. He was born 
in the Ardennes, Champagne region of France in 1929. Baudrillard’s parents were 
civil servants from a peasant family, and Baudrillard was the first member of his 
family to go to university. He likes to wear brown and smokes roll-ups. His hobbies 
include photography and going to the movies. He has a passion for Alfa Romeo 
cars and concerns about his increasing girth. Transcriptions of interviews suggest 
an approachable and affable man who is generous with his time and the Beaujolais 
noveau. Baudrillard, unlike the late Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, does not 
insist on the right to edit interviews, and the Baudrillard of interviews and seminars 
is often diffident and tentative in putting forward his views. Baudrillard the writer, 
however, is an iconoclast, a provocateur, a maverick. He is perhaps the most 
notoriously uncompromising of all postmodern theorists. Baudrillard at seventy is 
still an enfant terrible as well as an eminence grise of postmodern or ‘post-Marxist’ 
communication and cultural theory.
Baudrillard has lived and worked during a period in which France moved 
decisively from being a largely agrarian economy to becoming a leading 
industrial/commercial economic power. Baudrillard’s location within the political 
context of the post war ‘modernisation’ of France, however, is often overlooked by 
his English and American readers, and should not be forgotten. Like a number of 
other young intellectuals, Baudrillard was radicalised by his opposition to France’s 
brutal attempts to repress Algeria’s anti-colonial rebellion. However, the collapse of 
France’s colonial empire and the failure of the Fourth Republic took place against 
the back ground of increasing economic success. In A History o f Modern France,
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Alfred Cobban describes this success by referring to the impact of the economic 
strategy drawn up and implemented by the Commissariat du Plan:
“From 1947 to 1951 the equivalent of some £2,300 million was invested in 
railways, electrical power plants, coal, shipping, petroleum refineries, and 
various lesser industries. Hydro-electric plants, which in 1919 had produced 
only fifteen, in 1951 produced forty milliards of kilowatts. Coal and steel 
recovered the level of 1929. The number of tractors on the land was 
multiplied by five over the pre-war figure. In 1939 sixty percent of French 
imports had been paid for by exports: the comparable figure for 1951 was 
eighty per cent. By 1954 the productivity of fifteen of the twenty main 
industries had passed that of the boom year of 1929.” [Cobban 1965, pg 219] 
In the context of this powerful economic recovery, Baudrillard’s early development 
as a theorist could be characterised as being informed by the tensions between 
post war economic prosperity and its discontents and the decline of the Communist 
Party as a new radical left agenda began to take shape. A political agenda which 
emerged as young intellectuals reacted to what they felt to be a situation in which 
economic renewal was not leading to changes in an authoritarian and restrictive 
social order. As a result, a gauchiste political and cultural avant-garde pitted itself 
against what it saw an the inadequate orthodoxies of the French Communist and 
Socialist parties as much as the technocratic capitalism fostered by the centre-right 
in a conflict which came to a head in the Parisian street battles of May 1968.
This tradition of oppositional cultural politics, running from the Dadaists and the 
Surrealist movement through to the Situationists and gauchiste groupscules and 
such ‘post-structuralists’ writer/activists as Michael Foucault and Felix Guattari, has 
been an important factor in the course of twentieth century French political history,
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and it is within this tradition that we must locate Jean Baudrillard. In the collection of 
interviews “Baudrillard Live” he describes his career as moving from Marxism, via 
situationism to what he calls a 'metaleptic'1 position. Baudrillard has increasingly 
taken on an oppositional role: he has been, and remains, anti-capitalist; he has 
conducted long polemics against orthodox Marxism, semiotics and psychoanalysis; 
and he dared to attack Michael Foucault in Forget Foucault just at the time Foucault 
was consolidating his pre-eminent position within the French intelligentsia.
Baudrillard has never tired of being an ‘outsider’, someone who operates from 
marginal positions. This outsider/’trickster’ role has meant that he has embroiled 
himself in controversy, including his attacks on the established French left and on 
French feminist theory, which have been detrimental and remain detrimental to his 
standing. However, despite stubbornly attempting to remain outside of academia 
and to remain a subversive figure, Baudrillard is increasingly becoming an 
eminence grise, he is recognised as an important figure, perhaps the most 
important figure, in debates about the nature of ‘postmodern’ culture and 
communications: Jean Baudrillard is now very much an institution, a major feature 
that must be negotiated for those who are attempting to explore critically the terrain 
of postmodern capitalism.
Baudrillard’s his reputation among his anglophone readers is now such that his 
positions are sometimes conflated with postmodern theory perse  in British and 
American work on postmodernism and postmodernity. For Neville Wakefield, 
Baudrillard's work is the conceptual epicentre of postmodernism. Wakefield
1 This word is used to suggest a position based on the endless substitution of one thing for 
another, a process which for Baudrillard one sign is displaced by another which is then displaced 
by another, etc. - the Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines ‘metaleptic’ as “a figure mentioned by 
Quintilian consisting in the metonymical substitution of one word for another which is itself 
figurative”. This definition, as we will see, neatly summarises Baudrillard’s ontological anti­
realism and preoccupation with the combination and circulation of signs (simulacra).
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presents Baudrillard's work as the (postmodern) negation of Marxism, 
psychoanalysis, semiotics, ethnology, and sociology. In contrast to my 
understanding of Baudrillard as a left theorist trying to develop an alternative to 
Marxist critiques of capitalism, Wakefield reads Baudrillard’s work, particularly 
Simulations, as a discourse informed by, and informing, a nihilism even more 
virulent than that of Nietszche's. In Baudrillard's world, or at least in Wakefield’s 
version of it, the social itself has imploded into itself, collapsing into an 
undifferentiated, aleatory circulation of signs in a process that annuls the possibility 
of real historical change. It will be seen that such a position effectively undermines 
any theoretical basis for radical political intervention as well as - if this position is an 
accurate index of contemporary society - any basis for a revolutionary or even 
reformist leftist politics. Worse than this, the sheer proliferation of signs and 
images, the ungrounded procession of simulacra results in an asemic parody of a 
iebenswelt from which all trace of reality, the final referent of all critical discourse, 
has been banished.
The sign and the ‘real’ of the social, which Wakefield/Baudrillard treat as the 
most precious of our ontological assumptions asphyxiate in the (simulated) non­
atmosphere of Baudrillardian 'hyperreality". Wakefield’s Baudrillard threatens our 
orders of meaning: he targets established cultural and social analysis as well as 
assumptions about the role of communications and the media in contemporary 
Western society. Whereas Baudrillard's rival, Michel Foucault, carried out a project 
of methodological renewal for the human sciences and related disciplines, 
Baudrillard's work, according to Wakefield, sets out to demolish them and then play 
among their ruins. Wakefield describes Baudrillard as a "cuckoo in the nest"
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threatening:
"not only to deprive the habitants of sustenance but in the process to destroy 
the nest itself. Metaphors of exorcism and cathexis become ever more 
import to [Baudrillard's] work as the guru role that was both self-appointed 
and adopted - as the "evil demon of the image", the ideological Jacques 
Cousteau of the New York Intelligentsia", "a prophet of the apocalypse" - 
increasingly cast him as a sort of Kurtz to be confronted at the end of the 
river of withering signifiers." [Wakefield 1990, pg2]
For Wakefield, Baudrillard is analogous to Conrad's Kurtz, a sort of postmodern 
Tiresias figure who has examined our constructions of meaning, our dialectics, our 
overviews, and found them wanting. Baudrillard's work deals with the end of an 
order of meaning, an order that was based on the assumption that signs are 
securely attached - whether by convention or ontology - to their referents, and that 
these signs can be exchanged for the real in much the same way as money is 
exchanged for commodities. In semiotics, the sign, comprising the signifier (SR) or 
material form of a sign and its mental content or concept, the signified (SD), 
guarantee access to the real, to a referent standing "behind" the sign. The sign, a 
convention governed artificial entity, exists as that which substitutes for something, 
as that construct which gives access to an anterior natural reality.
These premises, for Wakefield, still inform semiotics and the Marxist and 
psychoanalytical structuralist methodologies developed amongst others by Louis 
Althusser, Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes and the early Baudrillard. The basic 
premise of these approaches is that signs - by whatever means - are ideological 
precisely because they are taken as giving unproblematic access to an ontologically 
anterior, 'real', naturally occurring order of meaning or doxa. The fundamental
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critique of ideology put forward by these writers is that this signs constitute a false 
conception of the individual's relation to an order of meaning which appears to be 
natural, and to which we have an unmediated access through signs which are 
umbically connected to this reality. Against this doxalogical approach, these writers 
argue that signs are artificial constructs: they are the products of the conventions 
that govern their formal nature and their function. Signs cannot function as signs 
without being ‘artificial’, without being a construct that 'stands in place o f some 
other entity. Theorists such as Barthes, following the premises of Ferdinand des 
Saussure’s structural linguistics, heavily foreground the radical artificiality of signs, 
regarding them as constructs governed by convention rather than any relation to a 
pre-given reality. Their work suggests that signs are ontologically troubling: they 
are entities with their own material reality (signifiers), which informs the production 
and circulation of social meaning, but that they also exist as substitutes for 
something else (referents). The presence of a sign is always in some respect the 
absence or displacement of its referent. However, because a sign's existence as a 
sign is predicated on some other, not present entity, it is fair to say that signs are 
ontologically incomplete - and while, as Barthes and Lacan have repeatedly 
stressed, they to some extent ‘construct’ meaning, they depend ultimately for their 
existence on object that are beyond them and that cannot be ontologically reduced 
to a mere effect of signification. In a sense, signs are 'completed' in the real; their 
referents guarantee or underwrite their meaning (signifieds), just as a state's gold 
reserves once underwrote its national currency.
Baudrillard, or at least the Baudrillard Wakefield alludes to as the "evil demon 
of the image", begins from the assumption that signs no longer refer to any ‘real’ 
referent. In this he breaks with the semiotic tradition which regarded signs as
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convention governed constructs, but constructs that ultimately relate to an anterior 
reality. Baudrillard regards signs as ‘floating’: a condition in which signs are no 
longer ontologically connected to referents that were once the ultimate source of 
their meanings. Signs proliferate: increasingly sophisticated elctronic media 
reproduce a plenitude of signifiers that are not related to referents. Television, 
cinema, radio, multi-media home computers, magazines, newspapers, advertising 
images, all serve as the channels, the terminals for hooking us up to what 
Baudrillard sees as a free-floating, groundless "procession of simulacra". The sign, 
for Baudrillard of Symbolic Exchange and Death and Simulations, is no longer an 
entity that is dependent on a referent, it is no longer ontologically incomplete - it has 
become a simulation, a copy without original, which circulates in the postmodern 
condition of ‘hyperreality’. In Wakefield’s reading of Baudrillard’s theory of 
signification, a sort of anti-semiotics, the sign within postmodern capitalism is a 
simulacra that is no longer dependent on its referent, it no longer stands in the 
place of another object: the sign is complete in itself as a pure simulation which has 
no relation to any ‘real’ referent. Paradoxically, this ‘completion’ of the sign is an 
ontological loss, the loss of the real: it is the point at which the sing no longer has, 
or needs, any contact with an objective ‘real’ world anterior to signification.
Wakefield is, I believe, accurate in his depiction of the later Baudrillard’s 
rejection of established semiotics, but he uses it to support a skewed reading of 
Baudrillard’s work from the mid 1970s to early 1980s. Wakefield does not take 
account of the way in which Baudrillard’s thought has evolved nor does it address 
the publishing history of Baudrillard’s works in English. He homes in too closely on 
Baudrillard the nihilistic controversialist, the oppositional figure, and does not take 
account of way in which Baudrillard career has its genesis in an attempt to produce
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a structuralist, neo-Marxist semiotics capable of analysing the role of consumption 
as a creator of identity and meaning. Wakefield’s Baudrillard has not evolved, not 
changed positions, not developed his thought. This means that Wakefield’s view of 
Baudrillard is not informed by any critical reflection on the order of publication of 
Baudrillard's work in English. English readers of Baudrillard, it must be stressed, 
have not seen his work appear in its original order of publication, and this has 
meant that his English speaking readership have read the early Baudrillard through 
the filter of the later Baudrillard rather being able to follow the process of his 
development as a theorist. Later texts by Baudrillard such as Symbolic Exchange 
and Death (1976), Forget Foucault (1975), Simulations (1981) and The Ecstasy of 
Communications (1987) have all been published in English before the early texts 
The Object System (1968), The Consumer Society (1970) and The Mirror of 
Production (1972)2 - a book which has only been published in English by a small 
American publishing house. This situation reflects the impact of works such as 
Symbolic Exchange and Death and Simulations on Baudrillard’s anglophone 
readers, but it neglects the importance of the neo-Marxist phase of Baudrillard’s 
career. While Baudrillard at the time of writing The System o f Objects and The 
Consumer Society was a relatively obscure figure, another French theorist who was 
trying to bring about a theoretically viable synthesis of Marxism, semiotics and 
psychoanalysis, it is becoming evident that his early work forms a valuable 
contribution to the Marxist tradition. Baudrillard did not start to abandon an 
essentially Marxist theoretical perspective until The Mirror o f Production which was 
published in 1972. On reading this book, it becomes apparent just how far 
Baudrillard had moved from the Barthes influenced semiotic case studies of The 
System of Objects towards a position which led to his sustained critical attack on
2 All the dates given above refer to the year in which the French versions of these texts were
published. However, it should be noted that for quotations the year of publication given is that of
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Marxism, but still from within the camp of the left.
The issue of Baudrillard’s publishing history and bibliography in English is one 
which is worthy of further investigation. It would have been far harder for Neville 
Wakefield to characterise Baudrillard as the quintessential postmodern nihilist, and 
by extension to reduce the complex matrix of positions and practices that constitute 
postmodernism to a nihilism, if Baudrillard’s Marxist origins had been better known. 
Wakefield’s Baudrillard is a pure event, something with no history, no determinants. 
The ‘real’ Jean Baudrillard is actually situated in a given historical conjuncture, his 
work attempts to ‘read’ that conjuncture, to make sense of it, to analyse it. 
Baudrillard’s work, while definitely having an iconoclastic thrust, are not simply 
postmodern exercises in the demolition of the categories of critical theory, they are 
a challenge, a call to produce new formulations of the role of communications and 
culture in late or postmodern capitalist society. Baudrillard’s work is a contribution 
to critical theory, an attempt to analyse the role of communications within our 
society and how communications relate to the social, cultural and economic 
functioning of contemporary society.
It is as a critical theorist rather than as a nihilist enfant terrible that Jean 
Baudrillard’s work should be read. Reading Baudrillard in such a fashion is 
intended as a corrective to the focus on Baudrillard as nihilist which permeates the 
Wakefield’s account of Baudrillard’s theorising, and which can also be encountered 
in Douglas Kellner’s Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and 
Beyond. This book offers a synoptic account of Baudrillard’s work from 1968 to the 
late 19980s, and although it is very comprehensive, it presents Baudrillard as an
the English version of the text in question.
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essentially right-wing aristocratic nihilist, yet another ex-leftist denouncing his 
former beliefs. Although Baudrillard’s attacks on orthodox Marxism are well known, 
his political position, it must be stressed, is one which is on the left. Buadrillard is 
scathing about capitalism, and characterises it as that which is responsible for the 
displacement of the real by a combinatory of signs that have no anterior referent. 
Capital is the villain of Baudrillard’s writings, and his criticisms of ‘left’ political 
positions have reflected his view that they underestimate the power and ferocity of 
capitalism. Having said that, it will be argued later in this thesis that Baudrillard’s 
conception of capitalism as a vast combinatory of simulacra is one that, in his 
hands at least, precludes any possibility of challenging the dominance of capital.
The basic argument of this thesis is that Baudrillard’s work contains a 
trenchant critique of commodity capitalism that cannot be dismissed out of hand. It 
will suggest, however, that while Baudrillard’s critique of postmodern capitalist 
society is suggestive and in some ways a useful corrective to economistic versions 
of Marxism, it actually reaches an aporia by presenting a capitalism which cannot 
be politically challenged. Baudrillard’s work will be therefore considered as an 
important - although flawed - critique of capitalism. The first chapter of this thesis 
will first examine Baudrillard’s attempt to ‘liberate’ radical theory from what he 
regards as a conceptual complicity with capitalism as articulated by the discourse of 
political economy. It will look at how Baudrillard began to develop a critique of the 
tenets of political economy, and the relation of signification to political economy, 
that rejected the economism that he regarded as pervading much of orthodox 
Marxism. In order to define Baudrillard’s later theoretical position as clearly as 
possible, this chapter will examine the Marxist critique of orthodox political economy 
as a prelude to an account of Baudrillard’s own account of commodity capitalism
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which is based on arguing that the use value and economic exchange value of 
commodities are analogous to their cultural sign value and their sign exchange 
value.
Baudrillard, it will be contended, regards signification as fundamental to the 
constitution of the commodity form. The chapter will show how Baudrillard 
developed a thoroughgoing critique of the notion of use value, which he regards as 
being analogous to the ‘signified’ in semiotic theory in that they are both regarded 
as the ‘real’ or ontologically privileged aspect of the commodity or sign. I then look 
in some detail at Baudrillard’s attempt to transcend what he took to be the 
ontological essentialism of Marxism in favour of an anti-realist - but still materialist - 
ontology of the commodity which regards the “structure of the sign” as being “at 
the very heart of the commodity form” [Ed. Poster 1988, pg 79] while 
suggesting that Baudrillard fatally confers ontological realism with essentialism. I 
shall also argue that Baudrillard’s account of the commodity as a medium or system 
of communication is an important addition to critical theory and a useful corrective 
to wholly economistic interpretations of the commodity and its fundamental 
importance to capitalist exchange.
The next chapter will focus more on Baudrillard’s split with Marxism and his 
development of an alternative account of capitalism which is based on what could 
called ‘modes of signification’ rather than modes and social relations of production. 
Baudrillard’s account of the development of capitalism as three distinct orders of 
simulacra will be set in context by contrasting it with David Harvey’s Marxist 
account of the development of a postmodern capitalism which is heavily dependent 
on deploying signs to promote commodity circulation and capital accumulation. I
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then suggest that Harvey’s aetiology of postmodern capitalism will then be shown to 
underestimate the importance of signification in contemporary capitalist societies 
while presenting economic processes and the ‘natural’ categories of time and space 
as forming the privileged ground of the social. This approach, it will be argued, is 
based on a Kantian ontological schema that conflates cultural and ‘natural’ 
categories in a ‘realist’ attempt to provide a grounding for human experience. In 
contrast, Baudrillard’s concept of postmodern capitalism as the latest of three order 
of simulacra, three discrete orders of signification, will be detailed as an alternative 
to the orthodox Marxist conception of capitalism as being economically derived. 
Attention will be paid to Baudrillard’s contention that capitalism has shifted from 
being based on the production of commodities to the reproduction of commodities 
as sign-objects, the reproduction of simulacra or signs with no anterior referent but 
the model or code that governs their reproduction. In the course of this discussion, 
concrete examples of simulation derived from conservation and the heritage 
industry will be considered. The chapter will argue that Baudrillard’s main strength 
is his avoidance of economism but that he effectively marginalises the economic to 
the extent that his analysis effectively displaces economistic reductionism with a 
‘semiotic’ reductionism. Baudrillard’s theory of simulacra will therTevaluated against 
a Marxist conception of the role and limited autonomy of signification and its impact 
on commodity exchange in contemporary capitalism, which acknowledges the 
limitations of essentialism while avoiding Baudrillard’s theoretical tendency towards 
an unchecked valorisation of the sign.
The critique of Baudrillard’s conception of the successive orders of capitalism 
outlined in Chapter Two will form the basis for Chapter Three’s case study of 
Baudrillard’s work on fashion from his early neo-Marxist writings to the ‘postmodern’
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theorising of works such as Symbolic Exchange and Death and Simulations. The 
chapter will start by outlining Baudrillard’s approach to fashion by considering how 
his particular form of materialism informs the discussions of fashion that appear 
throughout his work. Although Baudrillard’s theoretical approach to fashion in The 
System of Objects has changed considerably by the time The Consumer Society 
was published, these neo-Marxist texts analyse fashion primarily in terms of 
signification. These analytical approaches to fashion will be discussed at length and 
applied to examples from car manufacture and marketing to show how the car in 
1950s America became, and remains, a sign-form and how as such it has entered 
the arena of fashion - which for Baudrillard is a privileged locus of commodity/sign 
exchange. A critical discussion of Baudrillard’s genealogy of simulacra as applied to 
will then act as an introduction to a critical exposition of Baudrillard’s mature 
theorising on fashion. It will be argued that the analysis of fashion in Symbolic 
Exchange and Death - an analysis which can be considered the apogee of 
Baudrillard’s work on this subject - is based on an amalgamation of the differing 
theoretical perspectives on fashion that feature in Baudrillard’s early neo-Marxist 
writings. It will be suggested that the fusion of the two conceptions of fashion is the 
basis for Baudrillard’s later analysis of fashion as an aleatory combinatory of 
simulacra, a semiurgy that no longer relates to economic practices or any other 
form of ‘real’ anterior referent.
Following this, the chapter will contrast Baudrillard’s approach with Dick 
Hebdige’s Marxist influenced approach to analysing fashion as a significatory 
practice, and suggest that Hebdige’s account is superior to Baudrillard’s in that it 
presents fashion as a (potential) arena for contestation, a locus for cultural politics - 
an advantage that is shared by Angela McRobbie’s writings on fashion and youth
17
identity. The chapter will then evaluate Baudrillard’s theorising about fashion, 
arguing that its anti-humanism has resulted in a dismissal of human agency which 
further locks Baudrillard into a politically quietist position. Finally, the chapter will 
then argue that Baudrillard’s later work on fashion allows him to re-evaluated as a 
reductionist structuralist as opposed to a postmodern nihilist, that the criticisms that 
he launched against the totalising logic of Michel Foucault’s concept of power can 
also be applied to Baudrillard’s notions of life within an all encompassing 
combinatory of simulacra.
However, despite the criticisms of Baudrillard’s work put forward in this 
chapter, the conclusion of this thesis will return to its central argument that 
Baudrillard is a critical thinker who is worthy of serious and sustained consideration. 
I shall suggest that by reading Baudrillard’s work against its fundamental tenets can 
be useful to developing an essentially Marxist conception of postmodern capitalism. 
Baudrillard, it will be argued, must be read as not a fundamental challenge to 
Marxism, but, as Susan Willis reads him, as an adjunct to Marxism’s critical project. 
The conclusion will argue that Baudrillard’s critique of political economy and 
orthodox Marxism can be co-opted into the Marxist tradition as a corrective to 
economistic reductionism. It will be presented as providing a opportunity to 
demonstrate not the ‘relative autonomy’ of signification but the fact that signification 
is essential to capitalist exchange and profit accumulation and that it more accurate 
to talk of a ‘semio-economic’ base for the social and cultural infra-structure than a 
purely economic base. This Baudrillard inspired critique of Marxist economism 
suggests that there is potential for Marxism to develop its critical categories by 
accepting that modes and forms of signification are as fundamental to the 
continuing production of human societies as any and all economic practices.
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This thesis will attempt to be as even handed as is possible, Baudrillard’s 
criticisms of political economy and Marxist positions will be presented as robustly as 
the critique of Baudrillard’s work that is contained in this thesis, which is an attempt 
to look at Baudrillard as a critical thinker, an idiosyncratic presence within 
contemporary leftist theory. This approach is deliberate - after a career which has 
spanned some forty years, it is time that the fervour that has marked the reception 
of Baudrillard’s work in America and England should begin to give way to attempts 
to assess the value, flaws and potential for further development of Baudrillard’s 
extraordainary body of work.
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Chapter 1: Baudrillard, Marxism and Political Economy
This chapter will closely examine Baudrillard's radical critique of political economy, 
a critique that denies that orthodox Marxism presents a position outside the formal 
logic of meaning of liberal bourgeoisie political economy, and insists that Marxism 
fundamentally accepts the theoretical horizons of capitalist economics. In doing so, 
this chapter will give a definition of political economy, describe the Marxist critique 
of political economy, and then show how Baudrillard criticises this approach to 
political economy. The chapter will consider whether Baudrillard provides an 
important new approach to understand the formal co-incidence of commodity 
exchange and signification in advanced capitalist society, and also discuss the 
important limitations of his theoretical work in providing the grounds for establishing 
a new radical, anti-capitalist praxis. As importantly, it will also examine 
Baudrillard's contention that Marxism as a social theory has neglected the crucial 
importance of signification in critically understanding the current nature of political 
economy. It will be argued here that Baudrillard's early contribution to the critique 
of orthodox political economy should be read as an important but ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt to transcend the horizons of orthodox Marxism in an attempt 
to establish a new basis for the criticism of capitalist society and its discontents.
This discussion will be followed by an assessment of whether Baudrillard has 
actually created an effective alternative to Marxist interpretations of political 
economy, one which offers a better approach to understanding the relations 
between social and economic exchange systems and the creation of meaning in 
contemporary society than those put forward by theorists working within the Marxist 
tradition. This chapter will close by indicating how Baudrillard’s writings on political 
economy provide the framework within which he developed the key theoretical
20
concepts that inform his controversial account of the production and reproduction of 
meaning through signification within the contemporary social order and its 
predecessors.
The category of ‘political economy’ remains fundamental to both Marxist and 
liberal bourgeois attempts to understand the nature of modern society and the 
development of the capitalist economic order. In Global Formation: Structures of 
the World-Economy, Christopher Chase-Dunn offers a concise definition of political 
economy:
"Economics and politics are not really separate phenomena despite the 
needs of academic disciplines to maintain their boundaries. Political 
economy is the study of the interaction and interdependence between 
economic and political activities. We cannot understand any social system 
without knowing how both power and production are organised. [Chase-Dunn 
1989, pg 113]
Political economy is therefore concerned with the relations between the modes of 
production and exchange and the political organisation of society. The very phrase 
'political economy' implicitly acknowledges that it is the study of how the process of 
ensuring the means of subsistence (economic activity) is regulated and ordered in 
human society. It acknowledges that, as Chase-Dunn states, the political and the 
economic form a couplet, and that their separation is merely an analytical 
convenience,. The way in which any regime of material production guarantees 
subsistence, either through exchange or through direct production of the means of 
subsistence, is a major arena in which power in exercised in any given social order. 
In capitalist society political power regulates the relations between worker and 
capitalist, producer and consumer to the extent that to talk about economic matters
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is always to talk about power relations and vice versa.
Political power and economic 'development' enjoy, as Chase-Dunn suggests, a 
reciprocal relationship in which developments in the economic realm affect the 
relations of struggle which comprise the political arena. The development of a 
capitalist economy in Western Europe and North America was certainly informed by 
the shift of power away from an entrenched nobility towards the mercantile 
bourgeoisie. However, this shift of political power, culminating in the liberal 
bourgeoisie revolutions of 1848, was made possible by the development of new 
technics and social relations of production, which generated a decisive movement 
away from land as the privileged form of capital and source of social status and 
power. The economic and political always walk hand in hand through history; the 
economic is always mediated through the social, and the social is always informed 
by the nature of the prevailing economic system. However, the two terms in the 
couplet are not of equal value, and although there is a reciprocity between the 
economic and the social, the economic is the privileged term in the couplet of 
'political economy'. This privileging of the economic reflects the deep-seated 
conviction amongst orthodox political economists and their orthodox Marxist critics 
that the ultimate dynamic in shaping human society is the economic order, which is 
regarded as the essential term, the ontological ground and catalyst of change and 
development, the very engine of historical and social development. However, 
although political economy explicitly links the economic and social as indivisible in 
actuality, orthodox political economists accept the capitalist economic order as a 
given, as being a horizon beyond which political economy would not, and could not, 
pass. It is for this reason that in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
Frederick Engels described political economy as being " the theoretical analysis
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of modern bourgeois society" [Marx 1976, pg 46], For Marx and Engels, and for 
Baudrillard, political economy was, and is, an analysis of capitalist bourgeois 
society that is also an ideological justification for that society. Political economy 
provided not a means for accounting for the development of industrial capitalism, 
but it also implicitly provided a justification, a legitimisation, for a society 
increasingly dominated by the capitalist mode of production and exchange.
For Marx, Engels and other critics of orthodox political economy writing from 
within the Marxist tradition, one of the main charges against political economy is its 
insistence on founding all economic and social/political orders on the notion of an 
individual subject which is always already ontologically anterior to any given social 
order. The hero of the discourse of orthodox political economy is a rational human 
subject endowed with needs which can only be met through the rationally 
calculated appropriation and consumption of certain objects. Orthodox political 
economy contends that the rational, autonomous subject can only produce and 
consume within the confines of existing social conditions, while insisting that these 
conditions are the result of a myriad of individual subjects coming together in order 
to ensure that they have the capacity to produce enough to meet their rationally 
identified needs. For orthodox political economy, society is merely an aggregate of 
individuals, it has no dynamic of its own, and as such it is ultimately a reflection, 
and magnification, of the qualities of the individual human subject. The 19th century 
French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is attacked in Marx's The Poverty of 
Philosophy for being essentially an apologist for an individualist conception of 
political economy. Proudhon's view of political economy fully replicates the 
individualist ideology that Marx regarded as permeating the work of orthodox 
political economists in the tradition of Adam Smith:
23
"Since a very large number of the things I need occur in nature only in 
moderate quantities, or even not at all, I am forced to assist in the production 
of what I lack. And as I cannot set my hand to so many things I shall propose 
to other men [sic], my collaborators in various functions, to cede to me a part 
of their products in exchange for mine." [Marx 1978, pg 25]
Proudhon's political economy is based on arrangements negotiated by essentially 
free subjects who come together to exchange their products in order to acquire 
goods that they cannot themselves find or produce. It will be seen that this view of 
society is one regulated by some sort of implicit contract between productive beings 
that make rational assessments of how to acquire the means of subsistence by 
forming productive alliances which benefit all parties. No shades of exploitation, no 
shadow of the acquisition of surplus value, no traces of class inequality, mar this 
liberal idyll in which the rationally apprehended and rationally fulfilled needs of each 
and all provide the economic basis of the social fabric. For Proudhon, ‘man’ is the 
essential category of political economy, and ‘man’ is understood a human subject 
rationally seeking to fulfil ‘his’ needs. The given, autonomous human subject, 
endowed with reason and free-will, is the starting point of orthodox political 
economy, which regards society as being merely an aggregate of individual 
subjects whose essential nature is something that in some fashion determines the 
nature of society, rather than as something which is determined by a particular 
social and cultural order.
The Marxist critique of political economy is centred on a challenge to the idea 
that the ‘free’ human subject is, through ‘his’ association with ‘his’ fellows, the 
ultimate source of the social order. In the Introduction to a Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy, Marx brusquely dismisses the notion of the
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productive individual as the starting point of economic analysis by insisting that “the 
individual and isolated hunter or fisherman, with whom Smith and Ricardo 
begin, is one of the unimaginative fantasies of eighteenth century romances a 
la Robinson Crusoe” [Marx 1976, pg 8]. Marx then goes on to insist that the 
individual is not in any way anterior to society, and that the notion of a productive, 
consuming individual makes no sense outside of the social contexts, the power 
relations, that determine the way in which individuals produce and consume:
“Man [sic] is a zoon politikon in the most literal sense, not only a social 
animal, but an animal that can be individuated only within society.
Production by an isolated individual outside society - a rare event, which may 
well occur when a civilized person who already possesses the force of 
society within himself dynamically is accidentally cast into the wilderness - is 
just as preposterous as the development of language without individuals 
living together and talking to one another. [Marx 1976, pg 10]
The starting point of the Marxist critique of political economy, then, is its attack on 
the notion of the subject as being that which informs the nature of society, a notion 
which is counterpoised to idea that the social is that which ultimately informs the 
nature of the subject. The Marxist critique of political economy is predicated on its 
refusal to regard the subject as anything other than socially determined - in fact, the 
subject is not regarded as the cause or source of society but as an effect, a 
product, of society. The subject is dethroned, it loses its position as the centre of all 
experience, and the ultimate source of social and economic meaning. Frederick 
Engels gives a summary of this position in Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy:
“It is not the consciousness of men [sic] that determines their being, but on 
the contrary it is their social being that determines their consciousness.”
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[Marx 1976, pg 49]
The human “species being”, the essential nature of humanity as the collective 
producer of its lebenswelt, is not something which is ontologically prior to society, 
but is something that exists only through society. For Marx and Engels, human 
beings can only fulfil their needs, can only manifest their ‘species being’, their 
dynamic and productive nature, through and by virtue of the social. It is the 
collectivity, the ensemble of economic and social relations, that allows humanity to 
manifest its essential characteristic as the animal that is capable of producing, of 
manufacturing its own environment. Against the liberal bourgeois individualism of 
orthodox political economy, Marx and Engels posit the social, the collective as 
equally the source of all true human values and the perversion of those values by 
capitalist exploitation.
This dichotomy between ‘true’ human values and the values promoted by 
capitalist exchange can be perceived at its starkest in the dichotomy that defines 
the nature of commodity and commodity exchange under industrial capitalism. For 
Marx, a commodity is both its exchange value and its use value: exchange value is 
what a given object is worth in exchange for other objects or services, while use 
value can be defined as the utility of a given object, the capacity of an object to 
satisfy human needs. The exchange value of, say, a packet of cereal is measured 
by its cost, its value in an exchange system governed by abstract monetary values, 
while its use value lies in its nutritional value, its ability to satisfy the subject’s ‘need’ 
to eat. In the Marxist tradition exchange value is parasitic on use value; the utility 
of any commodified object is obscured by its exchange value, which is always 
privileged as a source of profit, and therefore capital accumulation, within capitalist 
society. Capitalism valorises exchange value at the expense of use value. Those
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qualities of the object that relate to, and fulfil human needs are, within capitalist 
society, given a value that is secondary to the exchange value of the object. In 
response to this, the Marxist critical tradition has argued that the notion of use value 
must be restored if human beings are to escape the reified relationship created by 
capitalism, relationships in which people are alienated, estranged, from their own 
needs as human beings.
The importance of the reified commodity form for Marxist critical theory is 
confirmed by Gyorgi Lukacs’ work on the commodity as the “central, structural 
problem of capitalist society in all its aspects” [Lukacs 1971, pg 83]. For 
Lukacs, the commodity was not just an object in a process of exchange, it was a 
translation of real social relations into an objectivised form, a form which denied the 
object’s origin from within those social relations, and its use by the people defined 
by those relations. A reified object took on a new quality, its own objectivity 
displaced its source and role in the system of production and consumption that 
define human society. Lukacs defines the reified object in these terms:
“The essence of commodity structure has often been pointed out. Its basis is 
that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus 
acquires a ‘phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational 
and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the 
relation between people.” [Lukacs 1971, pg 83]
In other words, a commodity exists only because of the relation between the people 
who produce, trade and consume that commodity. The commodity has a social 
origin, it is not a natural, given fact, it is a product, the results of specific acts of 
production undertaken by specific human beings in specific circumstances. 
However, the reified commodity, the commodity of exchange value presents itself
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as being divorced from specific human needs and specific lived social relations, and 
objectifies itself in a way that eclipses its origins in the social activity of human 
labour and consumption. The reified object could be described as concrete 
ideology, an object that hides its origins in the human social relationships. The 
reified object is a not simply an object, but is, according to Lukacs. a demand that 
all human needs should be reduced to, and satisfied by, the exchange of reified 
commodities:
“Reification requires that a society should learn to satisfy all its needs in 
terms of commodity exchange. The separation of the producer from his 
means of production, the dissolution and destruction of all ‘natural’ 
production units, etc., and all the social and the social and economic 
conditions necessary for the emergence of modern capitalism tend to replace 
‘natural’ relations more plainly by rationally reified relations. “The social 
relations between individuals in the performance of their labour,” Marx 
observed with reference to pre-capitalist societies, “appear at all events as 
their own personal relations, and are not disguised under the shape of social 
relations between the products of labour.”” [Lukacs 1971, pg 91]
Exchange value has become the measure of everything, the means by which all 
human needs are satisfied through the consumption of objects reduced to the 
commodity form. Those ‘natural’ social relations pertaining in societies living 
outside of capitalism, are, according to Lukacs, falling victim to commodification and 
Reification. The ultimate victim of this process are people who no longer fulfil their 
needs directly through personally controlled production and exchange, but who are 
now forced to seek the satisfaction of their needs solely through capitalist forms of 
commodity exchange. This process, for Lukacs, is one in which ‘reality’ that is 
refied under the forms of a ‘phamton objectivity’, and the truth of objects circulating
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in human societies in response to human needs is utterly displaced.
The process of Reification, and the corresponding alienation of the commodity 
from human social relations, can also be understood as resulting from the 
increasing abstraction of commodified objects, an abstraction in which exchange 
value displaces and distorts the truth of use value. In this process a commodity 
equals its abstract exchange value, and this becomes the measure of any given 
object, no matter what its intrinsic qualities may or may not be. In his essay 
Commodification of Reality [Ed Kellner 1994], Steven Best argues that the 
emergence of an industrial capitalism based on commodity exchange has led to a 
profound ontological deterioration in the status of objects. Best argues that objects 
are no longer valued for themselves, for their own qualities and nature, but as 
fantasies of ‘need’ fulfilment embodied in the commodified object. This process, 
Best contends, has its origins in the way in which the actual qualities of a 
commodified object are displaced in favour of a universal, abstract exchange value, 
which is itself only the vehicle for the circulation of capital:
“Once the circulation of capital has been abstracted from sensuous needs 
and qualities, from any social referent (the referent has become uprooted, 
privatized, fragmented among competing private interests), once it extends 
beyond the factories to penetrate all cultural interpersonal relations, it has a 
profound corruptive and distorting effect. The inversion that occurs in the 
economy, and which affects the whole of social life, is then directly 
transferred to the cultural and personal realm where commodity fantasy 
b e g i n s [Ed Kellner 1994, pg 45 - author’s italics]
Best’s arguments link semiology and political economy, they present use value as 
the final referent, the undistorted truth, underlying the debased nature of the
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commodified object. Indeed, the commodified object is really nothing except the 
fact it is not any other commodity, just as signs and their components are defined in 
post-Sussurean linguistics and semiology as having a negative ontology - that they 
are themselves only because they are not something else; they have no positive 
qualities, but are defined only by their difference to other signs. The commodity is 
what it is simply because it is not any other of a limitless number of other 
commodities, and therefore it has no identity except in its relation of difference to 
other commodities. It is therefore ideally suited to being appropriated through 
commodity fantasies because it has no inherent qualities which can resist its 
appropriation by ideologically generated fantasies of social differentiation and/or 
satisfaction through commodity acquisition and consumption. The social referent, 
the finality or telos of an object, which is grounded in its use value is eroded and 
displaced by a parasitic exchange which limits that object to being a mere moment 
in the general circulation of capital.
In contrast to Best’s elegy for use value as the ‘true’ reality of commodities and 
bulwark against commodity fantasy, the American Marxist Susan Willis makes a 
remarkable attempt her essay Unwrapping Use Value to present use value as the 
dialectical negation of exchange value and its capacity to displace the qualities of 
objects through the process of abstraction by commodification. Willis presents a 
short genealogy of the commodity which is very useful for understanding the 
intimate relationship between signification and exchange value. Willis implicitly 
draws on the semiotic notion of differentiation between signs, and the components 
of signs, through their difference alone. As we have seen, a sign has no positive 
ontological base in its own right. It does not have any sort of essence - its identity 
as a particular sign therefore stems from its relation to, its difference from, all other
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signs. A sign is dependent on differentiation, without differentiation, signs could not 
exist. Willis argues that specific, fetishisable commodities only exist because they 
are differentiated from other commodities through the significatory process of 
advertising, and cites Quaker Oats as an early example of this process:
“Prior to the 1890s, there was no advertising for what would later become 
Quaker Oats, because if such advertising had existed, it could only have 
promoted oats in general. The point of advertising is the designation of the 
commodity (and, by extension, the consumer) as a discrete unit.” [Willis 
1991, pg 2]
The marketing of a given brand of a specific commodity requires that that 
commodity is designated as being different to commodities that are generically 
identical. In The Object System, Baudrillard refers to the distinction between a 
Citroen 2CV and the short-lived French luxury car the Facel-Vega [Baudrillard 
1996, pg 140] as a distinction between commodities which share the same function 
are totally differentiated in terms of their marketing, and their availability and their 
social cachet. All cars have the same use value, however the 2CV and the Facel- 
Vega have totally disparate exchange values, and these values do not stem from 
anything intrinsic to the cars, but are generated by advertising, by fashion, by the 
codes of signification that govern their place in the circulation of exchange value. 
Therefore signification is an essential element in contemporary political economy, it 
is that which allows commodities to be differentiated so that they can acquire an 
exchange value that annuls their intrinsic differences, and assigns an abstract 
value, an identity, in a social and cultural order dominated by the circulation of 
commodities and capital.
Willis argues that exchange value has developed the ability to displace use
value completely through the emergence of what she calls the “hyper-commodity” 
[Willis 1991, pg 2]. The “hyper-commodity” can best be described as a commodity 
which is the sum total of a series of semiotically related objects. The commodity 
has become abstracted to the point that it is not a thing in itself, but exists only as a 
series of signs that relate discrete products. Willis gives the example of the 
“California Raisins” as being a typical “hyper-commodity”:
“Where raisins from California were once marketed according to specific 
brand-name identities such as “Sun Maid”, they are now promoted as the 
“California Raisins” and embodied in a band of wrinkly “dudes” with skinny 
arms and legs who chant “I Heard it Through the Grapevine” while soaking 
up the California sun. “California Raisins” do not represent a return to the 
pre-brand name generic commodity, but rather the hyper-commodity” whose 
connection to rock music and black culture heroes precipitates a vast array 
of spin-off products, from grotesque dolls to beach towels emblazoned with 
the “Raisins””. [Willis 1991, pg 2]
Instead of buying a single thing Willis argues that we now by commodities that 
consist of semiotically generated relations between a range of discrete products.
We do not simply buy and consume the “California Raisins” as dried fruit marketed 
through a range of advertising goods, we actually consume the abstract idea or the 
concept that links a growing number of items. At the time of writing, the two most 
note worthy hyper-commodities in Britain are the Spice Girls and the Teletubbies. 
Neither of these two phenomena can be understood as being anything except 
semiotically generated hyper-commodities: both the Spice Girls and the Teletubbies 
are the conceptual nexus around which the marketing and consumption of an array 
of discrete products (although no comments on the quality of these products will be 
made here) ranging from videos to toys. The most interesting characteristic of the
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hyper-commodity is the way in which it grows more fetishised as it becomes more 
and more abstract. Against this process of abstracted commodity festishisation, 
Willis pits concrete use value against exchange value as its antithesis, and the 
ground on which resistance to the ongoing commodification of all objects and 
experiences can be built.
Willis sees use value as that which is the truth of objects, the non-reified, non­
alienated from of the commodity, the form under which the commodity is restored to 
its status as an object capable of satisfying (non-alienated) human needs. Use 
value is the spectre haunting exchange value: it is the antithesis, the point at which 
exchange value is confronted by a radically antithetical form, one that cannot be 
absorbed into exchange value. For Willis, the truth - or ‘value’ - of use value is that 
it implies the possibility of entering into a realm of non-reified, non-alienated 
relations that transcend the established strictures of capitalist social relations:
“The Marxian account of commodity fetishism does not represent a negation 
of use value. Rather, it demonstrates that use value is dialectically referred 
to in our fetishized objects of consumption, just as all of mass culture is 
haunted by the desire for non-alienated social relations.” [Willis 1991, pg 13] 
Using Marxist inspired forms of critical analysis as a tool for understanding the 
importance of use-value as that essential part of the capitalist system of exchange 
and exploitation which is absolutely vital to that system, but is at the same time the 
point that offers the possibility of dialectically transcending the capitalist system of 
exchange and exploitation; a system that Willis understands as being predicated on 
a process in which objects are ontologically debased to take their place in a false 
regime of exploitative exchange.
33
However, while offering one of the most incisive and thoughtful critiques of the 
relationship between signification and political economy in advanced capitalist 
society, Willis also makes an early essentially favourable reference to Baudrillard’s 
attempt to find a radical, alternative to the use value as the point of departure for a 
theoretical critique of capitalism. Willis remains wedded to a project of recovering 
use value as the true form of objects, as that around which non-reified, non- 
alienated social practices and relations can be constructed. Her tactics are a 
counter-valorisation of use value in the face of exchange value, while Baudrillard 
scorns the notion of value as a product of capitalist significatory and economic 
exchange:
“According to Baudrillard, the construction of value under capitalism, which 
derives from the relationship of exchange value to use value, is homologous 
to the system of signification defined by Saussure, where meaning is born of 
the relationship of signifier to signified. This defines a more fundamental 
unity between consciousness and capitalism than obtains in Lukacs’ theory 
of Reification. For Baudrillard, the logic of capitalism is the logic of 
meaning.” [Willis 1991, pg 18]
Baudrillard does not accept the distinction which lies at the heart of the Marxist 
critique of political economy, he does not accept that use value is anterior to 
exchange value. Unlike Willis, Baudrillard has no desire to redeem use value, use 
value is, for Baudrillard, part and parcel of capitalism; it is not its dialectical 
antithesis of exchange value, but rather its ‘alibi’, its legitimisation. Willis rightly 
notes that in taking this position Baudrillard “challenges us to think outside of 
value altogether” [Willis 1991, pg 19], to attempt to think beyond the horizon 
established by the privileged capitalist couplet of signification and political economy.
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This point is echoed by Etienne Balibar in his The Philosophy of Marx which 
characterises Baudrillard as a rebellious child of Marx, one who “stands Marx on 
his head” [Balibar 1995, pg 79] when he seeks to develop a critique of use value 
which attacks what he regards as a “fetishism of use value” [Balibar 1995, pg 
76]. This is an important theoretical development in so far as it draws attention to 
the limits of use value. Use value is that which can form a benign essence of 
objects in the orthodox Marxist tradition; use value can appear as the quiditas or 
truth of an object that is hidden or distorted by exchange value. Baudrillard’s work 
offers a corrective to this view by reminding us that objects will always be 
exchanged and that they will always have a dimension of their being which can be 
described as ‘use value’ because all social and cultural orders are dependent on 
the exchange of socially meaningful objects. Exchange value per se is not a bad 
thing in itself, it is the capitalist form of exchange value which displaces the 
particular qualities of individual objects in favour of a universal, abstract form of 
exchange value which is geared to capital accumulation. Baudrillard begins Fora 
Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign by establishing the relationship 
between use value, exchange value, sign value and what he calls “the logic of 
symbolic exchange” [Ed. Poster, pg 57]. The relationship between what 
Baudrillard designates as sign value and use value is familiar to us from the Marxist 
critique of political economy:
“Here the advertising process of conferring value transmutes use goods 
(biens d ’usage) into sign values. Here technique and knowledge are divorced 
from their objective practice and recovered by the “cultural system” of 
differentiation. It is thus the extended field of consumption, in the sense we 
have given it of production, systems and the interplay of signs. Of course, 
this field also includes the production of signs originating from economic
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exchange.” [Ed. Poster 1988, pg 58]
The sign value of a commodity is its value as an image, a sign, its place within the 
cultural system which bestows meaning (in the form of value) on objects. Use 
value, the range of things one can do with an object, is translated in cultural value 
by the processes of advertising and design. A commodity is a statement about its 
owner/user, and not an object whose value can be reduced to pure utility. This 
distinction between sign value and use value will be seen to be analogous to 
Lukacs and Willis’ depiction of the commodity as a reified form, something which 
has been given a “phantom objectivity” or nature by means of its position within a 
combinatory of sign and economic exchange values. Baudrillard rightly points out 
that the cultural value, the sign value of an object is privileged over and above its 
objective, technical qualities. The commodified object circulates in a cultural 
system from which all ambiguity and ambience have been removed, and which 
produces meaning through the exchange of commodities as sign values. 
Baudrillard’s insistence on the importance of sign value provides
We have seen that Susan Willis attempted to redeem use value as the 
dialectical antithesis of both capitalist exchange value and those exploitative social 
relations informed by exchange value. However, Baudrillard, as we have seen, 
does not regard use value as being in any way ultimately antithetical to exchange 
value. Baudrillard argues that it is “the logic of symbolic exchange” rather than 
use value which represents an antithesis to both the notions of orthodox political 
economy and Marxism, which assume that any system of production and 
consumption, use and exchange must be based on a concept of value. Both 
orthodox political economists and Marxists locate the source of value in the relation 
of objects to human needs. Baudrillard pits his notion of symbolic exchange
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against these two traditions, which he regards as being predicated on the 
assumption that the value of objects resides in their capacity to satisfy a range of 
needs which are integral to all human beings. Baudrillard does not accept that the 
ability to meet human needs is the source of any commodity’s value. Value, for 
Baudrillard, is derived from the relation pertaining between the terms of a structured 
system, value is constituted by the relation between the elements of a given 
structure. In the case of commodities, their value comprises their economic value 
and sign exchange value understood as a relationship between elements in an 
overarching structure. The structure of capitalist semiotics is, according to 
Baudrillard, one in which signs relate in a manner that exemplifies capitalism’s 
imperative to abstraction, reductionism and a notion of value as being positive, 
unambiguous, ubiquitous.
Chris Horrocks and Zoran Jevtic in Baudrillard for Beginners offer a particularly 
lucid description of why Baudrillard finds capitalism’s regime of signification to be 
absolutely complicit in promoting capitalism as the horizon of all social meaning: 
“Baudrillard now claims that the sign is an accomplice of capital. Why is 
this?
1. Because it is an agent of abstraction.
2. It universally reduces all potential and qualities of meaning. The meaning
is “framed” when a signifier is tied to the signified.
3. It excludes and discriminates. Once installed, a sign offers itself as a full
value - positive, rational, exchangeable.
This is the rationality of the sign. Its rationality does NOT lie in the sign 
naming some exterior reality (a tree over there), but in its exclusion of 
ambivalence of non-resolution of meaning.” [Horrocks and Jevtic 1996, pg
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Baudrillard therefore sees the sign as the accomplice of capitalism, the structural 
reduction of the horizon of meaning. In taking this position, however, he attempts 
to move beyond the exchange value/use value dichotomy by claiming that symbolic 
exchange is the antithesis of use value, economic exchange value and sign value. 
He argues that sign exchange value, along with all other forms of value, faces one 
radical alterior term, the term of symbolic exchange, a term that he contends cannot 
be reduced to value or even its dialectical antithesis:
“Precisely speaking, there is no symbolic ‘value’, there is only symbolic 
‘exchange’, which defines itself precisely as something distinct from, and 
beyond value and code. All forms of value (object, commodity or sign) must 
be negated in order to inaugurate symbolic exchange. This is the radical 
rupture of the field of sign value.” [Ed. Poster 1988, pg 59]
Baudrillard therefore pits symbolic exchange against the three forms of value 
established by capitalist commodity circulation. He does not attempt any form of 
counter-valorisation of use value, as this would be in Baudrillard’s terms remaining 
inside the horizons of capitalism’s value-based system, but posits symbolic 
exchange as a “rupture”, a point of separation from all forms of social exchange 
based on the notion of an underlying value. Whereas Susan Willis sought the 
dialectical negation of exchange value in use value, Baudrillard takes an anti- 
dialectical stand and maintains that the only way to negate capitalism is not by 
searching for a its dialectical transformation through one of its values, but to pose 
the radical otherness of a form of exchange which is not based on any form of 
value at all. As Willis rightly points out, in taking this step, Baudrillard is challenging 
us to “think outside of value altogether” [Willis 1991, pg 19] in describing his 
critique of political economy as being “by far the most radical, the most utopian,
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and the most difficult to imagine how it might be translated into daily-life 
social practice” [Willis 1991, pg 18]. Baudrillard does not look for the dialectical 
antithesis of the capitalist system for hope, but counters it with a violent theoretical 
act in which capitalist forms of value are made to face not their dialectical negation 
but the absolute otherness of symbolic exchange.
The otherness of symbolic exchange, when compared to the capitalist (and 
Marxist) valorisation of value, can be grasped by considering Mike Gane’s claim 
that “Baudrillard’s work, from the start, is marked by a very radical attack on 
any theory, like Marcuse’s, which postulates an identifiable set of essential, 
innocent, human needs which can be thrown as a challenge against the 
modern system” [Gane 1991, pg 87]. Symbolic exchange is not geared to 
fulfilling any pre-given human needs, and cannot be reduced to any notion of need 
satisfaction. Baudrillard’s critique of needs is based on a deconstruction of the 
formal qualities of commodity understood as an entity which exists only within the 
systems of sign and economic exchange. He argues that both use value and the 
'signified' (or conceptual element of a sign) are homologous in that each exists to 
provide an 'alibi' or justification for exchange value and the signifier (the material 
form) when they are understood as being the privileged term, the term governing 




use value and signified do not have the same weight as exchange value and 
signifier respectively. Let us say that they have a tactical value; whereas 
exchange value and signifier have a strategic value. The system is organized
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along the lines of a functional but hierarchized bipolarity. Absolute pre­
eminence redounds to exchange value and the signifier. Use value and 
needs are only an effect of exchange value. Signified (and referent) are only 
an effect of the signifier (we will return to this point later). Neither is an 
autonomous reality, one that either exchange value or the signifier would 
express or translate in their code. At bottom they are only simulation 
models, produced by the play of exchange value and signifiers. They provide 
signifiers with the guarantee of the real, the lived, the concrete; they are the 
guarantee of an objective reality, for which, however, at the same moment, 
these systems qua systems substitute their own total logic." [Ed. Poster 
1988, pgs 70-71]
Here Baudrillard's argument is that use value and signified do not constitute a 
reality which should be regarded as being transcendent to both exchange value and 
signifier. Exchange value and the signifier, are for Baudrillard, the privileged forms 
of the commodity, forms that do not ultimately refer to the anterior reality of use 
value and the signified. He contends that both use value and signified are 
'simulations', an effect, rather than the cause, of the circulation of commodities 
(signifiers) as the exchange of sign values. Baudrillard contends that what has 
been taken for the real in Marxist critical discourse is not the primary ontological 
ground, a base upon which the superstructures of exchange value and signified are 
erected, but is in fact only an effect, a simulation model produced by the circulation 
of commodities under the forms of exchange value and sign value. The ontological 
axiomatics of Marxism is inverted by Baudrillard who does not seek meaning in the 
mute, anterior world of the 'real', but in the circulation of objects understood as 
exchange value and as signifiers that have severed their ontological ties with their 
signifiers. The social world for Baudrillard becomes an effect of significatory
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practices and not their cause; it is that which is produced only by the circulation of 
commodities which generate a ’reality' effect. Baudrillard argues that there is no 
reality to be discovered behind exchange value and the signified, they are not the 
real, not that which is expressed through the forms of exchange value and the 
signifier. The only way to discover a realm of being beyond capitalism’s structures 
is through the praxis of symbolic exchange, a praxis which he claims restores the 
enchantment of ambiguity and reciprocity to human exchange and social meaning.
At this point, Baudrillard breaks with any kind of realist ontology (but not 
ontological and epistemological materialism) and therefore breaks with the 
ontological axiomatics of orthodox Marxism. His theorising now deals with the 
world as being produced (or rather reproduced) through the play of simulations, 
signs - or more correctly, signifiers - that circulate without any umbilical link to their 
signifieds or any actual, concrete referents. The structure of the sign and the 
structure of the commodity have become one in a totalised system of commodified 
social exchange to which all meaning is subject. Here, Baudrillard attempts to 
surpass the critiques of Lukacs and Willis by insisting on the total nature of the 
simulation model that generates and dominates all forms of economic, social and 
cultural exchange. As Baudrillard points out, advanced capitalism rests on a 
welding together of the commodity form and the sign form, thereby reducing the 
horizon of signification to the horizon of commodity exchange. In Fora Critique of 
the Politicai Economy of the Sign, Baudrillard sets out the way in which the 
structures of the commodity form and the structure of the sign have formed a 
couplet:
"It is because the structure of the sign is at the very heart of the commodity 
form that the commodity can take on, immediately, the effect of signification:
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not epiphenomenally, in excess of itself, as "message" or connotation, but 
because its very form establishes it as a total medium, as a system of 
communication administering all social exchange. Like the sign form, the 
commodity is a code managing the exchange of values. It makes little 
difference whether the contents of material production or the immaterial 
contents of signification are involved; it is the code that is determinant: the 
rules of the interplay of signifiers and exchange value." [Ed. Poster 1988, pg 
79 - author’s italics]
The commodity is not something that can be separated from signification; the 
commodity is a coded object, it circulates within a system governed by exchange 
values, and, like the sign, it is determined ultimately by its code, by the system of 
formal relations, that determine its nature as a commodity. Both the sign and the 
commodity form what Baudrillard calls " a total medium", a totalised form of social 
exchange, which cannot be transcended. Use value is not a potential antithetical 
element in the system of capitalist exchange, as Baudrillard contends, "use value 
and the signified do not constitute an elsewhere with respect to the systems 
of the other two [exchange value and the signifier]; they are only their alibis" 
[Ed. Poster 1988, pg 71 - my parenthesis]. There is nothing within the system of 
commodity exchange that can transcend the system, or act as a point of rupture 
within that system. Use values do not offer the potential for establishing non-reified 
social relations around them, they are a component of the closed system of 
meaning established by advanced capitalism.
Baudrillard's theoretical critique of the relation between commodity exchange 
and signification is more rigorous than its economonistic Marxist counterparts as it 
insists that commodities are structured as signs, that they convey meanings which
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are socially exchanged, and that this feature of the commodity is not an ideological 
addition to the commodity or any other form of false appearance, but is, in fact, 
essential to its nature, and allows for its social circulation. Objects will always have 
a dimension that is their exchange value, their movement between people in a 
given social order. Under capitalism, their exchange is reduced to that of being 
circulated as for commodities as the basis of profit accumulation. Baudrillard’s 
insistence on the fact that objects can be exchanged as signs as well as economic 
goods is a necessary reminder that the economic is not the basis of the social, but 
an effect of the social, and that the social is always dependant on systems of 
exchange, which are themselves predicated on systems of signification.
Baudrillard's critique of ecomonism is therefore a useful reminder of the primacy of 
the social over and against the economic. It is also one of the most thoroughgoing 
attempts to demonstrate how significatory structures substitute themselves for the 
exterior real by their very nature, signs are a form of simulation rather than any 
form of access to a transcendent reality; they form an ensemble of meaning that 
has its origins in the interplay of signs within the arena of the social, rather than 
from some pristine, anterior reality. The real, Baudrillard reminds us, is socially 
constructed rather than given, and that no element within a social system can 
appeal to an unmediated reality as its source. The pristine real that is the economic 
base of orthodox Marxism has transmuted into a ensemble of significatory, 
meaning generating relations. In the West, at least, it is arguably no longer a 
mechanism for securing individual and collective survival through production and 
exchange, but it is now a regime of meaning, an order of social relations produced, 
and reproduced, through both the processes of 'economic' production and the play 
of signification which are both equally essential to the commodity form and the 
circulation of the commodity as exchange value.
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Advanced capitalism is based on the circulation of a commodities upon which 
all forms of meaning are inscribed. Lukacs' nightmare of total commodification of 
all experience and all social relations has come to pass in the form of an order of 
simulation that seems to be unchangeable. Baudrillard's early response to this is, 
as we have seen, to refuse to valorise meaning and to privilege a form of symbolic 
exchange that eschews value in an almost desperate theoretical challenge to the 
totalised hegemony of consumer capitalism. Symbolic exchange resists definition: 
it is the praxis of exchanging polyvalent meanings that are excluded from the sign 
and commodity form. Symbolic exchange makes no appeal to value or to meaning 
as it circulates in our society. It is purely other, a negation of commodity exchange, 
that Baudrillard argues cannot be incorporated in capitalist forms of semiotic and 
commodity exchange. Symbolic exchange is not a concept; it has no identity in 
itself, it remains the (deliberately) undefined term that haunts the formal perfection 
of sign and commodity exchange. Willis notes that symbolic exchange owes much 
to the work of Marcel Mauss on the function of the gift in so-called 'primitive' 
societies:
"Baudrillard appeals to the work of the anthropologist Marcel Mauss, whose 
elaboration of the gift ("/e don") in primitive society offers an alternative to 
societies based, like our own, on accumulation rather than dispersal. Central 
to Mauss' description and to Baudrillard's analysis is the annual potlatch 
ceremony practised by the Kwakiutl Indians where accumulated wealth and 
possessions are not just redistributed but wholly used up. Baudrillard sees 
the potlatch as the basis for reciprocal social relations based on a form of 
exchange that destroys value. Baudrillard's term for such a dynamic is 
"symbolic exchange", which he alludes to as the anti-form of capitalism,
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whose cursory and subtle manifestations might be glimpsed at unexpected 
moments even in consumer society. Baudrillard cites play, the spontaneous 
gift, destruction as pure loss, and symbolic reciprocity as examples of 
symbolic acts (Baudrillard, 1988: 93)." [Willis 1991, pg 19]
Although Willis is right to say that symbolic exchange is "somewhat inaccessible 
to discursive elaboration" [Willis 1991, pg 19], it can be regarded as the non- 
dialectical negation of capitalism, that which is absolutely other to a social system 
dedicated to amassing value (capital) as an end in itself.
In Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond, Douglas 
Kellner cites The Mirror of Production in describing symbolic exchange as an 
increasingly generalised and ill-defined antithetical principle to what Baudrillard 
takes as the productivism of advanced capitalism, a principle which he regards as 
politically naive and perhaps dangerously close to a right-wing vitalism:
“Baudrillard contrasts the abstraction, reduction and rationalization in 
productivist societies with ‘the richness of symbolic exchange’, and valorizes 
the latter over the former (MoP, p.45). In these and other passages, there is a 
nostalgia for the ‘primitive’, the pre-capitalist; and at least part of 
Baudrillard’s theory of symbolic exchange derives from anthropological 
studies of exchange in ‘primitive societies’. One might interpret his position 
at this point as a nostalgia for primitive communism, for a communal, 
ritualistic social order organized around symbolic exchange (and not 
production and the rest). In other passages, however, symbolic exchange 
becomes even more diverse and heterogeneous, as when, against Marx’s 
anthropological emphasis on the primacy of labor and production in human 
life, Baudrillard valorizes a ‘discharge with a pure waste, a symbolic
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discharge in Bataille’s sense (pulsating, libidinal).... A gratuitous and festive 
energizing of the body’s powers, a game with death, or the acting out of a 
desire (MoP, pp. 43-44). This would suggest that nonreproductive, ‘pulsating’ 
sex, exhibitionism, nonutilitarian waste and gratuitous violence serve as 
paradigms of ‘symbolic exchange’.” [Kellner 1989, pgs 44 - 45 - author’s 
ellipses]
Kellner’s animus towards Baudrillard is manifested in this passage, but it does 
indicate the weaknesses of the latter’s position in respect to actual political practice. 
Like Foucault and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Baudrillard advocates, at this 
stage in his career, a left politics which does not regard the working class as the 
key radical or potentially radical group in society. At this point in his career, 
Baudrillard sought political change in what Kellner describes as the “microspheres 
of everyday life” [Kellner 1989, pg 46] and among socially marginalised groups 
such as ethnic minorities and the members of ‘deviant’ sub-cultures. Baudrillard 
does not offer any way of converting his theoretical insights into a political praxis 
that can do more than simply create ‘symbolic’ challenges to the capitalist 
annexation of all facets of human life. Buadrillard certain argued that symbolic 
exchange is manifest among so-called ‘primitive’ peoples as a form of social 
exchange that is a type of pure expenditure, the refusal to accumulate value, a 
refusal to circulate objects and signs on the basis of their exchange value. It is, for 
the Baudrillard of The Mirror o f Production and Symbolic Exchange and Death that 
which still haunts value accumulation in our society. The praxis of symbolic 
exchange is perhaps manifest in acts of 'senseless' destruction, acts that waste 
surplus accumulation rather than hoard it as 'capital' - the Situationist International 
and the Dutch pro-situ group the Provos tried to challenge capital on this level. The 
Provos, for instance, by giving away goods from shops in an attempt to negate their
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commodity status. This form of challenge to capitalism is one which is, however, 
limited to a gesture that is purely negative, and does nothing to construct a lasting 
alternative to the capitalist social order.
Mike Gane points out that symbolic exchange is used by Baudrillard to attack a 
system of signification as simulation which increasingly precludes any opportunity 
for a critical attack on its system of meanings:
"In a crucial gesture, at this point, Baudrillard opens a daring attack on the 
sign itself from the point of view of the symbolic order, for in the last resort it 
is the principle of ambivalence in the symbol that is the mortal enemy of the 
sign (which functions to transform everything into positive terms). It is not 
with respect to the existence of the real world, with its apparent ability to 
intervene as last resort, that the circle is to be broken, since the real world is 
not available (and is never available except as the myth of semiology itself). 
Only the symbolic, in its radical negation of the positive term, can act 
effectively as a counter to the 'formal correlation of the signifier and 
signified.'" [Gane 1991, pg 92]
In the end, for Baudrillard, the sign is an instrument of tyranny, the tyranny of the 
capitalist regime of meaning based on signification, exchange value and 
accumulation. The one hope of breaking this tyranny comes from the possibility of 
the irruption of the ambivalent, auratic symbolic order into the formal systems of 
value exchange. Baudrillard concentrates on the formal qualities that govern the 
ontological status of objects, signs and exchange practices in consumer capitalism, 
rather than on the potential for the type of social revolution envisaged by orthodox 
Marxism. There is a desperate quality to the move of evoking symbolic exchange; 
it is perhaps too redolent of the last throw of the dice, of the last spasm of the
47
revolutionary project. Certainly, Willis is correct to point out the utopian, impractical 
nature of Baudrillard's attempt to contest the political economy of the sign, and it is 
extremely difficult to see how his writings could form part of a coherent political 
programme. However, Baudrillard's writings deliberately seek to frustrate being 
incorporated into any sort of programme, and as such they offer a sort of symbolic 
exchange to their reader, they offer ambivalence and ambiguity rather than a 
programmatic exposition of a pre-given position. In this they attempt a symbolic 
exchange based on negativity, on a refusal of a defining identity. Baudrillard 
refuses any attempt to define symbolic exchange, except as the negative principle 
combating the posivity of the sign form:
"It is the symbolic that continues to haunt the sign, for in its total exclusion it 
never ceases to dismantle the formal correlation of Sr [signifier] and Sd 
[signified]. But the symbolic, whose virtuality of meaning, is so subversive of 
the sign, cannot, for this reason, be named except by allusion, by infaction 
(effraction). For signification, which names everything in terms of itself, can 
only speak the language of values and of the positivity of the sign." [Ed 
Poster 1988, pg 91]
Baudrillard, it will be seen, conceives of the symbolic as the absolutely other to all 
forms of signification and value exchange. His theorising, which has often been 
condemned as offering no principle, or even hope, of transcending the social and 
cultural formation of capitalism, does include a theoretically powerful principle of 
opposition to the totalisation of meaning as capitalist forms of exchange under the 
form of signification. The symbolic resonates with the absence of given meaning, 
with the ambiguity of a type of exchange that cannot be reduced to an equation 
between the sign and commodity forms.
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Baudrillard's challenge to capitalist signification is among the most 
thoroughgoing and most radical attempts to break the hegemony of value that 
determines social relations under consumer capitalism. Unfortunately, Baudrillard 
does not offer a theoretical assault on capitalism which is compatible with traditional 
Marxist praxis, and which is extremely weak at the level of practical day to day 
opposition to capitalist exploitation and oppression. Baudrillard gives no guidance 
on organisation and tactics, but he does depict well the total nature of the current 
regime of meaning and its absolute complicity with commodity exchange, while 
attempting to find the point of negation of commodity exchange. Baudrillard’s 
genuine achievement is to have shown that capitalism is an order of signification as 
well as an order of economic relations, that its ‘appearance’ as an ensemble of 
signs is as vital to its functioning as the ‘base’ of productive forces and the social 
relations of production. Like, Georges Bataille whose arguments in favour of an 
economy of expenditure, prodigality and waste are based on the notion of a solar 
economy that always already produces to excess, Baudrillard's arguments against 
value in itself seem less and less absurd in the face of what Michael Richardson 
has called "the rapaciousness and sheer bankruptcy of an economy based on 
monetarist principles" [Richardson 1994, pg 96]. In posing the implicit question 
of the value of value, Baudrillard at least gives us occasion to consider the misery 
that is inflicted on human beings in the name of value, its signification, its exchange 
and its accumulation.
We have seen in this chapter how Baudrillard developed a new critique of 
political economy which moved him away from a neo-Marxist position towards the 
radical theorising of his later work. In the course of his critique of political economy, 
Baudrillard moved decisively away from a Marxist position based on the valorisation
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of use value, and insisted that use value was merely the 'alibi' of exchange value, 
just as the signified is not the privileged term in the signifier/signified couplet, but 
merely the 'alibi' of the signifier, its justification as the expression of a reality that 
transcends it. Baudrillard's break from Marxism comes with his advocacy of 
symbolic exchange as the negation of value per se, as opposed to the Marxist 
project of privileging use value over and above exchange value. Instead of the 
distinctions and dichotomies of Marxism, use value and exchange value, base and 
superstructure, production and consumption, Baudrillard concludes his critique of 
political economy with the introduction of his concept of signification as simulation. 
As he writes in Fora Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, "the process of 
signification is, at bottom, nothing but a gigantic simulation model of 
meaning [Ed. Poster 1988, pg 91. From this point, Baudrillard begins to elaborate 
his theory of signification as simulation, and to develop the genealogy of orders of 
simulacra that are among the best known aspects of his work for an English 
speaking audience. Baudrillard's concept of meaning as simulation could only be 
developed within the context of his critique of political economy and its dependence 
on simulation, although I shall argue that in developing his concept of signification 
as ‘simulation’, Baudrillard contradicts the position that he put forward in For A 
Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign and The Mirror of Production. Having 
rejected the economic as the base of the social, Baudrillard then moved on to 
consider history as the shift in the orders of simulation that governed meaning in 
different historical epochs in Symbolic Exchange and Death and Simulations. The 
next chapter will examine Baudrillard's genealogy of simulacra, and show how it 
develops the anti-realist ontology that dominates his critique of sign and exchange 
value while continuing to retain the weaknesses of developing a radical theoretical 
critique without attempting to set out how that critique can become a form a political
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praxis, a challenge that exists in the domain of everyday life and not simply as a 
theoretical project.
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Chapter 2: Beyond Political Economy - The Orders of Simulation
In the preceding chapter Baudrillard’s view of the relations between political 
economy and its Marxist critique of political economy were outlined and used to 
support the argument that although his position on political economy is one 
predicated on a rejection of the fundamental tenets of orthodox Marxism, it is one 
which continues to offer a useful point of departure for radical theory. We have 
seen that for Susan Willis, "the Marxian account of commodity fetishism is not 
a negation of use value" [Willis 1991, pg 13], a statement with which Baudrillard 
would agree, given that he regards Marxism as being complicit with the tenets of 
political economy, as being its theoretical 'mirror'. He perceives Marxism as that 
which represents the ongoing theoretical development of the essential tenets of 
political economy, rather than that which instigates a radical conceptual break with 
the capitalist regime of economic and significatory exchange. For Baudrillard, 
Marxism does not contest the fundamental ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of capitalist political economy; it shares with political economy a logic 
which assumes that ‘men’ who possess needs and the capacity to produce the 
means of satisfying those needs, produce goods to meet their needs, and because 
no one ‘man’ can produce enough to satisfy all ‘his’ needs alone, they exchange the 
goods they have produced as commodities in exchange transactions. Baudrillard 
regards the Marxist project of redeeming use value from capitalist mystification as a 
project which is based on the acceptance of the fundamental logic or ‘code’ of 
political economy, a logic of production and exchange which he wants to reject, 
contest and transcend. In The Mirror o f Production, Baudrillard writes that:
“In a work, man is not only quantitatively exploited as a productive force by 
the system of capitalist political economy, but also metaphysically
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overdetermined as a producer by the code of political economy. In the last 
instance, the system rationalises its power here. And in this Marxism assists 
the cunning of capital. It convinces men that they are alienated as labor 
power, thus censoring the much more radical hypothesis that they might be 
alienated as labor power, as the “inalienable” power of creating value by their 
labor” [Baudrillard 1975, pg 31 - all italics the author’s]
Baudrillard’s position is that Marxism is complicit with capitalism at a theoretical 
level; that it shares the 'code' of political economy, and does not negate but 
reproduces its categories in an inverted form. Marxism, for Baudrillard, does not 
challenge the 'truth' of political economy. Like political economy, it is predicated on 
an understanding of human society which is grounded on the concept of a human 
essence manifested in how 'mankind' labours to produce 'value'. Marxism, in all its 
guises, does not, therefore, offer a radical negation of the "simulation model" that 
Baudrillard sees as informing both liberal bourgeoisie thought and its Marxist 
critique. Although Marxists would refute this, and consider that Baudrillard's 
depiction of Marxism to be a caricature, in his terms, Marxism shares the same 
rationalist assumptions and the same valorisation of value and the notion of an 
essential 'reality' that informs the theoretical discourse of political economy.
Marxism is therefore only a theoretical 'mirroring' of bourgeoisie political economy, 
and not the source of a radical challenge to the hegemony of capitalist 
assumptions.
However, despite Baudrillard's rejection of Marxism because of what he 
regards as its conceptual conservatism, it is clear that the Marxist theoretical model 
is very much his point of departure. Perhaps Baudrillard's theoretical project could 
therefore said to be based on a reversal of the epistemological and ontological
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schema of Marxism in an "inversion" of the tenets of Marxism that is analogous to 
Marx's inversion of Hegelian idealism. Signification and political economy form a 
couplet in Baudrillard's early work, two terms whose relationship defines the nature 
of capitalism as a universal system of exchange and a universal system of 
meaning. However, in Baudrillard's work, these terms are not equals. Their 
relation is not one of simple 'difference', but one which is governed by a hierarchical 
positioning of the two terms in a distinction that privileges one term over the other. 
Whereas the theorists of political economy and those theorists working within the 
Marxist tradition valorise production, the economic, over the 'superstructure' of 
culture and the play of signification, Baudrillard privileges signification over and 
above political economy in a reversal of epistemological and ontological structures 
of orthodox Marxist theory. In his view, human societies are sign-societies: they 
are formed from the play of signs within radically different regimes of signification. 
For Baudrillard the history, or rather genealogy, of capitalist development is always 
one which is ultimately governed by shifts in what could be termed the ‘mode of 
signification’.
If Baudrillard's complex theorising about the relationship between political 
economy and signification could be reduced to a single position, it would be that the 
logic of capitalist economic exchange is analogous to the logic of signification; that 
signification is always already intrinsic to the structure of the commodity form and 
the mechanisms of capitalist commodity exchange. Indeed in For A Critique of the 
Political Economy of the Sign, Baudrillard declares unequivocally that "the 
structure o f the sign is at the very heart o f the commodity fo rm " [Ed Poster 
1988, pg 78 - author's italics]. From the comparatively neglected For A Critique 
of the Political Economy of the Sign and The Mirror of Production to the later and
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better-known Symbolic Exchange and Death and Simulations, Baudrillard argues 
that the circulation of objects within a capitalist economic order cannot be divorced 
from signification, and that the logic of signification is equivalent to the logic of 
capitalist commodity exchange. In these key texts, Baudrillard abandons any 
residual adherence to the epistemological and ontological nexus which informs the 
both discourse of political economy and its Marxist critique. His analysis of the 
emergence of capitalism and the social conditions of advanced capitalism is based 
on a notion of a general economy of exchange, which is predicated on the 
prevailing regime of signification. Baudrillard therefore argues against the orthodox 
Marxist view that signification is a superstructural process, one which is 
epistemologically and ontologically subordinate to the prevailing mode of production 
which forms society's economic base (a base which is itself ontologically grounded 
on the notion of an objective, transcendent material world). Instead of assigning 
signification to a secondary, superstructural role, Baudrillard argues that it is the 
crucial factor in informing the nature of culture and society, and that the prevailing 
mode of production, reproduction and consumption of signs is that which ultimately 
determines the social character of a given epoch.
In order to illustrate the difference between Baudrillard's theoretical position 
and that of Marxist social theory, this chapter will explore the contrast between 
Baudrillard's concept of the social which is predicated on a valorisation of 
signification with David Harvey's Marxist account of social and cultural 
development. It will focus on the key differences between the base/superstructure 
conception of historical progress and change advanced by David Harvey in his 
book The Condition of Postmodernity and Baudrillard's genealogy of regimes of 
signification (his "genealogy of simulacra") that features in the text Symbolic
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Exchange and Death and Simulations. In the course of this chapter, it will be 
argued that Harvey puts forward a position which is predicated on ontological 
realism, on retaining a sense of a foundational reality which is determined by the 
relations of modes of production to an objective, material world. It will be 
contended that this is, for Harvey, a reality which exists independently of any 
representation of it; a reality which is the transcendent referent of any and all forms 
of signification. Harvey's ontology will be shown to rest on the notion of a real world 
with objective properties that exists prior to any representation of that world. Unlike 
Harvey and other Marxist theorists, Baudrillard does not regard signification as a 
'superstructural' phenomenon, which is ultimately ontologically determined in the 
last instance by the processes of the economic base interacting with a foundational 
reality. It will be contended that Baudrillard’s theorising about the nature of 
advanced capitalism is characterised by an ‘anti-realist’ approach to epistemology 
and ontology, a position that acknowledges the importance of signification within 
advanced capitalist society, while avoiding the problems of economism and the 
essentialist positing of an a human subject or an anterior 'reality' as the ground and 
referent of all significatory processes. This discussion will be followed by 
considering the epistemological and ontological issues that arise in both 
Baudrillard's and Harvey's accounts of the relation of signification to political 
economy within a mature capitalist society.
Realism here will be understood as the view that all social, cultural and 
economic phenomena are informed by an underlying reality, which determines their 
natures, effects and relations with each other. In its most basic form, this position 
can be stated as a belief that “physical objects exist independently of being 
perceived” [Flew 1979, pg 278]. Such a belief is usually takes the form of a
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materialist approach to understanding the nature of reality, materialism has been 
cogently described as “the doctrine that whatever exists is either matter, or 
entirely dependant on matter for its existence” [Flew 1979, 205]. Transposing 
this doctrine to the study of signification, it takes the form that signs relate to 
referents which have an independent existence that cannot be reduced to an effect 
of signification. Such a view would claim that the referent is not reducible to the 
sign, and that it exists as a material entity endowed with its own objective reality. 
However, this position is far from unproblematic because the entire edifice of 
semiotics and discourse analysis built upon Ferdinand des Saussure’s structural 
linguistic is premised on the ontological separation of the sign and referent. There 
is no umbilical link between the sign and the referent, there is no ground for 
assuming that there is any way of passing from the order of the sign to the order of 
referent no matter whether which term is accepted as the privileged one. The 
distinction between the sign and its referent is implicit in C. S. Pierce’s definition of 
a sign as “something which stands to somebody for something else, in some 
respect or capacity” [Williamson 1978, pg 20]. This formulation acknowledges 
that a sign is not an extension of its referent, but an entity which displaces its 
referent in an act of signification which is paradoxically predicated on the notion that 
the referent must exist or be assumed to exist for something to stand in its place as 
a sign.
This something is usually something which is defined as having certain 
properties which are absolutely fundamental to constituting its character. It at this 
point that realism often becomes conflated with a form of essentialism, the belief 
that enmities have certain essential characteristics that define their nature, and that 
their existence is in some way a manifestation of that essential nature. This concept
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has its origins in the Western philosophical tradition that incorporates Plato’s 
ontological doctrine of ideal forms, Aristotle’s doctrine of essences as that which 
constitute a thing, and Kant’s transcendent idealism. It is still the dominant tradition 
within Western ontology and epistemology (casting its influence on social sciences 
and critical theory), and I intend to show that its fundamental tenet of a 
transcendent reality has insidiously influenced Harvey to the extent that his Marxist 
materialism is based on a fundamentally Kantian epistemological and ontological 
schema. Simplifying massively, the meaning of any act of signification within the 
tradition of Western philosophy stems from its relationship to the pre-given real, 
which may understood as an idealist non-phenomenal essence (whether 
constituted as a transcendent ideal form as in the various forms of Platonism or as 
the noumena, the ding-am-sich, of objects as in Kant or Schopenhauer’s 
ontologies) or as a materialist, ‘real’ entity. Criticism in this tradition is based on 
exposing the way in which some signs have an incorrect relationship with the real, 
how they are not true to the essential real. These signs mystify, they hide rather 
than reveal the transcendent reality. In contrast, other signs are ‘true’ signs of 
transcendent reality, they reveal the actual, real state of things, and these signs are 
as privileged as ‘false’ signs are reviled. True understanding in this metaphysical 
tradition is based on the concept of delimiting statements that accord with the 
essential truth of things from those statements that do not accord with the truth 
understood as that which corresponds to the essential characteristics of reality.
The socially and politically conservative version of this doctrine is open to the 
criticism that it precludes any notion of social or cultural change by conflating the 
socio-economic realm with a pre-given and therefore unchangeable and 
unchangeable nature. The true real, the real understood as a pre-given source of
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all things from molecules to signs in all their diversity, sets everything in stone: 
nothing can be changed because society rests on the unchangeable order of 
things, a reality which is itself underwritten by a supreme ontological principle such 
as ‘nature’ or ‘God’ For Plato the perfect society was in itself a sign of the 
existence of transcendent forms, a sign constituted by the conservative and 
repressive social project of ensuring that the whole of society lived in a way that 
accorded with the transcendent truth of things, the very source of all being. 
Although Platonic ontology was based on the descent of being through the great 
chain that bound the transcendent essential forms to such mundane entities as 
mud and slime, this conception of a graduated order of being can be found in an 
inverted form in some versions of Marxism, Psychoanalysis and Structuralism. 
Here, the real acts as a ground rather than as a transcendent essence, but the 
effect is similar in that there is a pronounced tendency in these disciplines for 
writers to adopt models of reality in which a base supports and informs a 
superstructure or manifest contents slyly refer to latent contents or content masks 
the meaning producing dynamics of form. The real is an hidden essence, an 
essence which can be brought to light by reading or decoding properly. This 
Platonic/Kantian ontological and epistemological schema is one that is based on 
the existence of a hidden real which has essential properties that define its nature.
Baudrillard rejects such a conception of materialism in his later work. He 
attempts to provide a non-foundational account of the effects of signification on 
contemporary society and the relation between signification and political economy. 
There is no ‘really’ real for Baudrillard, his conception of the world does not appeal 
to a reality that is hidden behind appearances, it a world in ‘truth’ is immanent 
rather than transcendental. Richard Harlan provides an interesting account of
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Baudrillard’s anti-realism which conflates an anti-realist position with idealism:
“For Baudrillard, ‘the ‘real’ table does not exist. Like Plato or Hegel, he 
regards the concrete outside world as an illusion or secondary effect: The  
empirical “object”, given in its contingency of form, color, material, function 
and discourse.... Is a myth.... It is nothing but the different types of relations 
and significations that converge, contradict themselves, and twist around it.’ 
Needless to say, this is a position of the very highest metaphysical idealism.” 
[Harland 1987, pg 177 - author’s ellipses]
Or is it? From this passage alone it is clear that Baudrillard does not insist that 
‘mind’ is in any way constitutive of reality. Therefore his position is not that of a 
classic idealist for whom ‘mind’ is that which posits a world which is ontologically 
dependent on its operations. Baudrillard’s position is that objects are not ‘real’ but 
that relations, structures, and codes are real in the sense that they have an 
existence which is not dependent on the mind of a constitutive subject. In fact, 
these relations do much to constitute the subject in Baudrillard’s view and they 
should be properly regarded as material, as that which is independent of any 
perception of them. The Marxist tradition argues that use value and exchange value 
constitute the ontological nature of the object as a item circulating within a given 
social order, while Baudrillard’s claims that both use value and exchange value are 
not objective, material properties but conceptions of objects generated by 
structures. For Baudrillard, the structure of objects comprise their reality: a reality 
that is predicated on the relations between the different elements of an object. 
Baudrillard’s ontology is therefore structuralist in that it attempts to displace 
orthodox Marxism’s invocations of the density of the concrete, the quotidian 
materiality of the world, with a more abstract conception of reality as a series of 
structural relations. Baudrillard’s more notorious claims about reality being
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displaced by hyppereality (the combinatory of signs generated by contemporary 
media) can be read as a claim that ‘real’ or natural reality, the seeming solid matter 
of things, has been displaced by an order of the reproduction of signs in which the 
structural relations between signs becomes the ontological source of the objective 
condition of our times as opposed to the pre-given ‘nature’ of things. This is not an 
idealist position, but a form of highly abstract materialism, a materialism which 
ontologically privileges the structural (understood as a form of materiality) rather 
than primal matter. For Baudrillard, the ‘real’ table is the set of structural relations 
that define the table as a particular entity in a particular social and cultural context. 
He rejects an essentialist concept of matter, but this does not mean that Baudrillard 
is therefore in the idealist camp.
Baudrillard’s structuralism allows him to account for signification and its relation 
to political economy without invoking a transcendent anterior reality as the 
foundation for his theorising. Structure is immanent in Baudrillard, it is that which 
comprises the world of social exchange and experience, it is that which comprises 
objects by means of the “different types of relations and significations that 
converge, contradict themselves, and twist around [them]” [Harland 1987, 
pg177]. Nothing is conceivable, in his terms, without structures that define the 
nature, social role and function of objects. These structures are part and parcel of 
everyday reality - they are that which through their own materiality make the 
materiality of our world possible. This conception of materialism is obviously light 
years away from the way in which orthodox Marxism conceives of materialism, but 
it is still very much a materialist position, albeit one which is anti-realist in that it 
does not cite a primal reality as its ontological foundation. Baudrillard’s 
‘structuralism’ does not imply essence of objects, they do not have a core of being,
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a ding am sich, in their use value, the appropriation of which is the basis of social 
and cultural relations. As we have seen in Chapter Two, Baudrillard does not 
accept that use value is that which realises the truth of objects but is just another 
form of capitalist fetishism, an attempt to impose a single meaning on the multiple 
meanings engendered by the structural relations that comprise objects. The 
difference between Baudrillard’s position and that of the orthodox Marxist tradition 
is best illustrated by comparing a Marxist account of the signification with the one 
offered by the later Baudrillard. David Harvey's The Condition of Postmodernity is a 
synoptic overtly Marxist treatment of cultural postmodernism and its relations to a 
social condition that he describes as "postmodernity". In this book. Harvey shows 
himself to be antagonistic to many of the premises of the theoretical positions 
articulated in France during the 1960s and 1970s which rejected Marxism as a 
liberatory philosophy, adopting an overtly critical stance towards the work of 
Baudrillard along with the work of other anti-Marxist radicals such as Michel 
Foucault and Jean-Francoise Lyotard. Harvey has developed a powerful and 
sometimes scathing Marxist critique of Lyotard's and Foucault's aversion to global 
or universal theorising, and their commitment to a politics that privileges local and 
specific struggles at the expense of any attempt to understand the relation of 
current political struggles to the socio-economic totality of advanced capitalism.
This commitment to an understanding of advanced capitalism as a totality is shared 
by Baudrillard who always conceives of capitalism as a totality, a complete 
ensemble of social and significatory relations. However, in stark contrast to 
Baudrillard, Harvey's work retains a commitment to a base/superstructural model of 
Marxism, an ontological model which privileges the development of productive 
forces and the social relations of production (the economic base) as the 'motor' of 
history, an anterior material reality on which the whole of contemporary society is
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constructed.
Harvey's account of cultural postmodernity is squarely within the tradition of 
orthodox Marxist theory. His work seeks to characterise history as a process in 
which the quest for capital accumulation acts as a spur to both technological 
development and the development of new social relations of production. It must be 
stressed that these developments are a reaction to the crises that are intrinsic to 
the capitalist mode of production and exchange. Modernity, for Harvey, is 
configured under the sign of Fordism: it is a socio-economic order based on the 
premise of rationally ordered mass production and mass consumption, a social 
order in which objects are produced and consumed with a view to increasing both 
individual and corporate wealth. If the hero of 19th century political economy was a 
lone ‘Robinson Crusoe’ exchanging those goods ‘he’ could not manufacture himself 
for some portion of ‘his’ surplus production, the hero of Fordism is the social mass, 
the collectivity being forged into new roles within a class-based society increasingly 
geared to fulfil all human needs through the mass production and consumption of 
goods, and indeed increasingly incapable of conceiving of any other way of meeting 
human needs except through the exchange of mass produced commodities. With 
the emergence of socio-economic modernity, the process that Lukacs 
characterised as ‘reification’ begins to dominate all experiences of social exchange 
as society learns “to satisfy all its needs in terms of commodity exchange” 
[Lukacs 1971, pg 91]. This distortion of human relations and displacement of 
properly human behaviour results from the reduction of all forms of social exchange 
to relations mediated by economic exchange values. Explicitly for Lukacs, and 
implicitly for Harvey, reification is as much a part of the tyranny of capital as class 
exploitation, and re-enforces the ideological legitimisation of capitalism by removing
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even the possibility of an alternative of a society founded on other than capitalist 
principles and practices. Against class exploitation and the extreme alienation 
implicit in the reification of objects and people into economic commodities, 
commodities which are measured against their exchange value and not their use 
(or human) value, Harvey pits Marx as a thinker in the liberatory, emancipatory, and 
sometimes utopian line of critical thought which descended from the Enlightenment: 
“Marx, who in many respects was a child of Enlightenment thought, sought to 
convert utopian thinking - the struggle for human beings to realize their 
‘species being’ as he put it in his early works - into a materialist science by 
showing how universal human emancipation might emerge from the class- 
bound and evidently repressive, though contradictory logic of capitalist 
development. In so doing he focused on the working class as the agent of 
human liberation and emancipation precisely because it was the dominated 
class of capitalist society. Only when the direct producers were in control of 
their own destinies, he argued, could we hope to replace domination and 
repression by a realm of social freedom.” [Harvey 1989, pgs 14-15]
For Harvey, the Marxist project is the recuperation of the possibilities of human 
existence that have been displaced by capitalist society. The Marxist project is the 
recovery of a social reality which while being the dialectical negation of capitalism 
has been engendered by capitalist economic, social and cultural development. The 
emancipatory potential of capitalist society remains as its dialectical other: the 
permanent possibility of realising ways of non-exploitational relations of production 
and social exchange that ‘haunt’ postmodern capitalism’s cornucopia of 
representation, its flux of imagery, its aleatory and fantastical semiurgy.
Harvey conceives of postmodern capitalism as having its genesis in major
64
changes to the economic base which introduced new social relations of production 
as a response to the economic crisis that undermined the post-war economic 
settlement. This settlement was based on what Harvey describes as a ‘Fordist’ 
regime of production, a regime of production based on the austere ‘rationality’ of 
time and motion studies' principles of organising labour by breaking down 
productive processes into discrete tasks, and then organising the actions necessary 
to complete these tasks into what Harvey describes as “component motions” 
[Harvey 1989, pg 125]. As Harvey points out, F. W. Taylor’s tract The Principles of 
Scientific Management promoted a division of labour aimed at maximising 
productivity while removing the labour process from artisanal control as far as the 
existing technology (and social technologies) of mass production permitted. 
However, Harvey also emphasises that Taylor’s approach had its ancestry in the 
work of 19th century writers such as Ure and Babbage. The approach to 
organising labour for maximum productivity advocated by Taylor, Ure, Babbage et 
al. was consciously implemented by Henry Ford, in a praxis that linked organising 
the productive powers of his employees with defining their subjectivity. Fordism 
was for Harvey as much an ideological activity as a purely economic one. Harvey 
writes that the Italian Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci was among the first 
Marxist thinkers to perceive that Fordism was both an economic and an ideological 
entity:
“The Italian communist leader Antonio Gramsci, languishing in one of 
Mussolini’s jails some two decades later, drew exactly that implication. 
Americanism and Fordism, he noted in his “Prison Notebooks”, amounted to 
‘the biggest collective effort to date to create, with unprecedented speed, and 
with a consciousness of purpose unmatched in history, a new type of worker 
and a new type of man.’ The new methods of work ‘are inseparable from a
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specific mode of living and of thinking and feeling life.’ Questions of 
sexuality, the family, forms of moral coercion, of consumerism, and of state 
action were, in Gramsci’s view, all bound up with the search to forge a 
particular kind of worker ‘suited to the new type of work and productive 
process.’ " [Harvey 1989, pg 126]
Although Harvey acknowledges that Fordism was in its infancy as a socio-economic 
organisational principle in the 1920s, when Fordist production processes had been 
in situ for some two decades, Fordism became established as the key form of 
praxis for an age in which mass production meant mass consumption and the 
radical reshaping of everyday life to accommodate the incessant demands of 
capitalist political economy. Not only was management control of the work process 
intensified, but management began to look beyond the work place, and found that 
there was a need to install a discipline in life outside the factory, a need to school 
people in a new dual role, the role of being at once a worker and a consumer in 
order to ensure that this new hybrid creature of capitalism was properly endowed 
with an appropriate subjectivity, a subjectivity which would ensure maximum 
compliance with their new role in the developing political economy of capitalism.
Harvey depicts Fordism as the realisation that a new economic regime 
demanded a new socio-cultural regime, that economic modernisation instigated a 
process of social and cultural modernisation. He writes that:
“What was so special about Ford (and what ultimately separates Fordism 
from Taylorism), was his vision, his explicit recognition that mass-production 
meant mass consumption, a new system of the reproduction of labour power, 
a new politics of labour control and management, a new aesthetics and 
psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalized, modernist, and populist
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democratic society.” [Harvey 1989, pgs 125 -126]
Fordism is, for Harvey, the begetter of modernity, and therefore that which created 
the conditions from which postmodernity emerged. It should be understood as a 
hierarchical yet populist attempt to create a society in which social exchange has 
become equivalent to the production and consumption of mass produced goods. 
Modernity is the experience of how a fundamental shift in the social organisation of 
production informed a series of changes in the social and cultural spheres. In this 
Marxist account of the genesis of the capitalism of modernity, the economic base, 
the ‘real’ of productive forces and the social relations of production informed by 
those forces, is that which drives the process of capitalist development. The way in 
which the social, psychological and cultural effects of these changes within the 
economic base were registered is given particular attention by Harvey, but it is clear 
that he regards them as ‘satellite’ or secondary phenomena, as ‘superstructural’ 
changes that were determined by an ontologically more fundamental order of 
existence.
For Harvey, the capitalism of postmodernity is one in which the relative social 
and economic stability of Fordist capitalism is being displaced by a form of 
capitalism that is increasingly signified as pure becoming, a state of flux, an 
ungrounded admixture of signifiers freed from their signifieds and referents, which, 
for commentators such as Neville Wakefield and Jonathan Raban, do not rest on, 
and in fact preclude, any form of stable ontological foundation. Instead of the 
dialectical interplay between ephemerally and permanence that Harvey detects in 
cultural production of the modernist movements of the later nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Harvey regards the culture of postmodernity, its order of 
representation, as being one in which on first sight there is no ontological
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counterpoint to flux and ephemerally, no perduring socio-economic base or 
ontological foundation upon which the changing surfaces of postmodern capitalism 
rest. However, Harvey does not accept this evaluation of postmodernity: he 
maintains that the postmodern carnival of imagery is based upon, and mediates, 
the underlying realities of space and time, the two most fundamental categories of a 
half-occluded but stubbornly real and permanent world. Harvey is adamant that 
“space and time are basic categories of human existence” [Harvey 1989, pg 
201]. The culture and social forms of postmodernity are constructed on these basic 
realities: they may, and do, distort them in ideologically loaded processes of 
signification, but space and time remain among the basic categories of ontological 
foundations of our experience. Madan Sarup regards the interplay between capital, 
space and time, and the effects of that interplay informed by the process of ‘time- 
space compression’ in which capitalism seeks to annul space in order to cut the 
‘turn-over time’ for capital accumulation (a process in which space is ontologically 
reduced to time), on our experience of space and time as characterising the 
capitalism of postmodernity:
“According to Harvey, the relations between money, space and time are 
interlocking sources of social power. He makes frequent reference to the 
concept of ‘time-space compression’, the processes that so revolutionise the 
objective qualities of space and time that we are forced to alter how we 
represent the world to ourselves. The word ‘compression’ is used to convey 
the point that the history of capitalism has been characterised by a speed-up 
in the pace of life.” [Sarup 1996, pg 99]
The ontologically ungrounded, ephemeral world of postmodern capitalism is one in 
which the world’s objective dimensions of space and time are being compressed as 
a result of capitalism’s inherent need to speed up the time it takes for profit to result
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from capital outlay. Under postmodern capitalism, space is being constantly 
compressed into time governed processes of production and consumption that 
Harvey regards as altering the way in which human beings now perceive and 
represent space and time. This process rests on the impact of the reality of human 
beings’ technics and social relations of production and the fundamental ontological 
categories of the world and the human lebenswelt. For Harvey, despite its own 
ideological mystifications, the development of capitalism is ultimately grounded on 
ontological realities, realities of production and consumption, and realities about the 
physical properties of the world. These realties are transcend any and all 
representations of them, and perdure through all the social and cultural mutations 
that accompany capitalist development.
Cultural postmodernism is, for Harvey, the result of the way in which the 
processes of production, exchange and consumption inform the physical condition 
of our world and the representations we make of that world. Despite the fact that 
Harvey regards semiotic processes as being secondary to the dialectical interplay 
of the realities of capitalist accumulation, space and time, he pays close attention to 
forms of cultural production in a symptomatic reading of the cultural condition of 
postmodern capitalism. In The Condition of Postmodernity, he links the way in 
which postmodern capitalism promotes, what for it are, “the values and virtues of 
instantaneity “ [Harvey 1989, pg 286] in a society characterised by what Harvey 
calls:
“The dynamics of a throwaway society, as writers like Alvin Toffler (1970) 
dubbed it, [which] began to become evident during the 1960s. It meant more 
than just throwing away produced goods (creating a monumental waste- 
disposal problem), but also being able to throwaway values, lifestyles, stable
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relationships, and attachments to things, buildings, places, people, and 
received ways of doing and being.” [Harvey 1989, pg 286]
As space is converted into shorter and shorter ‘turn-over’ times, Harvey contends 
that our experience is one in which all stable social relationships and all enduring 
relations with a given environment come under assault in a world that is a flux of 
discourses, images and sensations in an aleatory circulation in which any sense of 
permanence has been utterly displaced. In this world, objects are constantly 
stripped of associations, their accretions of meanings, as these are displaced by 
other, equally transient, meanings. Such a world can appear to have no depths; it 
becomes a play of surface presences, signs without referents, each of which will be 
displaced by another in a circulation of advertising and media images which seems 
a very close relation of both Susan Willis’ ‘hypercommodity’ and Baudrillard’s 
hyperreal procession of simulacra:
“Advertising, moreover, is no longer built around the idea of informing or 
promoting in the ordinary sense, but is increasingly geared to manipulating 
in the ordinary sense, but is increasingly geared to manipulating desires and 
tastes through images that may or may not have anything to do with the 
product to be sold (see plate 1.6). If we stripped modern advertising of direct 
reference to the three themes of money, sex and power there would be very 
little left. Furthermore, images have, in a sense, themselves become 
commodities.” [Harvey 1989, pg 287]
Harvey regards advertising as having jettisoned its overt referent. Advertising, for 
Harvey, is no longer a process in which the inherent qualities of any given 
commodity are signified to an audience of potential consumers, it is now a process 
of signification which refers to a social identity constructed from the privileged 
signifieds of “sex, money and power”, which is presented to audiences as though
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such an identity was in fact a given. Harvey’s approach to theorising advertising as 
a process of signification could well be described as ‘Kantian”, in that it posits the 
notion of a transient semiurgy which is based on far more stable and perduring or 
noumenal forms of reality. For Harvey, signification is always representation, 
whether it is the ideological mystifications of advertising or modern and postmodern 
art’s attempts to find new ways of representing our relations to space and time, 
signification is always a process in which an anterior referent is translated in sign 
form. That referent is of a more permanent nature or has a greater ontological 
value than the signifiers to which it refers.
Harvey therefore reads postmodern capitalism’s semiurgy as being posited on 
more fundamental realties, which themselves translated into the discourses and 
imagineries of advertising to suggest that there is some enduring thing that 
underlies the cornucopia of imagery that characterises our epoch:
“But images have other functions to perform. Corporations, governments, 
political and intellectual leaders, all value a stable (though dynamic) image as 
part of their aura of authority and power. The mediazation of politics has now 
become all pervasive. This becomes, in effect, the fleeting, superficial and 
illusory means whereby an individualistic society of transients sets forth its 
nostalgia for common values. The production and marketing of such images 
of permanence and power require considerable sophistication, because the 
continuity and stability of the image have to be retained while stressing the 
adaptability, flexibility and dynamism of whoever or whatever is being 
imaged.” [Harvey 1989, pg 288]
Harvey’s reading of the imaginary of postmodern capitalism is one in which the 
invariant features of capitalism, its axiomatics of production, reproduction,
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exchange and capital accumulation, mediate the flow of media images and use it to 
project an ideology in which everything will be, and always already has, been 
changed except the economic basis of the capitalist mode of production. Images of 
perduring power and authority not only market a given organisation or individual, 
but, in Harvey’s terms, they are also powerful reminders of the relative stability of 
capitalist categories and how the contradictions between those categories serve to 
generate the socio-economic instability that characterises Harvey’s reading of 
postmodern capitalism.
Such images are very much akin to what Jacques Lacan described as “points 
des caption” which anchor a given chain of signifiers in place. For Lacan, points 
des caption served to suture together signifiers, while Harvey’s capitalist imaginary 
of permanence serves to hold together the transient images of the postmodern 
semiurgy and images that purport to be unmediated images of the stable and 
invariant features of the social topology of capitalism. Harvey regards such 
signifiers as functioning to translate ideological discourse - with limited 
effectiveness - into social praxis in an attempt to provide a source of stability and 
coherence within our everyday life experiences of postmodern capitalism, a stability 
that is always within the capitalist order and which by necessity precludes any 
notion of alternatives to capitalism as a socio-economic order. This linking of 
semiotic and social practices is understood by Harvey as a means by which 
capitalism tries to reconcile its own inherent contradictions by trying to find an 
ideological ‘mythology’ which reconciles it tendencies to promote a fragmented and 
transient imaginary and experience of life with its need to reproduce itself as a 
coherent social, cultural, economic and political system. Harvey‘s reading of this 
practice is one in which signification is used to mediate an always already existing
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world and the always already existing socio-economic praxis of capitalism. It is one 
in which processes of signification represent or reflect other irreducible forms of 
reality without being themselves constitutive of those forms of reality. Harvey’s 
theorising of signification in postmodern capitalism is one in which the anterior 
realities of time and space determine the ultimate contours and features of human 
existence, and human existence is, in fact, unthinkable outside the ontological and 
epistemological conditions set by those realities. All imagineries, all semiurgies, all 
orders of signification, all regimes of economic production, exchange and 
accumulation, are ultimately ontologically secondary to time and space as those 
entities which ultimately determine the nature of our lebenswelt. Harvey’s view of 
the contemporary media and the imaginary of advertising, is that they are ultimately 
dependent upon realities that are external to them, and yet they manipulate the 
foundational realities of space and time to increase capital accumulation through 
the use of multi-media advertising. It is in this valorisation of a pristine reality that 
Harvey is at his greatest distance from Baudrillard’s thought; his imaginary 
mediates but does not constitute the real, while Baudrillard’s conception of 
postmodern capitalism rests on an absolute refusal to grant credence to any notion 
of a pristine physical real or a socio-economic base on which the superstructure of 
signification and social exchange is then erected. However, it has to be said that 
Baudrillard’s commitment to structures leads to a situation where he seems to take 
an essential position in which binary structures displace noumenal reality to such an 
extent that they themselves become essences, a sort of fundamental level of being 
which informs the phenomenal world of simulacra. This trait is most pronounced in 
Simulations where Baudrillard’s anti-realist materialism threatens to collapse into a 
binary essentialism, a discourse which reads all contemporary social and cultural 
phenomena as purely surface effects informed by a ‘inner’ world of structures. In
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Baudrillard’s defence it has to be said that the real/apparent or base/superstructural 
conception of the real is powerfully ingrained in theoretical discourse and is it is 
therefore difficult not to lapse back into using such a conception. However, 
Baudrillard’s anti-realism, while avoiding the confusion of cultural and natural 
categories that afflicts Harvey’s account of contemporary capitalism, is weakened 
by presenting its conception of objects in such a way that it could all too easily be 
read as an idealist critique of materialist theory. This leads to a situation in which 
Baudrillard can all too easily be accused of writing ‘metaphysics’ in the derogatory 
sense of erecting abstract theoretical structures that have no actual purchase on 
the current social and cultural conjunctures of contemporary capitalism.
In contrast, Harvey, as we have seen, regards capitalist development as being 
led primarily by the imperatives to technological development and their effects on 
specific, concrete social relations of production. His view of signification is therefore 
that it comprises a representative rather than a constitutive process, one in which 
the “emphasis upon ephemerality, collage, fragmentation and dispersal in 
philosophical and social thought mimics the conditions of flexible 
accumulation” [Harvey 1989, pg 302]. This view is diametrically opposed to 
Baudrillard’s account of the relation between signification and political economy in 
contemporary capitalist society, which presents the development of capitalism as a 
genealogy of simulacra - a process in which it is signification, the regime of sign 
production, reproduction and exchange, that characterises the different social 
formations of capitalism. For Baudrillard, signification is the privileged social 
practice. He does not seek to base signification on an ontologically prior order of 
reality, but regards signification as that which produces, and reproduces, different 
notions of a ontological order that determines the object of signification. It is
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important to stress that for Baudrillard, unlike Harvey, there is no meaning inherent 
in the properties of the ‘real’ world or in anything but the structural formations that 
constitute a given social order. Nor, for Baudrillard, are there any irreducible, 
anterior ontological properties that are constitutive of the world in which structural 
formations exist. Baudrillard's conception of signification privileges it as the only 
source of social and cultural meanings, meanings that believes can and should be 
reduced to the play of structures that constitute signification.
In The Mirror o f Production, Baudrillard introduces the notion of'simulation' as 
the ideological effects of the discourse of political economy, a discourse which 
imposes its own system of categories, its own conception of the ‘order of things’ in 
defining its object:
“Objectivity and truth are only the effect of the parcellization of a field of 
knowledge, of its autonomization under certain rules. Being closed off from 
everything else by a perfect and fragmented knowledge, that is the imaginary 
of the exact sciences, and the desire of science is nothing but the fascination 
with miscomprehension. Political economy as a science of the detached is 
thus properly ideological and the [Marxist] critique of political economy, when 
it wishes itself to be “scientific” (materialist), only serves to reinforce its 
object as a detached abstraction. There are no economic truths, or better, we 
have fashioned the truth of the economic as an arbitrary instance.” 
[Baudrillard 1975, pg 149 - all italics the author’s]
The notion that the discourse of political economy and the discourse of Marxist 
critical theory have systematically formed the object of which they speak, rather 
than being a representation of an anterior reality, is obviously based on the 
discourse theory elaborated by Michel Foucault in his books The Order o f Things
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and The Archaeology o f Knowledge. Throughout his career, Foucault advocated a 
position that refused to treat things as the source of discourse, he refused the 
common sense notion that meaning results from achieving a proper relation 
between words (or any other type of sign) and things. The discourses of political 
economy and Marxism, in Baudrillard's view, are constitutive of the realities that 
they would have us believe are both logically and chronologically prior to them. The 
discourse of political economy is therefore ideological in appearing to represent an 
object, when it is in fact constitutive of that object. It is also ideological in that, 
according to Baudrillard, it presents political economy and Marxism as pre-given 
totalities, despite the fact that these totalities result from a purely discursive 
'closure' in which some privileged chains of signifiers are distinguished as 
constituting 'political economy' or 'Marxism' in contradistinction to other chains of 
signifiers that constitute other 'disciplines' or 'sciences'. It will be seen that in taking 
this position, Baudrillard's adopted an ontological and epistemological stance which 
is diametrically opposed to that of the Marxist tradition, and that his critical 
approach is characterised by a thoroughgoing ontological anti-essentialism and 
anti-realism. This is not to say that Baudrillard is in any way an idealist, taking the 
position that there is nothing beyond discourse. Baudrillard, it must be stressed, 
insists on the materiality of signification, on the materiality of the process of 
simulation and its effects on the production and reproduction of the social, the 
economic and the cultural. However, it is also the case that this position is 
extremely vulnerable to being recuperated as a form of idealism, and as a form of 
discursive essentialism, which privileges discourse in the same reductionist way as 
Stalinist interpretations of Marxism privilege economic determinism as the ultimate 
source of our conditions of existence. This problem with Baudrillard's work will be 
discussed later in this chapter, although. It will be argued here that Baudrillard's
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approach to theorising signification as simulation is in fact materialist.
We have seen Foucault’s basic premise that “meaning is a product of 
differences between signs” [Lacan 1994, pg xxiii], as David Macey puts it in his 
introduction to Jacques Lacan’s The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, is the point of departure for Baudrillard's radical critique of the 
contemporary capitalism and its semiurgy. In her The Politics o f Truth: From Marx 
to Foucault, Michele Barrett offers a lucid description of Foucault’s approach to 
understanding discourse, which is also highly applicable to Baudrillard’s early 
attempts to elucidate his own radical position, despite Baudrillard’s subsequent 
distancing of himself from Foucault in his polemic Forget Foucault 
“Discourses are composed of signs, but they do more than designate things, 
for they are ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak’. In a neat reversal of the classical materialist hierarchy Foucault says 
that the rules of discursive practice ‘define not the dumb existence of a 
reality, nor the canonical use of vocabulary, but the ordering of objects.” 
[Barrett 1991, pg 130]
It will be seen that Baudrillard’s conception of both political economy and Marxism 
rests on the assumption that they are discursive practices that produce and 
reproduce their discursive objects according to the logic of their own codes. The 
world of an orthodox Marxist and the world of a classical political economist are 
both simulations governed by the discourses that form their models. These 
discourses, these simulations, do not translate the terms of reality into the forms 
and processes of signification, they instead substitute their codes, their closed 
structural logics, for the object they purport to represent. The economic simulation 
is a instance of what Baudrillard's dubs a “third order” simulacra, a form of
77
simulation which is not based on the relation of a copy (simulation) to a real original, 
nor based on abstract forces of production as in the second or industrial schema of 
simulation. Third order simulacra are the latest, and in Baudrillard’s view the most 
oppressive, of the three orders of simulation that define the production, 
reproduction and exchange of meaning in Western Europe and North America.
Because of its importance to understanding Baudrillard's work, his genealogy 
of simulacra deserves careful consideration. Baudrillard's genealogy of the forms 
of simulacra that open the second essay in Symbolic Exchange and Death, an 
essay which is better known, at least for anglophone readers, as the second 
chapter of Baudrillard’s most famous (or infamous) work Simulations. Baudrillard's 
genealogy owes much to the methodology of the later Foucault. It is an approach 
in which the emergence of new orders of simulacra are delineated in order to 
understand fully the radical discontinuity between given regimes of signification in a 
way that rejects teleological schemas in favour "of critique through the 
presentation of difference" [Sarup 1988, pg 63]:
“There are three orders of simulacra, running parallel to the successive 
mutations of the law of value since the Renaissance:
- The counterfeit is the dominant schema in the ‘classical’ period from the 
Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution.
- Production is the dominant schema in the industrial era.
- Simulation is the dominant schema in the current code-governed phase.
The first-order simulacrum operates on the natural law of value, the second- 
order on the market law of value, and the third order on the structural law of 
value." [Baudrillard 1993, pg 50]
Simulacra can be defined as regimes of signification, the historical emergence of
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significatory orders and their relation to their referents, or, in other words, the 
relationship of signs to ‘reality’ and the effect of the social circulation of those signs. 
It will be seen that Baudrillard maintains the fundamental dualism between the 
structural production and reproduction of meaning in the form of signs and the 
‘referent’ or ‘reality’ to which those signs refer that was first elucidated by Ferdinand 
de Saussure in his Course in General Linguistics. In this course of lectures, 
Saussure broke the link between object and representation, referent and sign, 
which, in various forms, had been regarded as the locus of meaning in discourse 
and significatory practices. The dynamics of meaning, for Saussure and 
Baudrillard, are produced by the constellation of structural relationships that 
constitute a sign. In this account of signification, signs gain their meaning by the 
relationships between their constituent elements (a sign = a signifier, the concrete 
material form of a sign, and a signified, the image or concept conveyed by the 
signified) rather than a unmediated or natural relationship with their referents. A 
sign is replacement for another entity, something that stands in something else’s 
place. It is always already a substitution, an entity that puts itself in the place of the 
thing, event or person that it signifies; the sign is always already a usurper from the 
inception of the modern order of signification, in Baudrillard’s genealogy of 
simulacra, by the virtue of the fact it does not translate the inherent meanings of 
the world into significatory media, but stands in the place of its referent.
Prior to the early modern period, Baudrillard argues in Symbolic Exchange and 
Death and Simulations that there was no distinction between signs and the real.
The order of signs was the order of nature. The pre-Renaissance order of 
signification was one in which there was no circulation of signs and meanings, signs 
were direct emanations of the given, and the social order was also an emanation of
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this ‘natural’ given. Prior to the Renaissance and the emergence of a mercantile 
capitalist economy, Baudrillard argues that signs were restricted, they designated 
positions in an immutable, God-given social hierarchy, a hierarchy in which to 
appropriate the wrong sign would be severely punished. Baudrillard describes this 
regime of signification as that which constitutes a cruel and innately oppressive 
social order, and warns against the ‘dream’ of returning to such an unequivocal, 
closed order of signification:
“If we are starting to dream again, today especially, of a world of sure signs, 
of a strong “symbolic order”, make no mistake about it: this order has 
existed and it was that of a ferocious hierarchy, since transparency and 
cruelty for signs go together. In caste societies, feudal or archaic, cruel 
societies, the signs are limited in number, and are not widely diffused, each 
one functions with its full value as interdiction, each is a reciprocal obligation 
between caste, clans or persons.” [Baudrillard 1983, pg 84]
Modern totalitarian societies, particularly those controlled by Fascist or Nazi 
regimes, have displayed exactly this nostalgia for re-inventing the strong sign, the 
sign that acts as a social and cultural determinant, as a socio-culturally constitutive 
power. The order of the strong sign is, as Baudrillard points out, an order in which 
the number, type and functions of signs are restricted, and that these restrictions 
which govern networks of social power relations and unequal social obligations are 
carefully policed. The pre-Renaissance social order was truly, for Baudrillard, an 
order of signification: it was a social order in which social position, power and 
prestige were defined by the signs that different individuals were allowed to 
appropriate. The social was a hierarchical order of signs, a fixed order of meaning 
in which signification was integral to social relationships, a manifestation of people’s 
social condition, which was part and parcel of a wider, God-given reality. In the
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pre-Renaissance order of signification, signs did merely ‘refer’ to reality, they were 
integral to reality, and it was only with the emergence of the first order of simulacra, 
the first order of meaning based on a distinction between sign and reality, that the 
notion of signs as being in some way a substitute, a replacement for a given 
external referent, became dominant.
The first order of simulacra is one which Baudrillard describes as being based 
on the differential relationship between the real and signs of that reality. The 
discourses and imaginary of first order simulation was characterised by a distinction 
that was maintained between the real and signs which copied or, rather, were 
counterfeits of the real. This order of simulation depended on there being a clear 
point of demarcation between the sign, the copy, and its referent in the order of 
reality. The real was the point of departure for signification which was a form of 
superstructure, an artificial order erected on the base of the natural. In this schema 
of signification, meaning arises form the radical distinction between the terms of the 
simulated or counterfeited and pristine, given reality. Signs have meaning precisely 
because they are not originals, but belong to a secondary order, an order of copies, 
forgeries, fakes of the real. These counterfeits always aim at the most faithful 
reproduction of its referent, but they are always debarred from the pristine order of 
the real that they seek to copy in such detail. The first order of simulacra, the order 
of the real and counterfeit, is one in which restriction is no longer applied to the 
circulation of signs in society, but is applied to the ontological hierarchy of natural, 
‘real’ being and artificial copies of that being.
This order of simulation is predicated upon a bar between sign and referent, 
copy and reality. As Baudrillard writes in Simulations, the sign of the classical or
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early modern period is characterised by, on the one hand, the immense 
proliferation of sign-forms relative to the restricted order of signification, and, on the 
other, the fixed boundary between two ontological orders, the pristine real and the 
counterfeit:
“For we have passed from a limited order of signs, which prohibits “free 
production”, to a proliferation of signs according to demand. But the sign 
multiplied no longer resembles in the slightest the obliged sign of limited 
diffusion: it is its counterfeit, not by corruption of an “original”, but by 
extension of a material whose very clarity depended on the restriction by 
which it was bound. No longer discriminating (it is no more than 
competitive), unburdened of all restraint, universally available, the modern 
sign still simulates necessity in taking itself as tied somehow to the world.” 
[Baudrillard 1983, pg 85]
It will be seen that this free circulation of signs, signs which are not in themselves a 
part of the natural order, but fabricated substitutes for their referents, occurs at the 
historical moment in which mercantile capitalism is emerging. As we have seen, 
Baudrillard believes that the logic of meaning under capitalism is analogous to the 
logic of capitalist exchange, meanings are produced by the circulation of signs as 
exchange values (signifiers) which refer to their use value (signifieds/referents), as 
though they were the ontological finality of the sign, as though they were that which 
justified the exchange of a proliferating number of signifiers despite the fact that 
they were no longer umbically bound to their signifieds and referents. At this point, 
signs become exchangeable, the circulation and exchange of signs against 
referents is the essential characteristic the modern form of the sign. Signs are now 
free to proliferate and be exchanged both against other signs and referents, but this 
freedom occurs because signs are no longer irrevocably moored to referents. At
82
the very start of the capitalist project of exchange and accumulation, the system of 
sign exchange is haunted by the possibility that signs can, and will, lie, that they are 
no just clear naturally indices, but that they can manipulate, subvert and displace 
given reality.
Baudrillard describes this Janus-faced event as being at once the liberation of 
meaning from its hitherto fixed constraints, and a powerful sense of how signs have 
become a fabrication, a form of production which moves the natural referent into 
the position of being that which is always already hidden behind the sign. The cost 
of escaping a fixed order of signification is the fact that 'truth' is no longer 
immanent, but is, as we have seen, generated from a discourse and imaginary 
which bifurcate the world into overt appearances and hidden substance, a 
discourse that is now wedded to the notion of production as its condition of 
possibility. Baudrillard describes this semiology as the first emergence of the 
couplet of signification and political economy:
“It is with the Renaissance, then, that the forgery is born along with the 
natural, ranging from the deceptive finery on people’s backs to the prosthetic 
fork, from the stucco interiors to Baroque theatrical scenery. The entire 
classical era was the age of the theatre par excellence. The theatre is a form 
that gripped social life in its entirety as well as all architecture from the 
Renaissance on. From these incredible achievements with stucco and 
Baroque art we can unravel the metaphysics of the counterfeit, as well as the 
new ambitions of Renaissance man [sic]. These latter consist in an earthly 
demiurgy, the transubstantiation of all nature into a single substance, a 
theatrical sociality unified under the sign of the bourgeoisie values, beyond 
differences of blood, rank or caste. Stucco is the triumphant democracy of
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all artificial signs, the apotheosis of the theatre and fashion, revealing the 
unlimited potential of the new class, as soon as it was able to end the sign’s 
exclusivity.” [Baudrillard 1993, pg 51]
The ability to use a single medium (stucco) to fashion a perfect copy of the 
disparate objects of the world, dramatises, for Baudrillard, the power of the new 
class to tear apart the fixities of the feudal order and to remake the world as a 
simulacrum. A simulacrum that celebrates the 'universality' of bourgeoisie values in 
its displacement of the immanent real with counterfeits of that reality. However, the 
world that is posited in the discourse of signification as the dialectic of appearance 
and substance is still a fleshed-out, naunced reality. The real is an intricate 
interlocking of different objects in different orders, it is the ultimate source of 
meaning, and the sign always pays homage to the primacy of the world in its 
attempts to mimic the cornucopia of being. However, the industrial revolution's 
introduction of mass production results in a sea-change in the order of simulation. 
The world as a unique reality counterfeited by a simulacrum of unique signs is 
displaced, with the emergence of mass production, in favour of a regime of 
signification based on the radical equivalence and exchangeability of signs. 
Baudrillard’s second order simulacra is comprised of a play of signification in which 
signs are not exchanged for the real, but are exchanged for each other as they 
proliferate to the point that any trace of their origins is lost. Second order simulacra 
do not have 'real' objects as their referent, their condition of emergence is the 
regime of technics that have allowed the serial production of an indefinite number of 
identical signs. The second order of simulacra, which is treated by Baudrillard in a 
somewhat cursory fashion in Simulations and Symbolic Exchange and Death, is 
very much the moment of political economy, that point at which a theoretical 
framework and actual economic practices fused together in a now order of
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production and signification. The second order of simulacra is the highpoint of 
political economy and Baudrillard would that the works of political economists such 
as Ricardo, and the critique instigated by Marx and Engels, are in fact exemplars of 
second order simulacra, mirroring its conversion of a reality composed of abstract 
forces into a social world of consumption and exchange. The categories of political 
economy are displaced by the processes of signification (simulation) as the second 
order of simulacra gives way to the third order. In this order of simulacra, political 
economy no longer has an object as the technics of the electronic age inform a 
praxis of signification which has now displaced production as the basis in what 
Baudrillard depicts as the capitalist mode of reproduction
In view of this, it is not surprising that Baudrillard takes issue with the Marxist 
notion that industrialisation is a liberation of productive forces that have at least 
potentially the prospect of satisfying all human needs if the means of production, 
distribution and exchange are no longer organised to ensure the continuing 
accumulation of capital by a minority of the world's population. For Baudrillard, 
technics, the physical machinery of production, is a medium disseminates a new 
form of sign, and as such technics are not neutral, they are that which produces 
and reproduces the semiurgy of industrial capitalism:
"The entire analysis of production will be swept aside if we stop regarding it 
as an original process, as the process at the origin of all others, but 
conversely as a process which reabsorbs every original being and introduces 
a series of identical beings. Up to this point, we have considered labour as 
potential, as force and myth, as a generic activity: an energetic-economic 
myth proper to modernity. We must ask ourselves whether production is not 
rather an intervention, a particular phase, in the order of signs - whether it is
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basically only one episode in the line of simulacra, that episode of producing 
an infinite series of potentially identical beings (object-signs) by means of 
technics." [Baudrillard 1993, pg 55 - all italics the author's]
If for Marxism, production is ultimately production ex-nihilo in that it is the 
foundational activity, the activity that creates, that fashions the life-world out of 
quotidian, material reality. The introduction of mass production simply magnified 
the powers and capabilities of production, the industrial revolution vastly augmented 
human beings' capacity to fashion the conditions within which they live. However, 
Baudrillard regards the industrial revolution as a degradation of the sign, an event in 
which signs lost their referents in the real, and became indices of abstract powers, 
the forces and dynamics of industrialised mass production. In Symbolic Exchange 
and Death, Baudrillard adds to his critique of Marxist conceptions of capitalism 
when he challenges Marx's belief in the liberatory capacity of technics:
"Marx's greatest error was to have retained a belief in the innocence of 
machines, the technical process and science - all of which were supposedly 
capable of becoming living social labour once the system of capital was 
liquidated, despite the fact that this is precisely what the system is based 
on." [Baudrillard 1993, pg 15]
Rather than offer the possibility of a liberation that may be realised by dialectical 
means, Baudrillard's concept of industrialised mass production is one in which signs 
are delineated by the simple difference between them, by the fact that one item in 
the sequence of production is not any other item in that sequence, rather than by 
their position in relation to a given referent in the real. Second order simulacra are 
characterised by the effects of mass production on the circulation of 
commodities/signs that determines the character of an industrialised society 
ultimately determined by the mass reproduction and exchange of signifiers in a
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simulacrum that might dubbed a 'semio-economic' social order.
Because of the highly abstract and schematic nature of Baudrillard’s account of 
the successive orders of simulacra3, it may be useful to consider these conceptions 
in the light of a short case study which shows the differences between signification 
and production in the second and third orders of simulation. Gawthorpe Street in 
the conservation area of the township of Padiham in East Lancashire has recently 
had its tarmacadam road surface removed, and its ‘original’ cobbled surface 
restored. Gawthorpe Street is a short street of stone built terrace houses on the 
edge of an important conservation area which contains a large number of mid- 
Victorian residences, shops, and an early police station. The restoration of its 
cobbled surface is a part of the ongoing restoration work within the conservation 
area. However, this fairly trivial event is a striking example of the difference 
between the second and third orders of simulation; it is a event in which Gawthorpe 
Street has not been so much restored to its ‘original’ condition, but has in fact 
become a third order simulation of its earlier appearance. Gawthorpe Street is not 
a counterfeit of an original, nor would it true to describe it as a second order 
simulation generated by serial production. In its current ‘restored’ conditon, the 
street is a simulation informed by and generated from a model. The model is in 
this case a model based on historical knowledge about the original features of a 
mid-Victorian street, and by restoring the cobbles - much to the detriment of 
pedestrians crossing the street - Gawthorpe Street has now found its self a 
simulation, a signifier of a referent which is its model and point of origin. It is worth 
stressing that there is no economic advantage to be secured by making Gawthorpe 
Street into a cobbled street again, nor is there is very much use value to be realised
3 For convenience, a chart detailing the different orders of simulacra is appended at the end of
this chapter.
in converting a street with a safe tarmacdam surface into a version of its former self 
complete with cobbles that are dangerous to any of the elderly people who live in 
the neighbourhood. Gawthorpe Street’s identity is now that of a sign, a sign whose 
referent is the conceptual model that is based on a logic by which streets within the 
conservation area of Padiham are to be distinct from streets in the rest of the 
township.
Although Gawthorpe Street is a small incidence of simulation, the former textile 
areas of East Lancashire clearly exhibit the difference between second order and 
third order simulation on a much larger scale. The Lancashire of the mid­
nineteenth century was one in which capital as the technics and social relations of 
production were exploited as the basis for a dynamics of production on a hitherto 
unheard of scale. By the 1860s, the Burnley area of Lancashire alone was capable 
of producing more cotton goods than the entire Belgian textile industry. In the 
towns and villages of South and East Lancashire, a new order of production 
informed what Baudrillard, as we have seen, dubbed the second order of 
simulation. In this order, the only referents are the abstract forces, the physics, of 
production. The production process was one in which abstract forces were 
harnessed to produce an uncountable number of identical items. Thousands of 
yards of woven cotton became thousands of mass produced items, each of which 
was a sign of its origin in the physics of production, a sign of its aetiology in the 
transcendent abstract forces of labour. In second order simulation, the substantial 
original, the ontologically profound referent, becomes abstracted, becomes part of 
the forces which are the precondition of all production. Accrington, Bolton, Burnley, 
Blackburn, Helmshore all still contain the relics of this order of simulation, one 
based on serial production of items which signify only their origins in the forces
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harnessed for social production and exchange. However, these relics are 
increasingly pressed into service as simulations of their earlier selves. In ‘working 
museums’ across Lancashire, power looms and spinning machines still work, not as 
part of a machinery of production but as part of a massive exercise in the simulated 
reproduction of an earlier phase of Lancashire’s economic and social history.
Museums, like the Helmshore Textile Museum and Elizabeth Street Mill, 
Burnley, are third order simulacra, they are copies without an original in so far as 
they do not mimic the actual (and terrible) conditions of nineteenth century cotton 
mills but a model of a working museum. They are not faithful to the actual history of 
the mills and the people who worked in them, but to a conceptual logic or model of 
how the past should be experienced as a sign-form or simulation in the last years of 
the twentieth century. They are places in which the dynamics of production and the 
second order of simulation have been annexed to the reproduction of third order 
simulacra, copies which refer only to their models. This process illustrates 
Baudrillard’s argument that the establishment of second order simulation based on 
mass production is the precondition for the emergence of third order simulation. 
Baudrillard describes the entry into a semiurgy dominated by third order simulacra 
in terms of a fundamental change from a mode of (mass) production to an order of 
reproduction, an order in which all signs are generated from the binary codes of 
their models:
"As soon as dead work wins out over living work - that is, as soon as the era 
of primitive accumulation is over - serial production yields to generation by 
means of models. And here it is a question of a reversal of origin and finality, 
for all the forms change once they not so much mechanically reproduced but 
even conceived from the point-of-view of their very reproducibility, diffracted
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from a generating nucleus we call the model. Here we are in the third-order 
simulacra; no longer that of the counterfeit of an original as in the first order, 
nor that of the pure series as in the second. Here are the models from which 
proceed all forms according to the modulation of their differences. Only 
affiliation to the model makes sense, and nothing flows any longer according 
to its end, but proceeds from the model, the 'signifier of reference', which is a 
kind of anterior finality and the only reference there is." [Baudrillard 1983, 
pgs 100 -101 - all italics the author's]
The third order simulacrum is one in which commodity-signs exist only as a 
simulation of, or a "diffraction from", the models that preceded them. Third order 
simulacra are reproductions, signs that are the immanent form of the model from 
which they are generated. Instead of their meaning being governed by a structural 
distinction between themselves and reality as referent, their structural principle is 
that of the binary opposition, the simple difference between terms, the difference 
between the coded, and coding, model and its manifestation as the ceaseless 
circulation of reproduced signs. The only 'meaning' of signs is now their relation to 
the code that governs their reproduction and their exchange in a late capitalism 
semiurgy or, rather, semio-economy that is, for Baudrillard, no longer based on 
"the law of capital, but on the structural law of value" [Baudrillard 1983, pg 
101]. Signs now circulate without any reference to the real, they proliferate to form 
a 'hyperreality', a reality that is generated from the play of ungrounded model­
generated signs that Baudrillard contends is more real than the real itself. The 
textile museums of East Lancashire are not indices of a lost historical period, but 
merely simulations governed by generating models. With the advent of third order 
simulacra, any access to the 'real', the natural, any referent beyond and above the 
sign is lost. The real becomes increasingly 'hyperreal', a condition which could be
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defined as a profusion of semioticised objects which are devoid of referential 
meaning while being totally immanent and lacking any pristine reality in their own 
right. Such objects are more real than real, just as the simulated fabric and 
contents of the Helmshore textile museum is more ‘real’ than any real cotton mill, 
and displace rather than signify accurately the reality of sweated work in the 
weaving and spinning sheds of East Lancashire.
Baudrillard's account of the emergence of third order simulacra is based on a 
through-going rejection of the notion that meaning is inherent within things. He 
does not accept, as Harvey does, that there are fundamental ontological categories 
upon which the structural relations that inform the social, economic and cultural 
orders are then erected. Baudrillard regards noumenal reality as something which 
has been lost in the development of capitalism's semio-economy. This economy 
has reshaped the order of meaning in line with the dynamics of its own structures, 
the real as a fundamental given has been displaced by the semiotic, by the 
circulation of signs which are no longer valued in terms of their referents, in terms 
of their relation to a referential finality that is analogous to the category of use 
value, but in terms of their 'exchange value' against other signs. The Baudrillardian 
world is one in which signs are increasingly detached from any final reference and 
are free to circulate and mutate in capitalist order in which the reproduction of a 
given code, a given structure of meaning, has displaced a social sphere based on 
primary production. Capital now exists to reproduce its own forms and media, and 
in a real sense, Baudrillard's world is one in which reification has reached its 
apogee in a world in which the distinction between subject and object increasingly 
undermined as people become reduced to the status of terminals in the vast relay 
network that is the third order of simulation. According to Baudrillard, the
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replacement of the real by simulations that are even more 'realistic', more 'life-like' 
than the real is an event which stems from mutations in the nature of capitalism; 
capitalism, for Baudrillard, no longer needs the 'real', the noumenal, as its finality, 
and it has moved beyond any concept of the real in reproducing itself as the 
reproduction of simulations. Baudrillard accords no referential value to the real, it is 
not, for him, the aetiological source of signification, nor an element in a dialectic of 
historical progress or development. The Baudrillardian universe is one in which 
signs have been unmoored from the real, and now circulate without impediment in a 
semio-economy which is antithetical to that of the pre-Renaissance order of 
restricted signification. In "Simulations", Baudrillard writes that the pre- 
Renaissance order of signification was one in which fashion was not possible, and 
that fashion, as a combinatory of different signs, begins only with the emergence of 
first order simulacra [Baudrillard 1983, pg 83]. The next chapter will therefore 
examine Baudrillard's approach to analysing fashion an actual cultural phenomena 
in greater detail, using his analysis of the role of fashion in mature capitalism in 
order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his position in relation to the 
Marxist analysis of fashion put forward by Dick Hebdige and Angela McRobbie’s 
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Chapter 3: Fashion as Signification
The preceding chapter offered an account of Baudrillard’s genealogy of simulacra, 
his account of the development of modes of production understood as the 
mechanisms of signification that was contrasted against David Harvey’s Marxist 
account of the development of postmodern capitalism. Baudrillard’s genealogy is 
one in which history is a succession of orders of simulacra in which concepts of 
representation are changed by the emergence of different technics of production 
and reproduction. The contours of Baudrillard’s theoretical world are in some ways, 
therefore, similar to those of Marxist conceptions of historical change. Orthodox 
Marxists would regard historical development as resulting ultimately from changes 
in the productive forces that inform the nature of a given society. However, 
Baudrillard’s later work is based on the notion that the mode of production is an 
effect of the significatory order. Baudrillard therefore argues that the mode of 
production is not the ontological ground depicted in both Marxist theory and political 
economy, but is rather a medium of social exchange, a form of communication in 
societies which are themselves constituted by significatory practices. He also, as 
we have seen, has come to reject any form of materialism based on the concept of 
a referential reality that constitutes the ultimate source of social meaning. This, as 
has been argued in the preceding chapter, does not mean that Baudrillard is an 
idealist. He should be regarded, rather, as a materialist who views the dynamic 
interplay of structures as being the origin of signification. Baudrillard’s materialism 
is one that is predicated on structure, on the interplay between the terms of a 
structural formation. It will be seen therefore that Baudrillard regards structures as 
being constitutive of any given social order of meaning, and that the genealogy of 
simulacra discussed in detail in the last chapter is in fact a history of the way in
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which social exchange has been structurally determined in Western societies since 
the middle ages.
Baudrillard’s critique of what he regards as orthodox Marxism’s inability to 
transcend the essential categories of political economy and his alternative account 
of the development of capitalism in his genealogy of simulacra are highly 
suggestive theoretical constructs which seem to have been elaborated with a view 
to making their practical application as difficult as possible. This chapter will 
therefore try to remedy this by looking at how Baudrillard can be used in analysing 
an example of social function of a sign system. It will concentrate closely on 
Baudrillard’s account of fashion and compare its understanding of fashion as 
signification with the sophisticated Marxist account of fashion put forward by Dick 
Hebdige in his book Subculture: The Meaning of Style. Baudrillard’s most 
sustained consideration of fashion appears in the collection of essays entitled 
Symbolic Exchange and Death. This book is the one in which Baudrillard 
consolidates a radical political position outside the Marxist tradition. However, this 
is a position which is still informed by Marxist categories and methodology. In 
breaking with Marxism, Baudrillard still remains to some degree with its orbit, and 
he certainly remains within the tradition of critical materialist theorising despite his 
refusal to take a realist position based on any covert or overt form of Kantianism. In 
Baudrillard’s theorising the social does not exist for the benefit of the economic: the 
social is not the organisation of production and consumption in order to secure 
economic advantages for (some) members of that society. Therefore, for 
Baudrillard, the economic is not the basis or hidden referent of society, but another 
medium of communication and exchange that defines the relations between the 
people who inhabit our society. The social does not exist for the economic, the
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economic is a medium of communication in a societies that are defined by systems 
of signification. The production and reproduction of signified meaning is the key 
social activity: communication sutures together objects in the current order of 
signification, its discourses and images. Despite his infamous rejection of 
sociology, Baudrillard continues to theorise capitalism as a totality, an ensemble of 
structural relations, that must be understood as a unity, unlike other radical 
‘postmoderrn’ or ‘post-structuralist’ thinkers, such as Foucault and Jean Francois 
Lyotard, who reject the idea that contemporary society can be theorised as a totality 
of relations and effects. In so far as he recognises sign circulation and exchange 
as a universal system, a structural totality, Baudrillard remains far closer to the 
Marxist tradition than the majority of other ‘postmodern’ writers for whom 
totalisation is simply an attempt to ignore and marginalise social and semiotic 
‘difference’. In Baudrillard’s work the significatory is privileged above and beyond 
the economic, indeed, Baudrillard’s concept of the postmodern ‘social’ order can be 
approached as being that of a superstructure without a base, a play of 
systematically related structures that are not grounded on any noumenal real. 
Baudrillard’s approach to society is one of reducing society to signification and 
communications, his is a ‘semio-society’, a society in which power and politics 
consist in the circulation of signs and images rather than the control of the means of 
economic production and exchange.
The role of fashion as a form of signification in contemporary society is a 
recurring theme in Baudrillard’s work. He has used fashion to illustrate his 
arguments from his earliest writings onwards, and he has consistently regarded 
fashion as a combinatory of signs, a bricolage of elements, in which meaning is an 
effect of structure. This is mirrored in his methodology which has become 
increasingly based on speculation which is not related to any form or concrete
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empirical or historical analysis. Baudrillard’s extended theorising about the 
significatory role of fashion in Symbolic Exchange and Death is very abstract and it 
does not include any case studies or specific examples of how fashion functions as 
a form of signification. This methodological approach is one which is consistent 
with Baudrillard’s refusal to endorse the notion that any system of signification has 
its source in the extra-discursive, in the mute world of ‘real’ things. Signs, for 
Baudrillard, are structures that no longer related to, or exchanged against, their 
referents because their mode of production, or rather their mode of reproduction, is 
one in which signs are no longer ontologically dependent on an anterior reality. 
Baudrillard’s signs are autonomous, and more than ever, sign exchange governs 
and dominates the social topology of late capitalism. Baudrillard’s ontology of the 
sign is therefore one of a structured surface that does not rest on any form of 
referential or noumenal foundation. Signs have become unmoored from the real, 
and Baudrillard’s account of the socius of late twentieth century capitalism is one in 
which signs interact with each other in a simulation of communication, a simulation 
in which the human subject has been displaced by, and perhaps dispersed into, 
signs and their unlimited circulation in the postmodern semiurgy.
In Baudrillard’s earliest writings, this form of circulation is one in which 
semiotics are subordinated to achieving the ever accelerating consumption of 
commodities that characterises postmodern capitalism. It results in social 
exchange being reduced to consumption, which Baudrillard argues should be 
regarded now as a more important underlying social dynamic than production. Even 
as a neo-Marxist, Baudrillard is adamant that postmodern capitalism is based on a 
new form of social praxis, a praxis in which production is relegated to the status of 
the ‘alibi’, the raison d’etre, of consumption. In contrast to the world of fashion and
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its ceaseless circulation of ephemeral objects, Baudrillard expresses a nostalgia for 
objects that were exchanged through generations, objects that gave a stability to 
the immediate, everyday social world. In The System of Objects, he writes of the 
socially constructed and maintained differences between objects, differences which 
once gave a profound social meaning to objects and which have been annulled by 
fashion:
“Today a farmhouse table has cultural value, but just thirty years ago its sole 
value arose from the purpose it served. In the eighteenth century there was 
simply no relationship between a ‘Louis XV” table and a peasant’s table: 
there was an unbridgeable gulf between the two types of object, just as there 
was between the two corresponding social classes. No single cultural 
system embraced them both.” [Baudrillard 1996, pgs 137 -138]
At this point in his career, Baudrillard regards fashion as an adjunct of the market, 
a carnival of ephemeral commodities. Fashion is that which governs the structural 
relations that give meaning to objects, it is a principle of control, a code, a matrix 
which determines the meaning of things. Fashion has become an admixture, the 
bringing together of objects in a single system, a system governed by a single - 
albeit complex - code, that were once radically separated by their use and cultural 
value. Any thing, any commodity can be included in the combinatory of fashion, 
and therefore there are no ‘unbridgeable gulfs’ between objects and their social 
consumption. The admixture of fashion is one that is no longer structured in terms 
of a distinction between discrete social classes and their cultural requirements, but 
is structured as a distinction between the old and the new, with the new being the 
privileged term in the couplet. The implicit logic of fashion in The System o f Objects 
is that of continual addition and replacement, new objects - which are marginally 
different to existing objects - are introduced as replacements for existing objects.
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New styles of clothing replace ‘earlier’ styles, rendering them ‘unfashionable’ or 
obsolescent, just as the latest style of a particular make and model of car renders 
the earlier version of the ‘same’ car unfashionable and discounts its value as a sign- 
form. Fashion, for the Baudrillard of The System of Objects, is a manifestation of 
the way in which capitalism seeks to constantly cancel existing things and situations 
in favour of the new, the more ‘up to date’, the more ‘advanced’. This is a order of 
distinction - the distinction between the privileged category of the ‘new’ and a 
category of the ‘old’, the obsolescent, that which is simply a residue of earlier 
instances of production. In this period of his career, Baudrillard is almost a 
precursor of Harvey’s concern with late capitalism as a ‘throw away’ society, a 
dynamic process of renewal in which that which exists is always being supplanted 
by the new in a society that privileges exchange value over and above use value. 
Fashion is about circulation and exchange in the early Baudrillard: it is the meeting 
place of political economy and signification. It is the locus of an exchange system 
that no longer privileges use value, but instead valorises sign exchange value, and 
which has spread its influence over all the objects that support and inform our social 
and cultural lives.
In The System of Objects, Baudrillard characterises fashion as a dynamic of 
obsolescence, a process in which changes in the style of objects lead to a situation 
in which objects are no longer produced for use, but as a elements in a system 
predicated on the certain obsolescence of all the objects related within the system. 
From the outset, for Baudrillard, fashion is a structure which is dedicated to 
annulling use value by translating objects into sign-forms. While Baudrillard cites 
French automobile design in the 1960s in The System of Objects, a clearer 
example of the development of the commodity semiotics of the car is provided by
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the American car industry from the late 1940s to the mid 1970s. American cars 
were massively constructed with a simple mechanical lay out, and as functional 
objects they had a much longer life span than the profit motive dictated. In order to 
boost demand, the American car industry embarked on the radical redesign of cars 
on a regular (often annual) basis, and ensured that individual models were updated 
on a regular basis from the late 1940s onwards. The addition of huge tail fins, 
fenders and an abundance of garish chrome decorations allied to a plethora of 
colour schemes effectively turned the car into a sign-form. The fins, grilles and 
fenders of various models became elements or paradigms which were periodically 
redesigned to radically alter the overall appearance, or ‘syntagm’, of individual 
models. This process began to change the status of the automobile in American 
from being a use object to becoming a sign-form, something that was nearer a sign 
of fashion and a testament to its consumers’ status and the affluence of mid­
century American society than a functional object. This process can be seen 
clearly when the marketing strategies of the Ford Motor Company in the 1950s is 
compared with its marketing strategy in the 1920s. In the 1920s, Ford was a one 
model company, it produced the Model T in a number of different guises, and sold 
the one model on the basis of its simplicity and durability. The Model T was 
famously only ever available in black, a colour which became the signifier of its 
functionality. The Model T Ford was its use value: it was designed to be used over 
a long period of time in often harsh conditions. By contrast, American Fords of the 
1950s were signs of their own fashionability, their position as the model of the 
moment, the perfect embodiment of the use value of the automobile.
Baudrillard argues that the use of tail fins in American car design, introduced in 
the 1948 model year by Cadillac, is a semioticisation of the car’s use value: an
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instance of function becoming an aestheticised sign-form:
"There was a long period during which American cars were adorned by 
immense tail fins. For Vance Packard these perfectly symbolized the 
American obsession with consumer goods. They have other meanings, too: 
scarcely had it emancipated itself from the forms of earlier kinds of vehicles 
than the automobile-object began connoting nothing more than the result so 
achieved - that is to say, nothing more than itself as a victorious function.
We thus witnessed a veritable triumphalism on the part of the object: the 
car’s fins became the victory over space - and they were purely a sign, 
because they bore no direct relationship to that victory (indeed, if anything 
they ran counter to it, tending as they did to make vehicles heavier and more 
cumbersome).’’ [Baudrillard 1996, pg 59]
Baudrillard is correct to point out that the semioticisation of the car impaired its 
functionality. In fact, through out the 1950s the use value of cars suffered as they 
became harder to maintain and repair, more vulnerable to rust and damage by 
other cars’ tail fins and fenders, while additionally becoming increasingly restricted 
to use on specially designed highways rather than a variety of roads and terrains. 
We have seen that re-styling and the constant addition of new marginal features, 
such as new grilles, body-work or interior designs, made cars into objects whose 
value was as much their sign exchange value, their value as a sign of affluence and 
modishness, as their use value. In addition to this, once the car was included in the 
semiosis of fashion, it became an increasingly ephemeral object. Fashion becomes 
a means of radically shortening the life span of objects: fashion introduced, for the 
early Baudrillard, the notion of objects that are always already obsolete at the point 
of purchase, objects that are produced as a part of a series which is already being 
replaced by the designers and engineers who work on developing the next set of
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marginal differences for the Ford Motor Company and its competitors.
This process is still the dominant process through which the motor industry 
stimulates new demand. In the late 1980s and early 1990s FIAT declined as a 
company and lost its leading position in the small and medium car markets mainly 
due to offering what was perceived as an elderly range of models. FIAT at that 
time pursued a policy of keeping the same model, with one major re-styling 
approximately halfway through its production run, for eight years. As a result, FIAT 
cars were widely perceived to be slightly out of date as they were challenged by 
newer models from other manufacturers. This judgement did not rest on the 
technological capabilities of FIAT cars, but on their fashion or sign value. Although 
many FIAT models such as the Panda and the Uno were important new designs 
when they were introduced, they were quickly overtaken by more ‘modern’ designs 
in their later years of production and were regarded as unfashionable by the 
motoring press and consumers alike. As a result of this, FIAT has changed its 
approach and has shortened the production life of its models to around five years, 
which currently seems to be an industry norm. FIAT has therefore adopted the 
classic strategy of ensuring that its products are perceived to have a short 
production span to ensure that they remain fashionable, that they are part of the 
new as opposed to the accumulation of the old.
In The System of Objects, Baudrillard cites the strategies listed by Vance 
Packard for ensuring the obsolescence of mass produced objects in late capitalist 
societies. These strategies may relate to the technical qualities of an object - a 
word processor, for instance, is a technological advance that has rendered 
conventional typewriters obsolescent if not obsolete - or to the build quality and
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therefore the durability of products or even to a deliberate truncation of the period of 
time in which an object is desirable because it is perceived to be new and 
fashionable:
“Obsolescence of function. In this situation an existing product becomes 
outmoded when a product is introduced that performs the function better.
Obsolescence of quality. Here, when it is planned, a product breaks down or 
wears out at a given time, usually not too distant.
Obsolescence of desirability. In this situation a product that is still sound in 
terms of quality or performance becomes ‘worn out’ in our minds because a 
styling or other change makes it seem less desirable.” [Baudrillard 1996, pg 
145 - all italics the author’s]
FIAT’s production strategies are now geared to producing “obsolescence of 
desirability” by reducing the length of time models remain in production, thereby 
making their models more ephemeral and therefore more fashionable as being in 
line with the latest design trends. FIAT have chosen to ensure that models are 
discontinued and replaced before their desirability is eroded by too long a 
production run. Baudrillard notes that obsolescence of desirability and 
obsolescence of quality work together: accelerating the replacement of objects by 
new version of the same object tends to lead to a lessening of their quality. Mass 
production equates to shoddiness for Baudrillard, who regards the mass produced 
artefacts of the 1960s as being essentially substandard:
“Thus certain American car parts are designed not to survive more than sixty 
thousand kilometres of driving. As manufactures themselves will discretely 
admit, the quality of most serial objects could be substantially improved with
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no significant increase in production costs. Deliberately debased parts are 
just as expensive to manufacture as normal ones... BUT THE OBJECT 
CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO ESCAPE FROM EPHEMERALITY OR FROM 
FASHION. This is the fundamental characteristic of the series: the objects 
that compose it are weakened on a systematic basis.” [Baudrillard 1996, pg 
146]
This passage dates Baudrillard’s text. The strategy for ensuring obsolescence in 
the motor industry has moved on from the 1960s - when the British Motor 
Corporation (BMC) included sheets of brown paper in car doors to ensure that they 
would rust - to one in which the actual quality of most cars has improved vastly over 
earlier models. Contemporary design and engineering standards have ensured that 
cars are better made, safer and less prone to corrosion than ever before. The car 
manufacturers have moved away from obsolescence of quality, which is a flaw in 
the fundamental use value of an object, to ensuring obsolescence of desirability. 
Cars are now fashion items, they are marketed and advertised as such; cars are no 
longer consumed as machines for transportation but as signs circulating through 
the medium of fashion. This is attested to by motoring magazines and television 
programmes which fetishize the appearance of cars, that frame them as signs in a 
general economy of sign exchange as opposed to prosaic functional objects.
Cars have become sign-forms, signs of their own newness, their own short­
lived status as objects of desire. The car is increasingly not a machine but a sign, a 
sign in which its functionality has been reduced to a signifier in the manner that 
Baudrillard describes in The System of Objects. Mark Gottdiener’s essay The 
System of Objects and the Commodification of Everyday Life [Ed. Kellner, 1994] 
concerns Baudrillard’s critique of the way in which commodified objects are reduced
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to a sign of their functionality is worth recalling in this context. The car is perhaps 
the best example of the object as a commodified sign-form. Car design is 
increasing an activity in which function is transposed into the register of the 
semiotic, the body and engine of the car are increasingly becoming a sign of 
functionality, a sign which functions in a way which is exactly analogous to how 
Gottdiener sees the house being transformed “from the hearth of tradition and 
historical continuity to a showcase for consumerism and status” [Ed Kellner 
1994, pg 31]. Function is not the referent of the sleek, contoured body of the latest 
model to be launched, it is a signifier, an alibi for the car as sign-form. This process 
is exemplified by the way in which ‘concept cars’ from design studios are now far 
more likely to be put into mass production. Baudrillard regards mass or serial 
production as being predicated on models, which are transcendent in relation to the 
series but inform its identity. The model is the ‘idea’ of the series, its idealist 
essence: it is that which confers an identity and substance on the indeterminate 
number of objects that comprise a mass produced series. Baudrillard draws a firm 
distinction between the model and the mass produced series:
“The model, by contrast, is privileged in that it lasts (though only in a relative 
sense, for it too is caught in the speeded-up cycle of objects). It is granted 
solidity, entitled to ‘loyalty’. Paradoxically, it has come to dominate an area 
traditionally reserved, it would seem, for the series, namely use value. This 
superiority of the model, reinforced by the influence of fashion - that is, the 
combination of technical and formal qualities - are what constitutes its 
superior ‘functionality’.” [Baudrillard 1996, pg 147]
The concept car is a model, superior in its quality and its status to any and all 
serially produced cars. It is the embodied idea of a car, and by introducing features 
from concept cars into serially produced models, the manufactures re-enforce the
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dependence of the serially produced on their originating model. The concept car is 
not ‘diluted’ in its status a model by being put into mass production, rather the 
superior status of the concept car model is celebrated by the series which is an 
embodiment of the model’s transcendent essence, its technical and conceptual 
superiority. The model is the referent for each and every individual serially 
produced object, each serially produced object is a sign, a simulation, of the model, 
each one of which attests, by its lack of uniqueness and aura, to the uniqueness 
and aura of the model. The distinction between the serially produced and the 
model is the structural dynamic which drives fashion for the early Baudrillard - 
fashion is the creation of simulations informed by models. Fashion is arena of 
change, the arena in which the public are to learn new needs and new ways of 
satisfying those needs. It is a process which is symptomatic of what Gerald Graff 
describes as the way in which “advanced capitalism needs to destroy all 
vestiges of tradition, all orthodox ideologies, all continuous and stable forms 
of reality in order to stimulate higher levels of consumption” [cited in Marcus 
1989, pg 128]. The Baudrillard of The System of Objects regards fashion as the 
dynamic heart of consumption, the arena in which the exchange and consumption 
of sign-forms is continually accelerated. Fashion is a driving force in Western 
society, in the early Baudrillard’s view, because it is ultimately a medium of 
communication, a medium through which social and cultural meanings are 
constructed and exchanged.
However, as early as his second book, The Consumer Society, Baudrillard begins 
to regard fashion in a different way. In The Consumer Society, he regards fashion 
as not simply being an exemplar of the dynamic of consumption, which he argues 
has become dominant within West European and American society. Baudrillard
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identifies the production of new commodities as a form of reproduction: a dynamic 
of constant ‘renewal’ in which the technological dynamism of capitalism is 
translated into a social dynamism of the continual reproduction of production and 
consumption. Baudrillard regards fashion as an exemplar of this process. In The 
Consumer Society, he describes the process of constant renewal as a “recycling” 
which calls to mind “the ‘cycle’ of fashion” or the late capitalist social imperative that 
“everyone must be ‘with-it’ and must ‘recycle themselves’ - their clothes, 
their belongings, their cars - on a yearly, monthly or seasonal basis” 
[Baudrillard 1998, pg 100]. He goes on to characterise fashion as a dynamic of 
constant reinvention, the constant arrival of the new and the reconstitution of the 
already existing as the new (as in the revivals of out dated fashions) in a process 
which is a form of coercion, one in which the dynamic of fashion, which functions 
even at the level of knowledge creation and dissemination, is an imperative to 
reproduce the socio-economic order of late capitalism:
“It [fashion] does, however, impose thoroughgoing constraints, and the 
sanction it wields is that of social success or banishment. We may ask 
ourselves whether the ‘recycling of knowledge’, under is scientific cover, 
does not conceal this same kind of accelerated, obligatory, arbitrary change 
as fashion, and does not bring into play at the level of knowledge and 
persons the ‘built-in-obsolescence’ as the cycle of production and fashion 
foists on material objects.” [Baudrillard 1998, pg 100]
It will be seen at this stage of Baudrillard’s career, he conceived of fashion as a sign 
of another, more fundamental process. At the time of writing The Consumer 
Society. Baudrillard still employed a depth model in which critical theory could 
fathom the underlying socio-economic sources of phenomena such as fashion. 
Fashion, here, is a sign of a social dynamic, it is one part, and one part only, of a
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complex capitalist socio-economic order. However, fashion is not conceived of as 
being the result of a simple linear process of production, a process in which the 
very latest fashions are produced to displace yesterday’s fashions. Baudrillard is 
already conceiving of fashion as a moment of production and consumption which 
form elements in a wider schema of reproduction. Production is already 
subordinated to reproduction, the reproduction of a particular social order.
Whereas production is a privileged term in some reductionist versions of 
Marxist thought, Baudrillard abandons the idea of the primacy of production. Even 
writing within the Marxist tradition, Baudrillard did not subscribe to the view that 
production is a form of historical poesis, the view that production is a dynamic of 
social and economic creativity. Baudrillard locates production as that which is 
merely an element within the process of reproducing the current order of simulacra. 
The era of production, the era of political economy, is regarded by Baudrillard as 
being a period characterised by primitive accumulation, the accumulation of the 
technics and media of mass production which inform the second order of simulacra. 
Even in his account of the second order of simulacra, production is only ever a form 
of accumulation for Baudrillard: it does not have any pathos of creativity, it is merely 
the stockpiling of the elements necessary to generate the third order of simulacra. 
The age of mass production, the age in which political economy reached its 
apotheosis, is only the forerunner of the postmodern condition in which production 
is not a genuinely act but a moment in the general economy of reproduction. 
Production is not a valorised category in Baudrillard’s work and in this sense, he 
worked outside the theoretical assumptions of orthodox Marxism, even during the 
‘Marxist’ phase of his work. Fashion is not something that he theorises in relation 
to modes of production and the social relations of production. Fashion is not a
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symptom of production in Baudrillard’s theorising, it is rather a privileged site in a 
general economy of semiosis. In taking this position, Baudrillard is already 
beginning to move towards the position he takes in “Symbolic Exchange and Death” 
in which, citing Walter Benjamin and Marshal McLuhan, he reduces production from 
the status of source to the status of a medium of communication:
“Benjamin was also the first (with McLuhan after him) to grasp technology as 
a medium rather than a ‘productive force’ (at which point the Marxian 
analysis retreats), as the form and principle of an entirely new generation of 
meaning. The mere fact that any given thing can simply be produced, as 
such, in an exemplary double is already a revolution: one need only think of 
the stupefaction of the Black boy seeing two identical books for the first time. 
That these two technical products are equivalent under the sign of necessary 
social labour is less important in the long term than the serial repetition of 
the same object (which is also the serial repetition of individuals as labour 
power). [Baudrillard 1993, pg 56 - author’s italics]
Production, for Baudrillard, is a medium, a form of communication in which meaning 
is governed by the relations between identical products, objects which are not a 
copies of an original but which are each the other’s perfect replica. The serial 
production of identical objects, whether these are cars, clothes or books, is from the 
outset a form of reproduction. It is a medium whose formal properties are such that 
the ‘message’ of serial production is endlessly reiterated to an audience of 
consumers. Baudrillard thereby undermines the ontological primacy of production, 
it is no longer that which confers the meaning of origin, but that medium by which 
the hyperreal simulacra of postmodern capitalism is reproduced.
If we again turn to Baudrillard’s genealogy of simulacra on which Baudrillard
bases his position, it will be seen that the orders of simulacra can be read, as Efrat 
Tseelon reads them in her essay Fashion and Signification in Baudrillard [Ed. 
Kellner 1994], as orders of fashion emerging from the mediaeval order of 
signification which, Baudrillard claims, did not know the concept of fashion. The 
pre-Renaissance world is depicted by Baudrillard as an order of transparent and 
absolute signs, signs were ‘honest’ because the right to use and display them was 
fiercely policed. Death or maiming were not uncommon forms of retribution for 
those who dared to display signs to which they had no right. Sign acquisition and 
display was based on a strictly hierarchical ordering of society, and such an order is 
inimical to the nature of fashion as an unstable combinatory of appearances or an 
“emporium of styles”. Tseelon notes that:
“Throughout European history, dress has divided people along class lines. 
From the Greek and Roman periods through Byzantine and mediaeval eras, 
but particularly since the fourteenth century which marks the beginning of 
fashion, the costliness of materials or workmanship involved in the 
production of garments distinguished courtly from common. Throughout the 
history of dress it was the principle of scarcity of resources which 
symbolised rank in dress. Natural scarcity provided “guarantee of 
exclusivity”. Scarcity took either the form of rarity in nature (as in the case of 
the furs of certain mammals, or of gold and precious stones), or in the man- 
made resources (as the case of silk which, up to the fifteenth century, was 
imported from the East).” [Ed Kellner 1994, pgs 120 -121]
In this reading, clothes were designed not to protect bodies but to be a sign-form, a 
display of wealth and/or social status. Rare materials and costly workmanship 
connoted status and social power, to counterfeit these signs was unacceptable 
behaviour, behaviour that troubled the essential clarity of the mediaeval regime of
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signification. Tseelon’s account of what might be called “pre-fashion” emphasises 
the economic basis of dress as a form of signification, while Baudrillard 
progressively abandons the idea of an economic substrata acting as the 
foundations of all social and cultural orders, and his work on fashion reflects his 
privileging of the signification as the social and cultural dominant.
However, despite the usefulness of the historical perspective in his work, 
particularly as applied by Tseelon to fashion theory, Baudrillard does exhibit a 
tendency to be far too schematic in the construction of his genealogy. This is 
particularly noticeable in Baudrillard’s analysis of the pre-Renaissance period in 
which a complex semiotic and social order is reduced to a sort of significatory pre­
history, a pre-history in which signs were radically restricted in their circulation by 
social reciprocity and obligation:
“In feudal or archaic caste societies, in cruel societies, signs are limited in 
number and their circulation is restricted. Each retains its full value as a 
prohibition, and each carries with it a reciprocal obligation between castes, 
clans or persons, so signs are not arbitrary. The arbitrariness of the sign 
begins when instead of bonding two persons in an inescapable reciprocity, 
the signifier starts to refer to a disenchanted universe of the signified, the 
common denominator of the real world, towards which no-one any longer has 
the least obligation.” [Baudrillard 1993, pg 50]
Restrictions on the use of signs, the use of what Baudrillard terms “obligatory signs” 
still exist in what for Baudrillard is the third order of simulacra. Restricted signs 
include police and armed forces uniforms, official identity cards, and passports. 
These are signs which are obliged to be honest, obliged to play their part in 
mediating a social relation between individuals. The uniforms of opposing armies
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act as signs in this sense, while ‘bonding’ may not be an appropriate term for 
warfare, Baudrillard’s notion of semiotically mediated reciprocity is certainly 
applicable to the way in which uniforms carry with them an obligation to enter a 
reciprocal social relationship - although in this case, a highly destructive one. 
Uniforms, however, tend to much less affected by fashion than civilian dress. The 
Danish army in the Second World War were equipped with a type of great coat 
introduced in 1865, and the longevity of the uniforms of the Swiss Guard and the 
Beefeaters is well known. The semiotic ‘honesty’ of these signs would seem to 
inhere in their being distinct from the general circulation system of fashion. It would 
seem therefore more reasonable to argue that the contemporary simulacra is one in 
which the different orders of signification described by Baudrillard co-exist in a 
complex and somewhat unstable semiotic combinatory.
We have seen that for Baudrillard the pre-Renaissance order of restricted 
signification was one in which sign use was heavily policed, yet by contrast he 
argues that the first order of simulacra, the significatory order from the Renaissance 
to the 18th century, was one in the sign was emancipated to circulate as the 
counterfeit - just as long as the difference between the real and the counterfeit 
could be distinguished. The counterfeit, whether it was a false shirt front, stucco 
ornamentation or an automaton, was regarded as a game with nature, a mirror 
image of a given original. The licensing of the counterfeit was the beginning of 
fashion, the beginning of an order in which signs could be brought together in a 
combinatory according to the dictates of wealth and taste. It is at this point in 
Baudrillard’s schema that clothing becomes fashion and becomes a source of 
pleasure. Fashion is a game to be played - at least by those who have the 
wherewithal to do so - and clothes are freed from their obligation to signify their
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wearers’ social status. Tseelon [Ed Kellner 1994] notes that the freeing of clothing 
from an obligation to be a ‘honest’ sign of social status caused some concern 
among the upper classes, leading to efforts to police clothing and thereby eradicate 
fashion:
“A petition to King Edward III from the House of Commons complaining that 
common men had begun to wear fabrics which did not fit their rank or income 
resulted in the legislation of the first sumptuary law defining precisely the 
type and quality of fabrics which could be worn by various classes. Similar 
laws continued to be passed until the sixteenth century with severity but little 
success. The sumptuary laws which attempted to regulate clothing practices 
along status lines, did not relate to style since rank was manifested in the 
quality of fabric, in the details, and in the choice of decoration rather than in 
different styles.” [Ed. Kellner 1994, pg 121]
In Baudrillard’s terms, such legislation was an expression of a fear of the false, a 
fear that a divinely inspired social order could be subverted by those who used 
signs to which they were not entitled by birth or by wealth. However, once the 
counterfeit was established, there was little that could be done to prevent people 
from playing with styles and adopting some features of the appearance of their 
social ‘superiors’. The fact that style was not subject to legislation is interesting as 
fashion in clothing is concerned with style, with the cut and arrangement of clothes 
as much as their quality and fabric. Tseelon’s historical perspective should be 
taken as qualifying Baudrillard’s notion of a sweeping and fairly sudden change 
from an order of restricted signification to the free for all of the counterfeit and the 
original. Fashion in this era is an area of struggle as the bourgeoisie used such 
counterfeits as stucco to reveal “the unlimited potential of the new class” 
[Baudrillard 1993, pg 51] as soon as it had fractured the old aristocracy’s grip on
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the social and significatory orders. For the bourgeoisie, the counterfeit, the ‘false’ 
sign was not a problem of truth and falsehood but a sign of its power to remake the 
world in its image, a sign that the old fixed order had been broken and that a new 
class was gaining the ascendant. Fashion is that which celebrates the arrival of the 
bourgeoisie and the first traces of a social order that was to be based on a system 
of the reproduction of commodity exchange.
The consolidation of the bourgeoisie’s social ascendancy was further re­
enforced by the introduction of the technics of mass production in Western Europe 
and American. The new technics of production led not only to a vast increase in 
the quantity of goods produced but also to a fundamental change in the 
significatory function of objects. If the bourgeoisie’s use of the counterfeit is 
understood as its semiotic remodelling of the world to demonstrate its (political) 
mastery of the forces of production and signification, the second order of simulation 
can be regarded as the culmination of the process of displacing a restricted ‘semio- 
social’ order for one that is generated not by the anterior real but by the unlimited 
powers and potential of production. In the second order of simulacra, as we have 
seen, abstract forces of production are manifested in the serial production of 
commodities in a regime of signification that has fundamentally altered the structure 
of signification from one based on the distinction between a original object and its 
counterfeit to one based on the difference between mass produced commodity- 
signs:
“A new generation of signs and objects arises with the Industrial Revolution - 
signs with no caste tradition that will never have known restrictions on their 
status, and which will never have to be counterfeits, since from the outset 
they will be products on a gigantic scale. The problem of their specificity and
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their origin is no longer posed: technics is their origin, they have meaning 
only within the dimension of the industrial simulacrum.” [Baudrillard 1993, 
pg 55]
The origin of the mass produced sign is the power and potential of technics. The 
sign no longer acts as the image of a natural referent which governs its meaning, 
meaning is now entirely located within the serial production of signs that circulate as 
commodities. In this order of simulacra, all objects, all sign-forms, are potentially 
available for use and consumption by all individuals, and fashion assumes the 
status of a socio-economic dynamic. Baudrillard’s approach to fashion in his earlier 
writings reflects this view of fashion. The development of his genealogy of 
simulacra adds a historical or diachronic dimension to the essentially synchronic 
analysis of his earlier works. Within the industrial simulacrum, the meaning of 
objects and signs is governed by difference, and fashion is a process of inventing 
and recycling commodity-signs to ensure ever increasing levels of commodity 
consumption. The sign, for Baudrillard, in this ‘modernist’ order of production is 
debased, it does not refer beyond a ‘relational’ regime of meaning to the ‘truth’ of 
an anterior referent, and therefore it loses its privileged position as an index of the 
real. However, the world of the second order of simulacra is not one in which class 
distinctions have been annulled by the de-restriction of sign consumption, rather it 
is a world in which fashion becomes a mark of difference, a sign of distinction.
The System of Objects devotes much space to the concrete analysis of these 
differences, or rather how relations of difference between objects are translated into 
social distinctions. Colours, textures, materials become signs of ‘taste’, signs of 
social standing, signs of one’s ‘personal’ identity. This process of distinction 
through difference has, according to Tseelon, its origins in the 19th century when
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serial production further threatened the semiotic distinctions between classes and 
the strategies adopted by the ‘upper’ classes to respond to this threat to social 
demarcation:
“The threats to the traditional social order encouraged the development of an 
alternative, more subtle, system of demarcation. In an attempt to distinguish 
the aristocracy by lineage from the nouveaux riches, this system anchored 
certain sartorial practices to moral values. For example, the concept of 
“gentility”, developed in the nineteenth century by the landed gentry to 
distinguish the “genuine” from the “pretend”, encapsulated this code of 
noblesse oblige. This code held that to be a “lady” was a standard of 
conduct which included rules of etiquette, elegance, and subtlety. “Those of 
birth and education learned to distinguish between good taste and sham.” 
Bright tints and clashing combinations were vulgar by their breach of certain 
rules of harmony and propriety.” [Ed. Kellner 1994, pg 123]
Here taste becomes morality, a call to distinguish the difference between the true 
and the false. Social demarcation becomes based on a ‘reading’ of the details of 
one’s appearance as a sign of rightness or pretence. The cut of a suit, the colour of 
a tie or blouse, and the quality of clothes become small but vital signs of social 
standing. Someone acting above his or her station in life could be detected by not 
knowing the nuances of dress codes, by lapses in taste. As Tseelon demonstrates, 
and as The System of Objects confirms, the use of restricted signs, the limiting of 
sign circulation to the cognoscenti, was part and parcel of the semio-social order of 
what Baudrillard dubs the second order of simulacra. There was no total 
emancipation of signs in this era, just as - as has been shown earlier - there is no 
total emancipation of the sign in an unrestricted semiosis in our own era of 
postmodern capitalism. Fashion as a socio-economic dynamic is based on turning
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differences into distinctions, the cut of a suit may be ’in’ or ‘out’ of fashion, but it will 
always have a place in the relational combinatory of fashion. Even clothes and 
objects which apparently reject fashion find a place within its combinatory, they 
function as the second term of the binary of the fashionable and unfashionable, or 
they are ‘recycled’ and reconstituted as the fashionable. An example of this are 
turn-ups on trousers, they first appeared as a fashion feature in the 1920s and 
became a standard fitting on trousers until the end of the 1950s, when they were 
relegated to the status of unfashionable. Despite a brief revival in the 1970s, turn­
ups were not recycled as fashionable until the mid 1980s, and they continue to be 
regarded as fashionable at the time of writing. The story of turn-ups illustrates the 
commutability, the reversibility that Baudrillard came to regard as a structural 
feature of the combinatory of fashion by the time he came to write Symbolic 
Exchange and Death.
This book, as well as including his genealogy of simulacra, also includes a 
reflection on the nature and function of fashion that is among the most important 
statements of Baudrillard’s radical analysis of signification and the circulation of 
signs within what he would argue is no longer a social order based on the political 
economy of production but a ‘semio-society’ governed by the reproduction of signs. 
The third order of simulacra as depicted in Symbolic Exchange and Death is one in 
which signs have been emancipated to the point that they are no longer referential, 
but are part of a vast aleatory semiurgy. The position of fashion in this semiurgy is 
a development of those put forward in The System of Objects and The Consumer 
Society. Baudrillard argues that fashion is dependent on modernity, it is dependent 
on a socio-historical schema of “rupture, progress and innovation” [Baudrillard 
1993, pg 89], a framework in which the modern (the fashionable) is conceived of as
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that which supersedes from the traditional. Fashion here is essentially innovation, a 
dialectics of the new and the old. However, Baudrillard goes on to reassert the 
position he took in The Consumer Society by arguing that a schema of rupture and 
innovation is no longer applicable to fashion in the third order of simulacra. 
Baudrillard regards fashion as that in which rupture between different old and new 
styles, old and new objects, and the continuous recycling of objects are 
complementary, the two aspects of the same combinatory and the same code:
“The dialectic of rupture very quickly becomes the dynamics of amalgam and 
recycling. In politics, in technics, in art and in culture it is defined by the 
exchange rate that the system can tolerate without alteration to its 
fundamental order. Consequently fashion doesn’t contradict any of this: it 
very clearly and simultaneously announces the myth of change: since it is 
produced through the play of models and distinctive oppositions, and is 
therefore an order which gives no precedence to the code of tradition.” 
[Baudrillard 1993, pg 90 - author’s italics]
The notion of fashion as an arena of change, that which is based on a distinction 
between innovation and accumulation, the new and the old, is relegated here to a 
‘myth’, an appearance of change within a combinatory that does not change in 
itself. The example of FIAT’s decision to reduce the production period of its models 
is example of innovation that is accommodated by a system of production and 
reproduction without challenging its fundamental principles, its code. Fashion is 
‘produced’ at the level of ‘myth’, the level of distinction between the model and 
series, the new and the old, but this level of production is only a ‘moment’ of a far 
greater schema of reproduction, a schema which has reproduces by amalgamating 
the traditional and the ruptural together as signs. Fashion in the third order of 
simulacra is essentially spectacle. Baudrillard writes of it as a simulation of change
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as opposed to the ‘real’ of change:
“Spectacle is our fashion, an intensified and reduplicated sociality enjoying 
itself aesthetically, the drama of change in place of change.” [Baudrillard 
1993, pg 90]
Fashion is the movement of signs, their distribution in a system of circulation. 
Fashion has become, for Baudrillard, a significatory rather than economic category 
at this stage of his work, and his mature conception of fashion as a combinatory, a 
medium of sign exchange, which is equivalent to the combinatory of political 
economy. This combinatory is one in which signs, has we have seen, proliferate in 
an endless play, a play which is not determined by any original anterior referent as 
in the first order of simulacra, nor by the referent understood as abstract forces of 
production, but only by the models, from which signs are continually reproduced. 
Value in this regime of signification becomes entirely structural: value is difference, 
the relation between the terms of binary oppositions rather than value predicated on 
labour, natural scarcity, use value or the economic exchange value of products. In 
this order of signification, only the fundamental binary structure of the codes 
governing the formation of models and the relation between models and simulations 
can be regarded as a source of value, and their value is, for Baudrillard, purely 
significatory. At this point, the categories of political economy, and its key notion of 
a source of value anterior to signification, collapse as the social, economic and 
cultural spheres are reduced to the status of a combination of signs, a play of 
signifiers.
In the this order of simulacra, the model, or rather the difference between it 
and the reproduced simulations that it informs, is the only reference for signs. In 
this order, the real is no longer the ontological foundation and source on which, and
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from which, signification is produced. It is a situation in which reproduction (of signs 
and all other commodities) has fully emerged from the chrysalis of production:
“In its infinite reproduction, the system puts an end to the myth of is origin 
and to all referential values it has itself secreted in the course of its process. 
By putting an end to the myth of its origin, it puts an end to its internal 
contradictions (there is no longer a real or a referential to which to oppose 
them) and also puts an end to the myth of its end, the revolution itself’ 
[Baudrillard 1993, pg 60]
Instead of production, which is essentially a linear process leading to commodity 
accumulation prior to exchange for profit and consumption and therefore a process 
which is determinate in that it has a point of origin and a goal, reproduction is 
indeterminate in nature. As an indeterminate process, reproduction has no clear 
origin, it is a delivery system, a medium by which signs are circulated and 
consumed in postmodern society. The notion of determination is one which is a 
process, event or object must be related to a source which is not that object, event 
or process; in this sense, every determined system or object is negated by the 
presence of something which is its other, and which defines its nature and function. 
The undetermined nature of reproduction, is according to Baudrillard, means that 
the real cannot be used as a ground on which to distinguish between the true and 
the false. Zygmunt Bauman describes this world of reproduced simulations in a 
passage which is worth reproducing at length as one in which such hitherto key 
distinctions are displaced by simulations which cannot be conceived in terms of true 
and false, real and mystificatory:
“Simulation, we are told, Ms no longer that of a territory, a referential being or 
a substance’. In simulation - this crucial, universal, perhaps exclusive, mode 
in which all things today are - the territory no longer precedes the map. It is
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rather the map that precedes the territory. The map ‘engenders the territory’. 
Well, you would say, one can agree or disagree about this proposition, but at 
least one knows what the proposition is about and how to find out whether it 
is true or not. Alas, your satisfaction is, to say the least, premature. 
Simulation, you think, consists in pretending that something is not what it 
really is; you are not alarmed because you know how to tell pretence from 
reality. The simulation Baudrillard talks about is not like that, however. It 
effaces the very difference between true and false, real and imaginary. We no 
longer have the means of testing pretence against reality, or just to know 
which is which. There is no exit from our quandary.” [Bauman 1992, pgs 150 
-151 - author’s italics]
In simulation distinctions between the true and the false, and the real and its 
representations, is collapsed. It does not support the categories, the codes that 
would allow the bourgeoisie and other dominant social groups of the second order 
of simulacra to tell the ‘real’ from the ‘fake’, the genuine man or woman of ‘quality’ 
from the impostor. Baudrillard does not accept that there is a ‘real’ world that 
provides the ultimate source of meaning in signification. For Baudrillard, the 
ceaseless reproduction of signs governed by simulation models leads to a situation 
in which the real is displaced because capital has no use for it. Baudrillard argues 
that capital no longer requires the real as its alibi and that the categories of political 
economy are now themselves only a simulacrum circulating among other simulacra, 
rather than being an index of the fundamental process of production. In the third 
order of simulacra production is only ever a moment in a vast schema of 
reproduction.
Fashion is a privileged locus within this order of the reproduction of simulacra.
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Baudrillard describes it as that in which signifiers are freed from their signifieds in a 
asemic combinatory:
“In fashion, as in the code, signifieds come unthreaded [se defiler], and the 
parades of the signifier [les defiles du significant] no longer lead anywhere.
The signifier/signified distinction is erased  “ [Baudrillard 1993, pg 87 -
italics in original]
Fashion is therefore freed any social reference, it is not that which indexes 
differences between classes, differences between age groups or ethnic groups, it a 
‘pure’ system of combination and re-combination that is always already reproduced, 
it is that which denies any form of poesis, it is the antithesis of creativity.
Baudrillard refers to this process of reproduction as a “mad and meticulous 
recurrence” [Baudrillard 1993, pg 87] in which there is no structural distinction 
between sign and referent, signifier and signified, but a structure of minimal 
difference, a structure in which one fashion object is what is it is, assumes its value, 
only because of the difference between it and all the other object -signs in the 
combinatory. Fashion is ultimately closed: it does not relate to the social, and 
displaces the social by a system in which signs relate to signs, rather people 
relating to people. At times, Baudrillard’s theorising appears to wish to substitute 
the human with a world of signs: a world in which signs relate to each other, 
combine with each other, and contest for position within the global combinatory. 
However, even if it is accepted that the subject is constituted rather constitutive, 
and that it is the product of a given social and significatory order, it appears odd 
and extreme to displace concepts of social and significatory interaction by human 
beings with a concept of signs having a monopoly of agency. In Baudrillard’s later 
writings on simulation (Symbolic Exchange and Death, Simulations and The 
Ecstasy of Communication), it appears people are merely the terminals or receptors
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for the procession of simulacra. Here Baudrillard takes anti-humanism to a new 
extreme, and yet this ferocious anti-humanism seems inhabited by an implicit 
nostalgia for the lost full presence of the real and a humans subject which was the 
master of that real. There is a sense of loss pervading Baudrillard’s work, the 
second order of simulacra, the freeing of the productive forces, seems to be a 
disaster of emancipation, a disaster which destroyed the old plenitude of the real 
which guaranteed the validity of all forms of representation. There is a high level of 
anguish in Baudrillard’s writings about the displacement of the original, his work 
reads as being somehow an elegy for a stable 'world of referents which has been 
fatally undermined by the technics of production and reproduction. Baudrillard’s 
pessimism is worth comparing with the optimism in relation to technical 
reproducibility and its impact on the ‘aura’ of art works that is displayed in Walter 
Benjamin’s essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction in which 
some of the new aesthetic and communicative possibilities of technical, in this case 
photographic, reproduction are outlined:
“For example, in photography, process reproduction can bring out those 
aspects of the original that are unattainable to the naked eye yet accessible 
to the lens, which is adjustable and chooses its angle at will. And 
photographic reproduction, with the aid of certain processes, such as 
enlargement or slow motion, can capture processes that escape natural 
vision. Secondly, technical reproduction can put the copy of the original into 
situations which would be out of reach for the original itself. Above all, it 
enables the original to meet the beholder halfway, be it in the form of a 
photograph or phonograph record.” [Benjamin 1973, pg 214]
The idea that serial production and the technical reproduction of objects and/or 
images can lead to new experiences, new understandings and new pleasures is
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alien to Buadrillard. The potential of technically based production and reproduction 
to expand the range of an original, to bring an original object into new social and 
cultural situations is never acknowledged in his writings. Baudrillard’s entire 
theoretical edifice is built upon a sense of loss, of the destruction of a stable 
significatory order resting on a stable ontological order, rather than on a sense of 
the new possibilities of signification inaugurated by the rise of mass production and 
the potential for more than semiotic ‘emancipation’, which the Marxist tradition 
regards as the spectre that has haunted capitalist development throughout the last 
century and a half.
In Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard continues his exploration of the 
analogies between political economy and signification by arguing that ‘fashion’ is a 
general “floatation” which follows the same logic that political economists would 
discern in the floatation of currencies:
“Fashion is not a drifting of signs - it is their floatation, in the sense in which 
monetary signs are floated today. This floatation in the economic order is 
recent: it requires that ‘primitive accumulation ‘ be everywhere finished, that 
an entire cycle of dead labour be completed (behind money, the whole 
economic order will enter into this general relativity). Now this process has 
been managed for a long time within the order the order of signs where 
primitive accumulation is indeed anterior, if not always already given, and 
fashion expresses the already achieved stage of an accelerated and limitless 
circulation of a fluid and recurrent combinatory of signs, which is equivalent 
to the instantaneous and mobile equilibrium of floating monies.” [Baudrillard 
1993, pg 92 - author’s italics]
For the mature Baudrillard, fashion is not a arena in which signs drift aimlessly, it is
124
the very locus of the universal commutability of signs that marks the third order of 
simulacra. Fashion is, in Baudrillard’s terms, the privileged site of sign exchange in 
postmodern society. Fashion is not just a simple surface play, a drifting, of signs, it 
is more akin to a vast market mechanism in which signs that are no longer tied to 
referents are exchanged in a process that is mimicked or parodied by the exchange 
of currencies that are no longer tied to the gold standard. Fashion is an exemplary 
practice that defines, while being defined by, a society informed by a regime of 
signification that no longer functions in terms of signifier and signified, 
representation and underlying reality, created image and pre-given truth. Fashion 
is a part of the procession of simulacra, it is a carnival of simulation. At this point in 
his theorising, Baudrillard has effectively freed fashion from its obligation to the 
social by arguing that it is purely a semiotic phenomena, something that takes place 
entirely within the order of signification. Fashion is about combining and re­
combining signs. Whether an object within ‘fashion’ is a coat, a dress or a new 
philosophy or artistic movement, it is something that has become a sign, and it is 
something that has its place in a totalised combinatory system. Fashion, for 
Baudrillard, is conversion into a sign. Fashion does not inhere within an object (the 
tails fins of a car are not fashionable in their basic material existence, in the use of 
metal that is all they denote) but it does inhere within signs, within the meaning that 
a particular object has within the system of differences that constitutes fashion (a 
tail fin is fashionable because it is connotes fashion as modernity, because it 
signifies the car as an example of fashion). At this point, Baudrillard’s account of 
fashion is that a pure semiotic combinatory, a system in which all objects can 
circulate and be exchanged for each other. Fashion, in this account, is a totalised 
system, there is no point from which to contest fashion as a social dominant, no 
point at which it can be challenged.
125
Baudrillard expressly separates the ‘recycling’ of fashion form the ambiguous 
reversibility of symbolic exchange. Fashion is a spectacle, the ‘myth’ of change 
rather than change itself, while symbolic exchange is always, for Baudrillard, a 
potlatch, a gift and a challenge, a ‘praxis’ that is always capable of instituting radical 
and profound change. Fashion is a medium of reproduction, a medium which 
Baudrillard regards as an exemplar of a combinatory in which value does not rest 
on utility or the exchange value of an object, but on its place in a system of 
differences. It has already been noted that Baudrillard follows Saussure in 
regarding something’s value as arising from its place in the system that constitutes 
it, rather than in any qualities that may be inherent within the object. Value in the 
third order of simulacra is about an objects place in a combinatorial system.
Fashion is not ever an arena in which a any form of radical challenge or actual 
rupture can take place. Baudrillard stresses that fashion is not a locus for symbolic 
exchange, but is that which annuls the profound challenge of the symbolic and the 
‘primitive’ in a critique of a Vogue article which presents fashion as a form of 
‘potlatch’, a feast, a squandering that symbolically challenges the economic and 
any notion of utility:
“We know, however, that advertising too wants a ‘feast of consumption, the 
media a ‘feast of information’, the markets a ‘feast of production’, etc. The art 
market and horse races can also be taken for a potlatch - ‘Why not?’ asks 
Vogue. We would like to see a functional squandering everywhere so as to 
bring about symbolic destruction. Because of the extent to which the 
economic, shackled to the functional, has imposed its principle of utility, 
anything which exceeds it quickly takes on an air of play and futility. It is 
hard to acknowledge that the law of value extends well beyond the economic,
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and that its true task today is the jurisdiction of all models. Wherever there 
are models, there is an imposition of the law of value, repression by signs 
and the repression of signs themselves. This is why there is a radical 
difference between the symbolic ritual and the signs of fashion. In primitive 
cultures signs openly circulate over the entire range of ‘things’, there has not 
yet been any ‘precipitation’ of a signified, nor therefore of a reason or a truth 
of the sign. The real - the most beautiful of our connotations - does not 
exist.” [Baudrillard 1993, pgs 94 - 95]
This passage is one of Baudrillard’s clearest statement on the nature and function 
of fashion. It is system of objects that become signs and then circulate as such. 
These signs are taken as referring to a ‘real’ when they are reproductions of a 
model, and their value is only their differential relation to that model. Fashion is not, 
for Baudrillard, an arena of transgression because it is a semiotic combinatory and 
not a not something which semiotically mediates social and cultural relations. It is 
at this point that Baudrillard abandons any notion of political activism in the face of 
universal simulation and the universal displacement of the real, which he believes 
render such activism into a futile simulation of political challenge.
Baudrillard’s refusal to regard fashion as an arena of social exchange marks 
out the key difference between him and such theorists as Dick Hebdige and Angela 
McRobbie. Both of them see fashion as an arena of contestation, a locus within 
which prevailing discourse can be, and are, challenged by what Foucualt dubbed a 
‘reverse discourse’, a mobilisation of signs that affirms a identity that contests given 
notions of social identity. Hebidge identifies the irruption of punk into the managed 
world of fashion as a moment when fashion as a combinatory was challenged by 
fashion, or rather anti-fashion, as a form of bricolage, a poesis comprising the
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elements of earlier ways of dressing:
“There was a chaos of quiffs and leather jackets, brothel creepers and winkle 
pickers, plimsolls and paka macs, moddy crops and skinhead strides, 
drainpipes and vivid socks, bum freezers and bovver boots - all kept “in 
place” and “out of time” by the spectacular adhesives: the safety pins and 
clothes pegs, the bondage straps and bits of string which attracted so much 
horrified and fascinated attention.” [Hebdige 1979, pg 26]
This bricolage, this refusal to accept that given paradigms relate in a given order in 
given syntagms, was, for Hebdige, an act of contestation, a challenge, even a form 
of potlatch. Hebidge’s account of punk in Subculture: The Meaning of Style is one 
that celebrates the way in which the codes of fashion, the codes of appearance, 
can be subverted and/or used to signify or construct a non-conformist social 
identity. Hebdige regards punk as a serious game played with an established sign 
system: punk was, for him, political in so far as it attempted to undermine accepted 
notions of appearance and behaviour. The accepted syntagm of jacket or pullover, 
trousers, skirt or jeans, shirt or blouse was undermined by a combination of 
paradigmatic elements that did not ‘go’ together - dress shirts were worn with 
bondage trousers and plimsolls or summer dresses were worn over high Doc 
Martens boots. Sometimes the entire notion of the accepted paradigm was 
undermined when bin-liners were pressed into service as clothes, extending their 
use value and displacing the conventional codes of dress at a stroke. Punk, in 
Hebdige’s account, was a sort of revolt fought out on the plane of style, which is the 
plane of signs and their combination.
This is not to say that punk was pure rebellion, heir to the heretic tradition 
described in Greil Marcus’ Lipstick Traces: A Secret History o f the Twentieth
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Century, and for some of its adherents it was a certainly only a fashion movement 
to be discarded as soon as the next trend emerged, and not a something that was a 
commitment to punk’s potent combination of Situationist or pro-situ politics and 
existential nihilism. However, this does not mean that punk was something that 
would always have been recuperated as fashion, as a new stylistic combination 
among others. The shock of punk certainly wore off, and it did become a fashion 
as opposed to a non-conformist way of life, but its irruption sent out cultural shock 
was which are still being felt twenty-three years after the event. Punk was a 
challenge, an act of disruption based on reassembling, detourning, signs in a way 
that was a refusal on the part of working class and lower middle class young people 
to play their allotted social roles and a way of responding to the social and cultural 
conjuncture of the mid to late 1970s:
“The punks appropriated the rhetoric of crisis which had filled the airwaves 
and the editorials throughout this period and translated it into tangible (and 
visible) terms. In the gloomy, apocalyptic ambience of the late 1970s - with 
massive unemployment, with the ominous violence of the Notting Hill 
Carnival, Grunwick, Lewisham and Ladywood - it was fitting that the punks 
should present themselves as ‘degenerates’; as signs of the highly 
publicised decay which perfectly represented the atrophied condition of 
Great Britain. The various stylistic ensembles adopted by the punks were 
undoubtedly expressive of a genuine aggression, frustration and anxiety.” 
[Hebdige 1979, pg 87]
Hebdige goes on to note that punk’s success lay in its ability to “symptomatize a 
whole cluster of contemporary problems” [Hebdige 1979, pg 87], its ability to 
present a signify a response to a (sense of) crisis in the social, economic and 
cultural spheres. Punk was a response to a conjuncture of circumstances that
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created a subculture which was semiotically distinguished from wider British 
society, and it was therefore something that permitted individuals to take part in a 
collective act of producing new social identities. Punk’s irruption can therefore be 
regarded as a form of production, as opposed to a moment within a general 
economy of reproduction. Punk anti-fashion was an expression of an anterior social 
and cultural reality that was not simply a reflection or mirror of that society, but the 
creation of a semiotic that was a mediated expression of a troubled social position.
This was a position that was both dependent on the objective class status of 
punks and their vehement rejection of that position, it was a position that rested on 
the quotidian realities of 1970s working class life and the potential of something 
else - even if that something else was the void. Hebdige’s account of punk 
performance highlights this central contradiction from which the punk identity was 
mad, when he writes of the way in which punk groups such as the Clash followed 
the European avante garde in critically exploring the relationship between audience 
and performers:
“Most significantly, they attempted both physically and in terms of lyrics and 
life-style to move closer to their audiences. This in itself is by no means 
unique: the boundary between artist and audience has often stood as a 
metaphor in revolutionary aesthetics (Brecht, the surrealists, Dada, Marcuse, 
etc.) for that larger and more intransigent barrier which separates art and the 
dream from reality and life under capitalism.” [Hebdige 1979, pg 110]
This contradiction between a conjuncture that is anterior to signification and the 
production of punk’s iconoclastic semiotic operates in a conceptual landscape 
which is foreign to that of Baudrillard. Baudrillard’s concept of fashion is one of a 
perfect and all encompassing combinatory which is immune from disruption or
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detournement, it is beyond any form of challenge and contestation. Fashion, for 
Baudrillard, no longer has any other. Hebdige’s account of punk, however, suggests 
that fashion is more than simply a procession of simulacra or a combinatory of 
signs without referents. His account reminds its readers of the actual 
circumstances in which semiotic means are created, are produced. The reading of 
punk in Subculture: The Meaning of Style is suggestive in that it offers an 
opportunity to get out of the impasse which Baudrillard’s theorising on fashion has 
reached. Punk is a form of production, albeit one that was seen as illicit, a moment 
in which a new and deviant semiotic was created, rather than an instance of fashion 
recycling itself. Punk was the production of social meanings that were outside 
fashion, and the attempts made to domesticise punk as fashion recounted by 
Hebdige bear witness to this:
“For whatever reason, the inevitable glut of articles gleefully denouncing the 
latest punk outrage was counter-balanced by an equal number of items 
devoted to the small details of punk family life. For instance, the 15 October 
1977 issue of Woman’s Own carried an article entitled ‘Punks and Mothers’ 
which stressed the classless, fancy dress aspects of punk. Photographs 
depicting punks with smiling mothers, reclining next to a family pool, playing 
with the family dog, were placed above a text which dwelt on the ordinariness 
of individual punks; ‘It’s not as rocky horror as it appears’... ‘punk can be a 
family affair’... ‘punks as it happens are non-political’, and, most insidiously, 
albeit accurately, ‘Johnny Rotten is as big a household name as Hughie 
Green.” [Hebdige 1979, pg 98]
This attempt to recuperate punk attests to its being in some way, at some time, 
external to fashion comprehended as Baudrillard’s totalised, universal combinatory 
of signs. Punk is the other of fashion: a form of production which (originally) took
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place outside fashion understood as a commodity marketing mechanism and a 
semiotics of personal appearance, and which attacked its conventions by means of 
an aggressive use of pastiche and bricolage. This conception of punk both sets 
limits to the combinatory of fashion by rejecting its convention governed order of 
signification and its order of supercession and its periodic recycling of once 
unfashionable elements. It also suggests that reproduction is not the privileged 
term in the production/reproduction couplet. Production is the fundamental activity, 
it is the active creation of the human lebenswelt, the social and culture realms. 
Production both creates and nullifies, it is a praxis which should be regarded as a 
fundamental to any social and significatory order. It has the power to disrupt the 
reproduction of any socio-economic formation, while reproduction is not 
fundamental in this way in so far as it is only a that which makes possible any act of 
production. Reproduction is in a sense the repetition of production, the continuance 
of production, and it is dependant on production. Therefore, against Baudrillard’s 
conception, fashion should be conceived of as a locus for the continued creation of 
the semiotics of appearance, a creation which is haunted by the possibility of 
disruption by signs that are not part of the ensemble of relations that constitute the 
combinatory of fashion at any particular moment.
Baudrillard’s view of reproduction can be turned on its head. Instead of 
production as a ‘moment’ within a much greater scheme of reproduction, Hebdige’s 
account of punk suggests that reproduction is always produced, any system of 
reproduction must be created and maintained as a system, and therefore 
production should be privileged over and above reproduction. The ‘recycling’ of 
elements that Baudrillard regards as the dominant characteristic of the fashion 
combinatory does not guarantee that the reproduction of object-signs has displaced
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the production of commodities. It, rather, indicates that such a ‘recycling’ of 
elements is not a continual reproduction of sign-forms, but the production of new 
significatory meanings for existing objects. The notion that production has been 
displaced by the reproduction of simulacra is one that in seeking to counter the 
Marxist valorisation of production leads to a situation in which reproduction 
becomes all-encompassing, and the notion of creation, the idea that production can 
institute a radical break with exisiting conditions and constitute a new situation, is 
effectively nullified in Baudrillard’s theorising. Baudrillard’s animus against 
Marxism’s ontological privileging of production and his rejection of the ontological 
and epistemological categories of critical theory leads to a model which is immune 
to disruption, a model which cannot conceive of the possibility of fundamental 
change to the existing social and significatory orders. At this point, Baudrillard’s 
attempt to be more radical than Marxism fails on the political level, it offers no 
grounds on which action to institute fundamental change to the current order of 
power relation. It is a powerful analytical model, but one which is as much as victim 
of its own totalising, its refusal to accept that any given socio-economic regime 
produces real and fundamental contradictions that are the very possibility of radical 
and irreversible change. In this sense, the criticisms that Baudrillard made of 
Foucault’s concept of power in Forget Foucault rebound on himself: his ‘mature’ 
theorising constructs a totality which cannot be disrupted that will always recuperate 
any disruptive praxis, and which has a fundamental stability which is at odds with 
the contradiction given nature of postmodern capitalism.
The limit of Baudrillard’s theorising is that it presents a powerful analytic 
depiction of contemporary society which is carceral in nature: there is no place for 
reverse discourse, no place for contestation within the schema of simulacra. This
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totalising tendency weakens Baudrillard’s work by not allowing it to give a proper 
account of how social classes and groups often contest the prevailing social order 
and its regime of signification. In contrast, Dick Hebdige’s work reveals the 
disruptive potential of subcultures and the limits to their capacity to produce a 
fundamental challenge to the prevailing significatory order. Hebdige’s treatment of 
punk is illuminating in that it shows that social and significatory givens can be 
contested, that the bricolage of contemporary fashion is defined by a relation to that 
which is ‘non-fashion’, the other of fashion, and that this process is constitutive of 
social identities. Angela McRobbie’s essay The Role of the Ragmarket in the 
collection Postmodernism and Popular Culture indicates that ‘fashion’ is itself not 
homogeneous, but an arena of conflict informed by notions of taste, propriety and 
the values of a given society. She identifies the 1960s and early 1970s ‘counter­
culture’ as that which promoted the ‘recycling’ of the detritus of haberdashery and 
accessories:
“Military uniforms were first found along side the overalls and great-coats in 
army surplus stores and on second-hand rails of shops such as ‘Granny 
Takes a Trip’, in the King’s Road. Metal-rimmed glasses added a further 
element to that theme in the counter-culture suggesting an interest in the old, 
the used, the overtly cheap and apparently unstlylish.” [McRobbie 1994, pg 
137]
McRobbie notes Stewart Hall’s comments that this movement away from fashion as 
style, as the ‘new’, and a consequent ‘recycling’ of objects which were once 
unwelcome signs of deprivation, as both “an identification with the poor” and “a 
disavowal of conventional middle-class smartness” [cited in McRobbie 1004, 
pg 137]. it was a moment in which ‘fashion’ became a ‘recycling’ of signs, a 
‘recycling’ which was not that described by Baudrillard, but a ‘re-writing’ of the
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meaning of objects. The semiotic value of a military great-coat on a ‘hippie’ is 
entirely different to its meaning when it was first issued and worn by service 
personnel. The great coat becomes a paradigm in a new syntagm, a syntagm 
which connotes the rejection of the values of smartness, orderliness and imposed 
discipline that were its original meaning. In this instance, fashion is a game of 
bricolage in which items are combined in a manner that is at odds with the 
conventional dress code.
This creation of a social, and therefore a personal identity, does not have to be 
one of violent contestation, an attempt to shock, as McRobbie rightly states. It can 
also be an attempt to find something which is regarded as ‘authentic’ in the sense 
that Baudrillard sees the peasant’s table as being authentic. This is an attempt to 
recuperate use value along the lines suggested by Susan Willis, an attempt to find 
an object which is the locus of non-reified human relations, an object which stands 
in some way outside of commodity capitalism:
“For the generation whose memories had not been blunted altogether by the 
dizzy rise of post-war consumerism, markets for old clothes and jumble sales 
in the 1960s remained a terrifying reminder of the stigma of poverty, the 
shame of ill-fitting clothing, and the fear of disease through infestation, rather 
like buying a second-hand bed.
Hippy preferences for old coats, crepe dresses and army great-coats, 
shocked the older generation precisely for this reason. But they were not 
acquired merely for shock value. Those items favoured by the hippies 
reflected an interest in pure, natural and authentic fabrics and a repudiation 
of the man-made synthetic materials found in high street fashion. The pieces
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of clothing sought out by hippy girls tended to be antique lace petticoats, 
pure silk blouses, crepe dresses, velvet skirts and pure wool 1940s-styled 
coats. In each case, these conjured up a time when the old craft values 
prevailed and when one person saw through his or her production from start 
to finish.” [McRobbie 1994, pg 143]
In this instance, fashion is an attempt to move away from the commodity form to 
consumption of objects that have little or no exchange value when compared to 
high-street fashion items, but which retain their use-value. Fashion here is not 
simply a combinatory of sign-objects, but a moment in which the very meaning of 
consumer capitalist is contested by an attempt to re-appropriate use value by the 
‘recycling’ of old and hitherto unwanted clothing. This indicates that fashion is not a 
single, continuous combinatory of signs but a arena of conflicting codes and 
discourses, a shifting locus which is informed by human praxis. This is not to say 
that fashion is inherently revolutionary, but a reminder that fashion is itself 
fashioned from production, from praxis, and as such cannot be regarded as a total 
and stable combinatory. However, the processes of recuperation through which the 
semiotically disruptive appearance of hippies or punks is reduced to the ‘hippy-look’ 
or the ‘punk-look’ should not be forgotten, fashion as a mechanism of consumer 
capitalism can also seek to recuperate previously outmoded styles, as Baudrillard 
notes. Here the irruption of punk becomes reduced to a sign-form, a simulation, 
something that can be used and discarded, and which does not reflect any social 
identity other than that of a consumer.
Baudrillard’s theorising on fashion’s weakness in that it denies a ground for the 
contestation of established orders implies its strength, that of an awareness of the 
recuperative power of postmodern capitalism. Any sign, any image, no matter how
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subversive it may once have been, can be recuperated as a commodity, that 
compound of economic exchange value and sign exchange value. Baudrillard’s 
work is a stark reminder of the way in which any event can be co-opted as a 
paradigm in the syntagm of fashion, that it can be reduced to a moment in the 
general circulation of capitalist exchange. The recuperative power of capitalism, its 
ideological ability to de-radicalise once potent signs and diffuse them through our 
culture remains one of its central bulwarks, a mechanism for the domestication for 
any cultural phenomena that threatens the prevailing social and cultural order. 
Baudrillard’s theory of fashion as a combinatory of simulacra provides an excellent 
account of the ‘imperialism’ of fashion, an ‘imperialism’ that reflects the impulse of 
capitalism to annex every area of our conscious and unconscious lives to its pursuit 
of capital accumulation. The combinatory of fashion is one in which sign exchange 
value and economic exchange value are privileged over and above use value, 
which is displaced as fashion accelerates “obsolescence of desirability” by both 
cancelling the old, the existing, by means of introducing the new, and by recycling 
the elements of the combinatory so that what was once obsolescent is recast as the 
‘new’, or rather as a sign of the new. Despite the power of this analysis, and its 
obvious usefulness in supporting critiques of consumer capitalism, it concentrates 
too much on fashion as a structural system, and therefore, does not have give a 
sense that, unlike Hebdige and McRobbie, Baudrillard is concerned with the people 
who have to negotiate the combinatory of fashion. His later writings convey no 
sense of how human subjects are constructed and positioned, how they are 
produced, by the structures of wider capitalist society, and how fashion relates to 
the ongoing production of human beings as workers and/or consumers. The 
detailed analysis of consumerism that was the raison d’etre of The System of 
Objects and The Consumer Society has been lost to a theorising which seems
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more intent on producing theoretical structures rather than trying to comprehend 
the quotidian experiences of consumer that mark our era. Baudrillard in the course 
of his work on fashion has produced a suggestive account of the combinatory of 
fashion and the effect of third order of simulacra in that domain, but he has become 
unwilling to get ‘his hands dirty’ by looking at how fashion is appropriated and 
consumed, how it plays a role in constituting subjects, and how it therefore retains 
the capacity to be a site of cultural conflict.
The ultimate failure of Baudrillard’s project is highlighted by his work on 
fashion. Starting out from the impulse to reinvent political radicalism that 
characterised the 1960s and early 1970s period in France, Baudrillard attempted to 
create an analysis of consumer capitalism which was based on the idea that 
commodities were not simply bifurcated between use value and exchange value, 
but that they were also their sign exchange value, their value as signifieds which 
could culturally appropriated and consumed, This project identified a weakness in 
the orthodox Marxist conception of the commodity, a conception which did not 
properly account for the commodity as a sign-form. Although Marxists such as 
Susan Willis and Judith Williamson have developed impressive accounts of the 
semiotics of the commodity form, and in Willis’ case have argued that the semiotics 
of the commodity are integral to its status as a commodity, much Marxist theory has 
not appreciated the fundamental importance of signification to the development of 
commodity in late capitalism. Baudrillard’s attempt to recast the critique of the 
commodity form as a critique of semiotics, a critique of its reduction of meaning to 
an ambiguous exchange between the sign and referent, signifier and signified, was 
a bold and note worthy attempt to demonstrate that commodity capitalism is about 
signification, and that as a mode of production it is dependent on signification and
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sign exchange. Unfortunately, Baudrillard’s predilection for constructing abstract 
theoretical structures has meant that the genuine radical impulse in his work is 
checked by its inability to suggest any way of transcending or even contesting the 
current social order. His work contains nothing that indicates any way forward for 
the inhabitants of the third order of simulacra, it is survey of the ruins of the world of 
referents, an implicit elegy for the real as the ultimate source of meaning and 
guarantor of signification. Baudrillard remains a radical, but his is a radicalism 
without hope. His radicalism is manifest in his relentless reduction of all social and 
cultural phenomena to its structural elements, to its code. Baudrillard, although 
usually described as very much a postmodernist, is actually a through-going 
structuralist, systematically developing universal structures which are supposed to 
account for the entire range of human social and cultural activity. His work is in that 
sense far more reductionist than that of the most orthodox Marxist. While an 
orthodox Marxist will reduce all superstructural social activity to an expression of an 
event in the economic base, Baudrillard reduces all social and cultural phenomena 
to the reproduction of simulation; and whereas, following Althusser, Marxism has 
developed conceptions of the relative autonomy of the superstructure, Baudrillard 
does not ultimately regard any area of society or culture as being relatively free of 
the generating and determining code. In this sense, Baudrillard is closer to pre- 
Althusserian base-superstructure Marxism than both his opponents and supporters 
have assumed, his theoretical world is governed by a rigorous structuralism which 
belies his the post-structuralist and postmodernist appearance of his work.
In the light of the comments made in the preceding paragraphs, it is perfectly 
reasonable to ask what value there is in Baudrillard’s work. The next chapter will 
seek to conclude this thesis by arguing that Baudrillard should read in the way that
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he himself recommends reading Marx and Freud, that is against the grain. 
Baudrillard argues in Symbolic Exchange and Death that the residual value of Marx 
and Freud is only found when they are pitted against themselves, when the 
conceptual apparatus of their work is turned on itself. Following this, the conclusion 
will argue that there is much in Baudrillard’s work which is of value, and that can 
inform critical theory, but that for this to be appreciated Baudrillard must be set 
against Baudrillard. Finally it will argue that Baudrillard’s work when read against 
itself, provides an outline sketch of a theoretical conception of the relation of 
signification and economics that that has great potential for development within 
Marxist theory.
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Conclusion: Baudrillard Contra Baudrillard
In the Preface to Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard contends that it is now 
necessary to go beyond the theoretical horizons of Marxism, psychoanalysis and 
semiotics. He attempts this by setting the fundamental terms of key authors in 
these disciplines against themselves. Such a reading would concentrate on the 
'subversive elements' within the theoretical edifices of psychoanalysis, ethnology 
and semiotics:
"Indeed we must switch the targets of each of these three theories, and turn 
Mauss against Mauss, Saussure against Saussure and Freud against Freud. 
The principle of reversibility (the counter-gift) must be imposed against all 
the economonistic, psychologistic and structuralist interpretations for which 
Mauss paved the way. The Saussure of the Anagrams must be set against 
Saussurian linguistics, against even his own restricted hypotheses 
concerning the anagram. The Freud of the death drive must be pitched 
against every previous psychoanalytic edifice, and even Feud's version of the 
death drive." [Baudrillard 1993 pgs 1-2]
This strategy can, and should, be applied to Baudrillard as well if his work is to 
overcome the aporia which it had reached in its theorisation of signification as a 
pure combinatory of signs divorced from real referents. To regain its effectiveness 
as a radical theory of the role of signification in postmodern capitalism, Baudrillard’s 
work has to be read against itself, against its own axiomatics. Baudrillard should be 
read contra Baudrillard. By this, it is meant that Baudrillard’s account of 
signification as simulation should be turned back on itself so that his work can be 
juxtaposed with a Marxist critique of capitalism. This would treat Baudrillard’s work 
in the sense that Susan Willis treated it, as an adjunct to a fundamentally Marxist
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critique of capitalism, rather than as a fully blown alternative to Marxism. Reading 
Baudrillard against himself is an attempt to re-situate Baudrillard as a critical 
theorist, one whose work can, and should, be read as alongside Marxist critiques of 
commodity exchange and the generation of meaning in a society governed by 
commodity exchange and capital accumulation. However, this should not be taken 
as implying that Baudrillard’s work can be made to be compatible with the tenets of 
Marxism, despite the neo-Marxism of his earliest publications. Baudrillard’s 
theorising, as we have seen, rejects the very ontological foundations of Marxist and 
neo-Marxist theory, and only a wilfully inadequate reading of Baudrillard’s work 
would support the argument that it can be annexed outright to Marxist and neo- 
Marxist critical theory. Baudrillard’s later work remains outside the Marxist tradition, 
but this does not mean that Marxists can only react by denouncing Baudrillard as 
an apostate and/or postmodern nihilist. There is too much that is insightful and 
compelling in Baudrillard’s work for it to be simply dismissed. Marxists need to 
confront Baudrillard’s symbolic challenge by ‘working through’ his theories, and 
continue or begin a debate with his theorising and its grasp (despite the 
accompanying hyperbole) of the importance of simulation to postmodern capitalism.
As a way of expanding these arguments, let us review the development of 
Baudrillard's theoretical engagement with signification and political economy as it 
moves from a neo-Marxist critique of commodity consumption to a non-dialectical 
theoretical assault on capitalism as a code governing all forms of social meaning.
In putting forward this position, Baudrillard invokes ‘symbolic exchange’ as the 
‘other’ to capitalist commodity exchange. Baudrillard's move away from neo- 
Marxism towards what is perhaps best described as a postsructuralist radicalism is 
outlined in Chapter One of this thesis. For Baudrillard, the commodity is always a
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sign with a sign value that equates to economic use value and a sign-exchange 
value that is analogous to economic exchange value. The commodity, as has been 
demonstrated by the Marxist writer Susan Willis, is therefore always already a sign 
form. A commodity is, as Willis shows, dependent on signification; it is only a 
commodity if it can be semiotically distinguished from its generic grouping. 
Baudrillard's insistence that capitalism is both a mode of production and a mode of 
signification is an advance on the reductionist forms of Marxism because it 
recognises that signification is not secondary to the 'economic' base of production, 
and that it is an essential element within any social formation. For Baudrillard, the 
sign is capital's accomplice: its lack of ambiguity, its reduction of the scope of 
meaning by tying a given signifier to a given signified, and its consequent exclusion 
of any meanings that are not part of that privileged relationship, reduce the scope of 
social meaning to the horizon of capitalist commodity exchange. The condition that 
Baudrillard describes is one in which reification has intensified to the point that the 
structure of the commodity form is the very structure of semiotic exchange under 
capitalism. Baudrillard reaches this position because he argues that the 'real' as 
referent is an effect of the signifier rather than its ontological ground, and that the 
structure governing this process imposes its meaning and 're-models' the real 
according to its terms. For Baudrillard, postmodern capitalism is determined by its 
structures of signification. In taking this position, Baudrillard issues a fundamental 
challenge to the ontological tenets of orthodox Marxism, a challenge that rests on 
the conception of the sign as being constitutive of the 'real' rather than a mere 
refection of the real.
However, Baudrillard’s idea that capitalism remodels reality echoes the Marxist 
view that modes of production, reproduction and exchange transform what is
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socially accepted as the real. His view that nineteenth century capitalism displaced 
the pre-industrial semiurgy of original and copy for one in which objects signified the 
abstract forces that were harnessed in their production. Using Baudrillard, it 
becomes possible to trace the way in which capitalism leads to ontological 
transformations, the metamorphosis of what we take to be the reality on which our 
lives as conscious social beings is grounded. Baudrillard’s work graphically 
illustrates how the ‘real’, which is so often presented as a simple given, is in fact a 
construction, something that has never been natural but is an effect of the mode of 
production and signification. This is a corrective to the ontological essentialism that 
can permeate orthodox Marxist thinking, a corrective which is a stark reminder of 
the power of capital to remodel the very tenets of the real. Read in this way, 
Baudrillard’s view of the third order of simulation as a combinatory of signs without 
real referents is a powerful but flawed depiction of postmodern capitalism, a 
capitalism that has no more use for the real but reproduces itself through the 
aleatory play of simulacra. Baudrillard’s characterisation of a capitalist ontological 
order which consists of ungrounded signs captures the way in which signs such as 
those deployed by corporations such as Nike and Reebok have displaced the real 
commodities manufactured by those companies and are sought after for their 
significatory value alone. Although Baudrillard can be criticised for not reminding 
his readership of the social relations of production that appertain to the production 
of Nike and other branded goods, his silence about this is a perhaps unintentional 
reminder that the postmodern semiurgy has no place in its simulated reality for the 
actual conditions under which signs are produced. In postmodern capitalism the 
ideological occlusion of actual conditions and social relations of production is 
complete to a hitherto unimaginable degree.
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The concept of the real as being historically constituted by significatory 
structures implies that, for Baudrillard, signification is the key area for political 
intervention. His notion of symbolic exchange can therefore be seen as an attempt 
to develop a form of political intervention in a society that is ultimately governed by 
codes of signification. However, although Baudrillard's notion of symbolic exchange 
is suggestive as a contestational political practice, it remains too ill defined and 
divorced from the key social loci of production for it to be the basis of an effective 
anti-capitalist politics. As Baudrillard moved away form any his earlier Marxist 
affiliations towards an alternative leftism, his writing demonstrates a new animus 
towards what he presents as an undifferentiated and homogenous Marxism, a de- 
historicised Marxism which provides him with an easy critical target. Baudrillard’s 
depiction of Marxism is itself a simulation informed by his theoretical model, taking 
no account of the diversity and continuing vitality of the Marxist tradition. The 
notion of ‘symbolic exchange’ could offer a valuable means of theorising the 
importance of the cultural, non-economic aspects of class antagonism if it was 
better defined as a practice in which prevailing values and the symbolic order of late 
capitalism are challenged. Baudrillard’s suggestive but skeletal notion may well be 
fleshed out by being used to support case studies of actual political and industrial 
conflict in order to show how these conflicts have an important symbolic dimension 
that cannot be properly ignored or reduced to a reflection of an underlying 
‘economic reality’ but is actually constitutive of social meaning.
Baudrillard's antipathy towards Marxism is most marked in The Mirror of 
Production where he argues that Marx and subsequent Marxist theorists have 
produced nothing other than a 'mirror' of capitalist production and exchange. 
Baudrillard's attack on what he regards as Marxism's conceptual conservatism,
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reflects his estimation of its political conservatism. His 'solution' to what he regards 
as the inherent problems of Marxism is to continue to valorise signification as a 
privileged social category. This has resulted in Baudrillard adopting the materialist 
position, described in Chapter Two, that is very easily mistaken for an idealist one. 
The materialism that Baudrillard advocates is not based on any notion of a reality 
anterior to signification, but one which regards signifying structures as objective, 
material entities capable of determining social and cultural conditions. Baudrillard's 
materialism is one based on shifting the conceptual locus of materialism from 
'primary', quotidian matter to what for him is the objective actuality of abstract 
structures, the structures that generate all forms of communications and social 
exchange. Baudrillard's genealogy of simulacra offers a suggestive account of the 
historical relations between political economy and signification when his peculiar 
version of materialism is borne in mind. The chapter demonstrates how 
Baudrillard’s genealogy of simulacra can be applied to the conservation work and 
the growing heritage industry, using an example from East Lancashire. It argues 
that this industry is a third order simulacra, a simulation of working life in the waving 
and spinning mills of East Lancashire governed by the heritage industry’s model of 
the history of the cotton industry in Lancashire. The actuality of the past does not 
intrude into this simulation, rather it displaces the way in which the people who 
worked in the mills coped with what was dangerous and unpleasant work. An entire 
history is displaced in favour of a simulation which is the mechanism by which a 
collective historical experience is converted into a commodified form.
Chapter Three of this thesis seeks to make Baudrillard’s genealogy of 
simulacra more concrete by using Baudrillard’s treatment of fashion in his earlier 
and mature works as a case study for a critical assessment of Baudrillard’s concept
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of simulation as a vast combinatory of signs that have no referents other than their 
generating models. The chapter looked at how Baudrillard developed a notion of 
fashion as a social ‘driving force’ for consumption, a conception of fashion in which 
new commodities displaced the old by virtue of their being ‘in’ fashion rather than 
‘out’ of fashion. This notion of fashion as a linear process in which new fashion 
objects displaced exisiting objects is illustrated by Baudrillard’s examples of the way 
in which demand for new cars was stimulated by constant changes to their 
appearance, so that one year’s model was eclipsed by a new, redesigned model 
which became the ‘fashionable’ form of the car. Here Baudrillard presents the 
model as that which is the transcendent essence of the series, it is the pure form of 
each particular car in a production run, and that which is consumed when any 
particular car in a production run is purchased. However, this simple concept gave 
way in Baudrillard’s second book The Consumer Society to a concept of fashion as 
a recycling of elements in which objects which were once ‘out’ of fashion are 
recycled as fashionable. This notion of recycling is the point of departure for 
Baudrillard’s notion of fashion (and, by extension, all other sign systems) as a form 
of combinatory, a vast ‘recycling’ of signs which have no referents in the ‘real’ world 
but which are entirely derived from the models that inform the combinatories of 
simulacra.
Baudrillard’s conception of fashion as a combinatory of simulated signs is a 
carceral order of signification, a combinatory which has displaced any sense of the 
world beyond signification and which has substituted itself as a hyperreal parody of 
what was taken as the real world. This account of signification within postmodern 
capitalism is open to attack on the grounds that it eradicates any sense of human 
agency, any sense that there is a praxis which can challenge the aleatory
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reproduction of signs. This perfect combinatory is an aporia, a theoretical dead 
end. Baudrillard’s notion of the sign as that which has eradicated its referent does 
not offer any possibility of constructing an alternative to the social conditions of 
postmodern capital. His attempts to be more radical than the Marxist tradition 
ultimately lead him to a position of pessimistic political queitism. However, as has 
been stated earlier, Baudrillard’s own conception of simulation can be re- 
appropriated as an adjunct to a more robust radicalism. A radicalism in which the 
social meaning, the symbolic aspect, of political struggles are not relegated to a 
subsidiary role, but are accepted as a key form of ideological and therefore political 
struggle, the contestation of the given social meanings of late capitalism.
The point of departure for this reading of Baudrillard is his notion of a 
simulacrum or simulation, words which denote, for English readers, that which is a 
replica, a reproduction, a clone, a copy, a counterfeit, a duplicate, a facsimile, an 
image or an imitation.4 All these terms imply a process in which an original is 
reproduced, and a moment of production in which an object’s likeness is copied by 
another thing. Simulacra are therefore not simply a copy but that which has been 
made into a copy or reproduction of something else. In putting forward his theory of 
simulation, Baudrillard does not address the fact that all forms of simulation are the 
result of some form of production. This means that simulacra are dependent on 
both the technics of production and the given social relations of production for their 
existence, they are determined by the way in which they have been produced. 
Baudrillard’s genealogy of simulacra acknowledges this in respect of the first and 
second orders of simulacra, but it presents the third order of simulacra as one in 
which production has been ousted by reproduction. This view of the modern or
4 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1973 Edition) defines the word ‘simulacrum’ as “a
material image” or a representation of some thing that is not the simulacrum itself.
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postmodern semiurgy refuses to acknowledge that all production has both an 
economic and a significatory dimension as Baudrillard himself demonstrated in For 
a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. All production is therefore the 
production of signs, the creation of objects that signify a social meaning. The 
French ultra-leftist author Jean Barrot describes this in the following terms in his 
essay Ideology and the Wage System:
"Now, human activity does not produce only goods and relationships, but 
also representations. Man is not homo faber; the reduction of human life to 
the economy (since taken up by official Marxism) dates from the 
enthronement of capital. All activity is symbolic: it creates, at one and the 
same time, products and a vision of the world." [Ed. Home 1996, pg 24]
The genesis of the simulation both as a product, an economic artefact, and as a 
sign is in the fact of its production. Baudrillard’s genealogy of simulacra can be 
read as a genealogy of the significatory aspects and the ontological effects of 
different modes of production since the Renaissance period. This reading of 
Baudrillard means that the genealogy of simulacra reads as a genealogy of the 
technics of production and the social relations of production.
The first order of simulacra is determined by a technology that has a limited 
capacity for serial production and by social relations that still placed tight restrictions 
on the circulation of signs between social classes. In this context, products would 
be far more restricted in number and be regarded, as Baudrillard states, as copies 
or counterfeits, each one being a particular counterfeit of a particular original. 
Baudrillard anticipates his analysis of the effects the technological and social 
restrictions on the production and circulation of signs in the early modern period 
when he analyses the different significatory roles of a peasant’s farmhouse table
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and a ‘Louis XV’ table in The System of Objects:
“Today a farmhouse table has cultural value, but just thirty years ago its sole 
value arose from the purpose it served. In the eighteenth century there was 
simply no relationship between a ‘Louis XV” table and a peasant’s table: 
there was an unbridgeable gulf between the two types of object, just as there 
was between the two corresponding social classes. No single cultural 
system embraced them both.” [Baudrillard 1996, pgs 137 -138]
The farmhouse table’s meaning is its use value, it signifies only its functions as a 
table, while the decorations of a ‘Louis XV’ table ‘counterfeit’ and improve on the 
curves and planes of nature. Both tables signify their place in a hierarchical society 
but both do so as a result of acts of production, each gains its social meaning from 
being manufactured as a certain sort of object rather than by embodying a natural, 
God-given order of meaning. For Baudrillard, therefore, the key difference between 
the significatory order of the Mediaeval period and the early and later modern 
periods is the fact that sign values are produced rather than given. This means 
that, for Baudrillard, the Mediaeval social ‘policing’ of signs to restrict their 
circulation and meaning tends to give way in the late 18th and 19th centuries to a 
technological determination of the meaning of signs. The aetiology of the modern 
sign is therefore to be located in production, whether that production is technically 
restricted and ‘auratic’ as in the first order of simulacra or whether it is dependent 
on serial production as in the second order of simulacra.
For Baudrillard, the second order of simulacra is, as we have seen, the 
apotheosis of political economy, the era when the forces of production displace the 
‘natural’ referent by the sheer volume of serial production. The 18th and 19th 
centuries saw a massive rise in the productive capacity of Western Europe and
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North America, this means that more objects were being produced and circulated 
as both products and signs. The significatory capacity of these products was, 
according to Baudrillard, much inferior to that of the products of the early modern 
period in that they did not signify a ‘natural’ referent but only the conditions of their 
own production. This order of simulacra is revolutionary in that it greatly extended 
the scope of productive, and therefore significatory, forces. Baudrillard, however, 
as we saw in Chapter Two, attempts to down play the importance of this 
fundamental revolution:
We must ask ourselves whether production is not rather an intervention, a 
particular phase, in the order of signs - whether it is basically only one 
episode in the line of simulacra, that episode of producing an infinite series 
of potentially identical beings (object-signs) by means of technics." 
[Baudrillard 1993, pg 55 - all italics the author's]
Baudrillard is right in stating that this is one episode in the order of signs, a moment 
within a general economy of signification, but it is a moment which is only possible 
because of a vast expansion of the forces of production and a corresponding 
change in the social relations of production. It is the start not only of serial 
production but serial signification the production of identical signs that still convey 
social meanings in their very sameness. This order of signification has perhaps 
been best analysed by Walter Benjamin who clearly saw that this order of 
production greatly expanded the range and forms of signification. Benjamin also 
did not regard this expansion of productive capacity as something that went beyond 
the limits of production, and therefore production remained the privileged social and 
cultural category in his writings. Baudrillard, too, can be seen as identifying, 
although not celebrating, capitalist forms of mass commodity production as the 
moment in which signification was changed utterly, a change which is still affecting
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us at the very beginnings of the 21st century. In attempting to elevate signification 
over and above economic production, Baudrillard actually re-emphasises the 
importance of treating capitalist modes of production as both economic and 
significatory, as both the creation of commodities which function as signs, 
conveyors of social meaning. However, this should not distract us from how his 
relegation of the second order of simulacra to an intermediary role, a ‘moment’, 
between the key first and third orders of simulacra , leads to Baudrillard not 
grasping the impact of mass production and the new social relations of production 
and consumption of commodity/signs that it engendered. As Willis has 
demonstrated, the mass produced commodity is profoundly dependent on 
signification to define itself as a particular, individual commodity over and against its 
generic grouping; the mass produced commodity is dependent as a form on its 
capacity to signify itself as a commodity rather than as just another object among 
others. The era of mass production and its mode of commodity signification, as 
described by Willis, co-exists with the third order of simulacra’s electronic 
reproduction of ungrounded signs but does so on the basis of mass production.
The electronic media that allow the reproduction of signs without original referents 
are themselves mass produced commodities and circulate as such, despite 
Baudrillard attempts to substitute the domain of exchange relations, the circulation 
of signs, for the realm of material production which, as David Harvey has shown, 
informs the role and function of signification in postmodern capitalist society despite 
the increasingly phantasmagoric and uncanny nature of its semiurgy
Baudrillard argues that in the third order of simulacra, we enter a combinatory 
of signs that are ontologically divorced from any referent except their models. His 
vision of this significatory order is one in which all signs are reproduced from their
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models, and each sign incessantly reproduces the nature of its generative model. 
Human beings become the terminals for a vast semiurgy, a combinatory of signs 
that cannot be challenged because they have no origins in discrete acts of 
production, but are instead the result of constant reproduction of simulation models. 
This state of affairs cannot be challenged if Baudrillard’s own axiomatics are 
accepted, but if the third order of simulacra is read as an order based on production 
then it becomes possible to identify a point in the system which is vulnerable to 
political action. This point is the production of the signs that comprise the 
postmodern semiurgy, these signs are produced, manufactured by people using 
specific technologies and working within given social relations of production. These 
relations are maintained with a view to producing goods so that they can be 
exchanged in order to extract and accumulate profits from their consumption. What 
Baudrillard calls “the law of capital” [Baudrillard 1983, pg 101] has not given 
way to “the structural law of value” [Baudrillard 1983, pg 101], capital has 
merely found a new area to exploit. Images, whether on film, television or video, 
are commodities, they are as much commodities, products, as they are pure 
signifiers divorced from any prior referent. In this situation, capitalism is still 
vulnerable to organised labour and its implicit threat to the continuity of production. 
Although Baudrillard does not seem to realise it, capitalism is very much aware that 
organised labour is a threat to its ability to maximise profits no matter what the 
human cost, and its functionaries and apologists have spent many years in trying to 
undermine and curb the power of the labour movement in both Western Europe 
and North America. Perhaps the biggest reversal of Baudrillard’s position comes 
with the realisation that it is this, not Baudrillard’s abstract form of ‘symbolic 
exchange’, that most threatens capitalism as both an economic order and a 
significatory order. In this sense, the activities of ordinary trade unionists have a far
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greater impact on the conjuncture that we are currently facing than Baudrillard’s 
theorising.
Baudrillard’s work has its flaws and it is hoped that these have been made 
apparent in the course of the proceeding chapters and this conclusion. However, I 
would suggest in conclusion, that Baudrillard’s work, if read in the light of the 
proceeding paragraphs, offers a very useful insight into how capitalism welds base 
and superstructure together in the very processes of commodity production, 
exchange and consumption. It moves beyond, and invites Marxists and others, to 
use in moving away from the reductionist tenets of economism towards a 
realisation that the economic and signification can only be separated as a result of 
what Christopher Chase-Dunn dubs “the needs of academic disciplines to 
maintain their boundaries” [Chase-Dunn 1989, pg 113] or as an analytical 
convenience. Like the signifier and the signified, the economic and the significatory 
can only be separated in theory, in practice they are inseparable, the one giving 
form to another. If critically reading Jean Baudrillard instils one lesson, it is that 
there is no mode of production or reproduction that is not also a mode of 
signification, and that there is also no mode of signification that is not at the same 
time a mode of production or reproduction. Everything that is produced signifies 
and signification is the production of social meanings, the creation of a meaningful 
world from contingent matter. The flaws in Baudrillard’s work must be addressed 
and it is important not to follow him towards replacing economistic reductionism with 
a significatory reductionism. It is also important to realise that while Baudrillard 
cannot be assimilated into the Marxist critical tradition, it is an important stimulant 
and irritant, a body of work which is suggestive of a new way of conceiving the 
relation of signification and production as well as an insight into the ontological
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impact of regimes of signification/production.. It remains to be seen if the implicit 
challenge within Baudrillard’s work is taken up by Marxists and other critical 
theorists and whether the results prove to be a critique of postmodern capital that is 
not content with simply interpreting the world, but which also accepts Marx’s 
injunction that “the point is to change it” [Marx and Engels 1970, pg 123 - 
authors’ italics].
Beyond all the hype, Baudrillard’s work sketches a conception of the world in 
which the economic and significatory are seamless is an important advance on 
attempts to conceive the world as an economic base and a socio-cultural 
substructure because it avoids the trap of ecomonistic reductionism. If the trap of 
semiotic reductionism that ensnared Baudrillard can be avoided, this way of 
conceptualisng the world should prove fruitful for those who are interested in the 
way that human beings produce their world and the conditions under which they 
produce that world. Baudrillard’s work will remain important because it shows a 
way of thinking about signification without trying to make it secondary to economic 
practices, and although the faults in his work cannot be ignored, he deserves an 
audience in the coming century and beyond if only because of his attempt to think 
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